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Emotional reactions are a critical element in the motivation to help others. For 
the purpose of the current research, these reactions are broadly conceptualized as focused 
either on the self or on other human beings. Self-focused affect (e.g., anticipated regret) 
motivates helping through the reduction of an unpleasant emotional state, whereas other­
focused affect (e.g., sympathy) motivates helping due to concern for the victim. 
This dissertation investigates the role of affective vs. deliberative infonnation 
processing in the genesis and use of emotional reactions in decisions to provide financial 
aid to people in distress. In five studies, a model of affective vs. deliberative infonnation 
processing is examined within the domain ofprosocial behavior. Three main hypotheses 
investigated whether infonnation processing mode influenced participants' donations, 
v 
affective reactions, and the relationship between affective reactions and donations. 
Processing mode was manipulated by a cognitive load paradigm, a priming procedure, 
the number and identifiability of victims, serial vs. single presentations, and the addition 
of background statistics related to the victim's situation. Furthermore, participants' 
ability to visually focus on a single target presented with and without distractor victims 
was investigated as part of an attentional mechanism that generates affective responses. 
The results supported a model in which deliberative processing has potentially disruptive 
effects on the generation of other-focused affect and on the extent to which these types of 
emotions predicted donations. The importance of other-focused affect in donation 
decisions was augmented by reducing deliberative capacity, priming affective 
processing, and increasing the affective salience ofvictims by identifying them. The 
influence of self-focused affect on donations was robust to changes in information 
processing mode and appeared to be governed by different mechanisms than other­
focused affect. Humanitarian aid organizations should be sensitive to these issues when 
eliciting donations from potential donors. Implications and future research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
At times, people are unmoved by tragedies such as genocide or mass murder and 
fail to actively engage in behavior that ameliorates the suffering ofothers. Yet other 
times when witnessing the suffering of an individual we often care enough to go to great 
lengths to provide aid. The decision to help a single victim but not a faceless mass raises 
an important question: how can people be sensitive to the suffering of individuals yet 
also oblivious or unresponsive to the seriousness and scale ofmass tragedies? 
Recent psychological research on these disparate reactions to the suffering of 
others suggests that the way we process information influences the decision to help those 
in need (e.g., Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic, 2007, Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 
2007). At least some of the psychological factors that determine helping seem to revolve 
around how emotionally salient the victims are, which in tum depends, at least in part, on 
how these victims and their tragedies are presented to us. Helping others, and prosocial 
behavior in general, is thought to be robustly related to emotional reactions (e.g., Batson, 
1990), and victims who evoke stronger affective reactions might have a higher chance of 
being helped (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005a). In fact, apathetic responses to others in need 
could be a result ofus not meaningfully representing the victims' situation and suffering. 
Meaningful representations, in tum, seem to depend on our ability to emphasize and 
emotionally react to the distress ofothers. 
An important reason why calamities that cost large number ofpeople their lives 
sometimes evoke less of a helping response than an individual victim appears, in part, 
related to our inability to bring meaning to large numbers (e.g., Fetherstonhaugh et aI., 
1997; Slovic, 2007). While most people would probably agree that it is better to save 
many lives vs. just one, our affective reactions might speak a different language when 
these two situations are considered separately. For example, Kogut and Ritov (2005a) 
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show that a single life can evoke stronger affective reactions and be valued higher than 
several lives. The feelings we experience when confronted with the suffering of others 
and the ways emotions motivate us to provide help are not well understood and need 
further exploration. 
The relation between our affective responses and donations for victims in need, 
for example, is ofspecial interest to private aid foundations and non-profit charity 
organizations. If affective responses to victims are a core ingredient in helping, then 
organizations such as Save the Children, United Children's Fund, World Vision, and 
World Food Programme (to name just a few) need to be aware ofthe sometimes subtle 
ways in which emotions influence the decision to donate. Whether the charity serves 
starving children, homeless people displaced by war, people suffering and dying from 
AIDS, or any other charitable cause, the basic mechanisms of affect are important to 
understand. 
The experiments in this dissertation were designed to investigate how information 
about others in need ofhelp is processed, and to elucidate the psychological factors 
related to helping and the affective reactions that determine helping. Specifically, 
affective vs. deliberative information processing in decisions associated with donations 
were investigated. Before outlining the studies that were conducted to shed further light 
on these issues, relevant research related to the affective and deliberative determinants of 
helping will be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Considerable research addresses the question ofwhen affect determines people's 
decision to help others in distress. Specifically, research on affect, how it can motivate 
people to donate, mechanisms by which people determine the amount to donate, the 
relationship between attention and affect, and the role of deliberation in donations, will 
be the subject ofthe literature review. At the end ofthe review, results ofprior research 
on donations will be linked to a dual information processing model which is tested 
empirically in this dissertation. 
Affective Experience: Appraisal Theories and Dimensional Structure ofEmotions 
Before addressing the motivational aspects of feelings, this section will present a 
selective review of research on the subjective experience ofaffect. Of specific interest 
for this dissertation is people's propensity to experience emotions related to helping 
others. Research on prosocial behavior has identified feelings like empathy (Batson, 
1990), sympathy, and compassion (Kogut & Ritov, 2005) that determine helping, and 
related affective reactions such as anticipated regret (Connolly & Butler, 2006; Connolly 
& Zeelenberg, 2002) that might also guide decision making in these contexts. 
Irrespective of the specific emotion (e.g., sympathy or regret), defining the 
subjective experience of an emotion is a "very thorny issue" (Izard, 1993, p.71), and 
considerable disagreement exists among researchers on how to best conceptualize and 
measure affect (Izard, 2007). According to Russell (2003) the initial question ofwhat an 
emotion truly is has not yet been adequately answered by researchers since first proposed 
by James (1890). Attempts to circumvent the definitional problem of the subjective 
experience of emotions have been made, including the decomposition ofemotions into 
response modes (e.g., experiential, behavioral, and physiological; Gross, 2002), core 
dimensions inherent to all emotions (e.g., activation and valence; Russell, 2003), and 
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causal antecedents that determine the nature of the emotional experience (e.g., cognitive 
appraisals; Lazarus, 1991). Influenced by contemporary research on cognitive 
mechanisms, Schachter and Singer (1962) proposed a model ofemotions that emphasizes 
the role of cognitive appraisal and attribution. Lazarus (1991) expanded on this model 
and asserted that all forms ofemotions are either mediated or generated by some form of 
cognitive processing (e.g., cognitive appraisal, attribution, and construal processes). 
Many cognitive theories of emotion maintain that subjective appraisals of 
situations are the major determinant for the type and flavor 0 f affective responses 
(reviewed in Izard, 2007; 1993). For example, Siemer, Mauss, and Gross (2007) state 
that appraisals are necessary and sufficient to produce different emotions and different 
intensities across individuals within the same situations. Consequently, the same 
situation can arouse different emotions across different individuals depending on how 
they cognitively interpret (i.e., appraise) and make sense of the information that they 
perceive. Siemer et al. (2007) identify four primary appraisal dimensions that influence 
the subjective experience ofemotions: 1. The judged importance of an event; 2. how 
likely the event is to happen; 3. who the responsible agent is; and 4. how able one is to 
control the emotion-arousing situation (p.592). According to cognitive theories of 
emotions, feelings such as regret and sympathy for others in need ofhelp are at least 
partly based on one's subjective appraisal ofthe situation. Whether one feels 
compassion, for example, might depend on how much responsibility is ascribed to the 
person in need. For example, Levin and Chapman (1990) found that people were more 
willing to ensure that acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) victim groups 
would receive help when they were not responsible for the contraction of the disease. 
A counterpoint to the importance of cognitive appraisal in the generation of affect 
is provided by research on the neurological basis of emotions (e.g., Damasio 1994: 
LeDoux 1996), which suggests that emotions can arise without extensive cognitive 
involvement. Izard (1993) proposes that emotions are activated by four different 
interactive mechanisms (e.g., non-cognitive and neural evaluations, as well as 
motivational processes), only one of which is related to cognitive appraisal. Siemer et al. 
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(2007) also mention that the causal chain leading to an emotion is "notoriously difficult 
to test" (p.593), and that whether cognitive appraisal precedes or completely replaces 
non-cognitive causes (such as pain or hunger) is not settled as ofyet. An example ofhow 
non-cognitive mechanisms can give rise to emotions is provided by the possible 
biological underpinnings of feelings related to helping. According to Batson (1990), 
feelings such as sympathy might be genetically informed emotional reactions (i.e., they 
are evolutionarily adaptive in helping kin). Similarly, decision making guided by a desire 
to avoid regret about a loss might also be biologically informed (Camerer, 2000; Hamo & 
Heitfetz,2002). Although it is not clear to what extend feelings like sympathy and regret 
are products of cognitive appraisal vs. non-cognitive mechanisms, it is likely that both 
types ofmechanisms play into the generation of these kinds of feelings (Izard, 2007; 
1993). Moreover, if sympathy and regret are distinct emotional experiences it is likely 
that the cognitive and non-cognitive mechanisms are different for each emotion. 
Another viewpoint on how to define and classify the subjective experience of 
feelings (such as sympathy and regret) focuses on decomposing these emotions into their 
basic dimensions (e.g., Mellers, 2000; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Russell, 
2003; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999; Viistfjiill & Garling, 
2002). Note that these models usually do not elaborate the mechanisms by which 
emotions are generated (i.e., cognitive appraisals), but define emotional experiences by 
their distinct characteristics. They identify underlying dimensions ofaffective reactions, 
but reach no consensus on how many dimensions are necessary to best describe an 
emotion (Reich, Zautra, & Davis, 2003). The seminal work ofOsgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum (1957) argues for three independent bipolar dimensions: evaluation, 
potency, and activation (EPA model)]. These components refer to the dimensions of 
pleasure/pain, ability/inability to influence a situation, and activity-passivity, 
respectively, and combine to form distinct emotions (Russell & Mehrabian, 1977). 
I Later models attempt to reduce the number of dimensions to two (Russell & Barrett, 1999; Tellegen, 
Watson, & Clark, 1999), or one dimension (Mellers, 2000; Slovic et aI, 2002). While two-dimensional 
models usually stress the importance ofvalence (positive / negative) and activity (active / passive), one­
dimensional models focus on valence only. 
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According to the EPA model, sympathy and regret are arguably best conceptualized on at 
least three core dimensions. In the context ofhelping, both sympathy and regret have a 
distinct negative valence (Batson, 1990; Connolly & Reb, 2005), and an activation level 
that gives rise to the motivation to provide help. Most importantly, these two types of 
emotions appear to differ on a third core dimension (potency), which is related to the 
ability to influence or control the emotion-arousing event. If one experiences regret after 
a decision (e.g., not helping others in need), one fust must be able to help (i.e., high 
degree ofpotency). 
According to this reasoning, a low degree ofpotency would result in lower regret, 
as low ability to provide aid precludes any decisions to provide help. On the other hand, 
feelings of sympathy do not require high potency, and can emerge regardless ofhow able 
one is to change the situation of those in need. In the specific case ofprosocial behavior, 
a further distinction ofemotions focused on regulating one's own emotional state vs. the 
wellbeing of someone else should be made (Batson, 1990). This distinction is based on 
the different affective focus (either on the selfor on others) and different underlying 
motivations to provide help. 
Motivational Aspects ofAffect 
Affect towards an object or person can represent a source ofmotivation for 
behavior (e.g., Izard, 1993; Mowrer, 1960; Peters, 2006). This seems to be the case for 
basic integral affect (i.e., the goodness and badness ofan object measured on the valence 
dimension) as well as for discrete emotions (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004). 
Objects that elicit positive affect are likely to signal tendencies to approach, while those 
that elicit negative affect are likely to be avoided (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999). Similarly, 
discrete emotions can also motivate behavioral tendencies, such as helping others in 
distress. 
The motivational aspects of feelings focused on the self and those that are focused 
on others have been linked to prosocial behavior in studies investigating determinants for 
altruism (Batson, 1990). Providing help to others in need can arise from selfish or 
selfless reasons. The scientific debate about the motivations to help other people 
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revolves around the question ofwhether we help others because we care about them or 
because we care primarily about ourselves? (Batson, 1990; Cialdini et aI., 1987, 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). One consistent determinant for helping seems to be the 
ability to feel empathy, defined as an "other-oriented emotional response congruent with 
the perceived welfare of another" (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005, p.l5; see also 
Batson 1991). These authors have investigated the role of empathy in helping and 
propose a model in which empathy acts as a mediator for prosocial behavior (Batson, 
1990,1987; Batson et aI., 1989; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). In several 
experiments investigating the "empathy-altruism hypothesis", they demonstrate that 
people can provide help from an empathic concern for a victim, while controlling for 
more selfish motivations to help (such as aversive-arousal reduction and empathy­
specific rewards or punishments2; Batson et aI., 1989, 1988). 
Empathic concern for others is usually a consequence ofvaluing the welfare of 
the person in need (Batson et aI., 2007), perspective taking (Batson et aI., 2003; Coke, 
Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Davis et aI., 2004), and perceptions of similarity (Cialdini et 
aI., 1997; Maner et aI., 2002). The role ofperceived similarity in motivating helping is 
disputed, however. While Batson et ai. (2005) found no empirical evidence of similarity 
affecting other-focused feelings or helping behavior, several researchers reported that 
people provided more help to an in-group than an out-group (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 
working paper; Ritov & Kogut, 2007), and Small (2007) found similar results with a 
minimal-group paradigm. 
Several determining factors ofhelping seem to revolve around the key issue of 
people's ability to empathize and "feel" for the victims3• However, while empathic 
2 Empathy-specific punishments are negative feelings (such as regret and guilt), that are experienced due to 
the failure to fulfill social obligations, while empathy-specific rewards are positive feelings about the self 
that result from helping and counter any negative affect that is experienced due to the (depressing) situation 
ofthe person in need (Batson, 1990). 
3 Other accounts for prosocial behavior exist, and focus primarily on an evolutionary explanation of 
helping. However, the key role of affect as a mechanism which motivates helping is not contrary to these 
accounts. In fact, emotional reactions such as sympathy are central to evolutionary explanations of 
prosocial behavior (VanVugt & VanLange, 2006). 
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concern about others is a key characteristic of feelings that are focused on the victims 
(Batson, 1990), it is not the sole potential motivator for helping. One competing 
explanation ofprosocial behavior focuses on the motivating aspects related to negative 
arousal ofthe self (Hoffinan, 1981). Exposure to the suffering of others usually evokes 
some form of negative arousal in the perceiver, which then motivates helping in order to 
feel better. Thus, providing help due to an aversive emotional state is generally seen as 
motivated by self-serving and self-focused feelings (Batson, 1990). An example ofthis is 
anticipated regret4 for not helping, or making oneself feel better by helping others. 
Research on anticipated regret suggests that a wide range of decisions can be influenced 
by the anticipation of"psychological pain" (Miller & Taylor, 2002; p. 371), including 
health-related decisions (Connolly & Reb,2005; 2003) and financial investments 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In order to feel anticipated regret, one has to mentally 
simulate the future and decide whether choosing one course ofaction leads to 
subjectively worse outcomes than others (Miller & Taylor, 2002; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2007). 
Janis and Mann (1977) outline four determinants for anticipated regret, which 
include choice options that do not clearly dominate each other, situations where the 
negative consequences ofa decision materialize sooner rather than later, when outcomes 
that are socially important (i.e., other people care about the outcomes as well), and 
situations in which the expected feedback from the rejected option can be obtained. 
Although anyone of these four determinants can be the reason for anticipated regret, in 
the specific case ofhelping others all of them can be present simultaneously. First, if the 
decision to help is not judged to be clearly superior to not helping, the decision maker is 
faced with a situation wherein either choice will leave him with regret for the non-chosen 
option. Second, the immediate negative consequences ofnot helping victims in need are 
4 Theorists disagree whether anticipated regret should be classified as an emotion or a mere cognitive 
prediction ofthe future resulting in "virtual" emotions (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; Frijda, 2004). This 
dissertation will side with Zeelenberg & Pieters (2007), as the "prospect of future regrets feeds into the 
present experience, and thus acquires the experiential qualities of any other emotion" (p. 9), even though it 
maybe cognitivelybased. 
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readily apparent and observable. Finally, cultural values often include some form of 
prosocial behavior (Malle & Dickert, 2007), and it is likely that others in one's 
environment care about the outcomes to some degree. lfthe potential helper is aware of 
anyone of these determinants, pre-decisional (Le., anticipated) regret is equivalent to an 
emotional barometer that forecasts feelings about the self in the context of the misery of 
others. This forecast ofa future emotional experience often informs current feelings 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) and, thus, motivates helping. 
Affect and Affect-Related Mechanisms a/the Construction a/Value 
Research on the construction ofvalues suggests that people do not exclusively 
retrieve their preferences and values from memory, but often construct their value for 
something on the spot (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Slovic, 1995). For example, Peters, 
Slovic, and Gregory (2003), found that positive and negative affect towards lottery tickets 
were predictive ofbuying and selling price, while results from Kogut & Ritov (2005a) 
indicate that affective reactions are related to donation amounts. Affective reactions to 
the victims (or perpetrators, as in Small & Loewenstein, 2005) can serve as infonnation 
about how much value is placed on helping. 
In a situation where financial donations are elicited for victims in need, people 
have to decide whether they should provide aid by donating as well as the amount of the 
donation. Affective reactions not only motivate people to help, but also inform them 
about how much value they place on the victim (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 
2007). Affective reactions, whether in the form of discrete emotions (e.g., sympathy or 
regret) or bipolar affect (positive vs. negative), are an important mechanism by which 
people construct their values (Peters, 2006; Schwartz and Clore, 2003). 
This affect-as-information hypothesis is advanced by several different lines of 
research, including neuroscience (Damasio, 1994), medical decision making (Peters, 
Dieckmann, Vastfjiill, Slovic, and Hibbard, in review), economic decision making and 
the endowment effect (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004, Peters, Slovic, & Gregory, 
2003), and risk perception (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Thus, when confronted with the possibility 
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of donating money to victims in need, it is likely that people will use cues from the 
situation and their affective responses as a source of information. 
Further evidence for the role of affect in the construction ofvalue comes from 
research on joint and separate evaluations. Hsee and colleagues (Hsee, 1998; 1996; Hsee 
& Hastie, 2006; Hsee & Zhang, 2004) suggest that affective reactions inform people's 
valuation ofobjects (and others) when these objects possess characteristics that are 
affectively meaningful and easy to evaluate. Thus, the value placed on an object relies on 
the degree to which it is affectively meaningful. For example, Hsee (1996) compared 
preferences for dictionaries that had either 10,000 entries and were like new, or had 
20,000 entries and a torn cover. Results showed that, when evaluated separately, 
participants preferred the dictionary with an easily evaluable, affect-rich characteristic 
(i.e., the condition of the book). However, when evaluated jointly, participants preferred 
the dictionary with the (arguably) more important characteristic of20,000 entries. Hsee 
(1996) argues that some characteristics are affect-rich and useful for preference 
judgments in isolation, whereas affect-poor characteristics are only used in judgments 
when they become affectively meaningful (i.e., through comparisons). 
The effects ofjoint vs. separate evaluation modes on decisions sheds light on 
how people make donations when confronted with a choice of either donating to one vs. 
several victims. It is possible that affective-rich information about an individual victim 
(e.g., how much sympathy it evokes) is used as a cue for donations when evaluated 
separately, but that other aspects of the victim gain in importance when making a 
donation for a single victim that is part of a group or for an entire group. In fact, Kogut 
and Ritov (2005b) found that a single victim received higher donations compared to a 
group ofvictims when evaluated separately, but found the reverse when the single victim 
was evaluated jointly with the group. When given a choice, participants donated to the 
group, not to the individual victim5• The practical importance ofjoint vs. separate 
5 The design used by Kogut & Ritov (2005b) does not address the possibility that this effect was the result 
ofnon-affective moral reasoning and the resulting moral demand effects. For example, when having to 
make a choice between helping one victim vs. a group it is hard to justify donating to a single victim. 
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evaluation modes is illustrated when considering that charity organizations, such as 'Save 
the Children', at times present victims in a joint-evaluation mode on their website 
(www.savethechildren.org) and ask for donations to one victim after giving donors the 
chance to browse through several candidates. This joint evaluation mode could 
potentially influence people's affective response as well as their willingness to contribute 
to the individual victim. For example, exposure to other victims might reduce attention 
to the victim that one donates money to, and also reduce affective reactions to it. 
Moreover, it is also possible that an increase in the total number ofvictims leads to more 
deliberative processing (e.g., Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 
2007). 
Mechanisms and Effects ofManipulating Affect in Donation Studies 
Victim number (i.e., changing the size ofthe victim group) and identifiability 
have been studied to examine how these manipulations influence cognitive and 
perceptual mechanisms involved in affective responses to victims. To explain the effect 
of changing the number ofvictims and their identifiability on people's affective 
responses, one needs to examine the roles ofattentional mechanisms, mental imagery, 
and perceptions ofgroup cohesiveness (i.e., entitativity). 
Affective Reactions to Identifiability and Victim Number Manipulations. Recent 
research on donations has focused on two seminal, interrelated effects6: changing the 
number ofvictims and identifiability ofthe victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; 
Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007, Slovic, 2007). Research on the effects ofchanges 
in victim number often compares people's donations to one vs. several victims (e.g., 
Kogut & Ritov, 2005 a, 2005b). Results suggest that, when evaluated separately, single 
victims often receive higher donations and elicit stronger affective reactions compared to 
groups ofvictims. This "singularity effect" seems to be evident even when the size ofthe 
group is quite large (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007) and also when it is as small as 
6 Loewenstein & Small (2007) propose several other determinants of a very specific emotional reaction 
(i.e., sympathy), including one's own personal state (e.g., ability to feel sympathy), past experiences, 
proximity, similarity, newness, and vividness. 
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two victims (Vastfjall et aI., in preparation). Small et aI. (2007) compared donations for a 
single identified victim to a much larger group ofstatistical victims (several millions). 
Their results suggest that a single identified victim receives higher donations than 
statistical victims. Moreover, adding statistics to the identified victim had the effect of 
reducing donations. While no apparent differences in participants' affect towards the 
single identified vs. statistical victims was found, affective reactions were more strongly 
correlated with donations for the single identified victim. This suggests that affect is 
related more closely to actual helping behavior when the victim is identified and the 
number ofvictims is small (Le., as small as it can be). 
Research on proportional reasoning supports the notion that victims are seen in 
contrast to their reference group. In particular, people are reluctant to help others when 
their donation is just a "drop in the bucket" (Fetherstonhaugh et aI., 1997). Seeing a 
victim as part ofa much bigger problem (as was the case in Experiment 3, Small, 
Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007) can produce this drop-in-the-bucket effect and reduce 
people's willingness to help. The effect is a direct consequence ofhow large the 
"bucket" is (Friedrich et aI., 1999), and it is likely that reduced willingness to help for 
larger buckets is a result ofpeople's diminished affective reactions (i.e., psychic 
numbing, Slovic, 2007) as well as lower perceived efficacy in helping a victim. It is of 
note that people exhibit insensitivity to changes in victim number (Le., psychophysical 
numbing) when the number grows large enough (Frederick & Fischhoff, 1998) regardless 
ofwhether the number ofvictims who can be saved remains constant and the size of the 
victim reference group increases (Fetherstonhaugh et aI., 1997), or when the proportional 
effect ofthe contribution is held constant (Le., when the percentage ofvictims changes 
proportionally to the changes in the victim reference group, Baron, 1997). In this 
context it is not difficult to explain why the hundreds ofthousands ofdisplaced refugees 
from violent conflicts such as the genocide in Rwanda or the civil war in the Congo are 
unlikely to evoke the same emotional reaction as a single victim or small group of 
victims do when one tries to comprehend their suffering (Slovic, 2007). It is arguably 
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very difficult (if not impossible) to mentally process large groups of people to the same 
degree of detail as one is able to do with just a single individual. 
Even when no reference group is provided and donations are elicited for just a 
single victim or a small group ofvictims, people can be insensitive to changes in numbers 
(Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Pham, 2007; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). These authors 
found that sensitivity to numbers might depend on the amount ofaffect that victims 
evoke. When asking people to donate to rescue efforts for either one or four pandas, 
Hsee and Rottenstreich found that depicting the animals in an affect-rich presentation 
mode (i.e., identified by pictures) caused insensitivity to the number ofpandas to the 
extent that participants donated similar amounts to each rescue effort. However, when 
the pandas were depicted in an abstract and affect-poor presentation mode (i.e., dots), 
participants donated more money to the four animals, suggesting that affective reactions 
are relatively insensitive to changes in victim numbers. 
Apart from exploring the effects ofnumbers, research on donations has also 
investigated the effect of identifiability (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Kogut & Ritov, 
2005a; Schelling, 1968; Small & Loewenstein, 2005; 2003; Small, Loewenstein, & 
Slovic, 2007). Typical ways to identify victims are to present them by name, age, 
picture (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005a), and background history (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, 
& Slovic, 2007). These bits of information are designed to make the victims affectively 
more salient, and are likely to increase caring about the victims because they are more 
vivid and the consequences ofnot helping the victims are psychologically more real to 
the helper (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). The effects of identifiability can even change 
people's willingness to help when the victim is determined but not yet identified. Small 
& Loewenstein (2003) found that participants donated more money to a family that had 
already been determined from a charity list compared to a family that was yet to be 
determined. Furthermore, identifying an individual can also result in an increased 
likelihood to punish petpetrators (Small & Loewenstein, 2005). Utilizing a social 
dilemma game, these authors found that when participants were able to penalize defectors 
(i.e., those who did not contribute money to the group), they punished more severely 
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when the defector was identified (by a number). Moreover, Small and Loewenstein 
report that participants had stronger emotional reactions of anger to identified vs. 
unidentified perpetrators. It is of interest that the effect of identifiability on the severity 
of punishments was fully mediated by the emotional responses, thus demonstrating the 
role of feelings in the identifiable perpetrator effect. 
Differences in identifiability of single individuals vs. groups are somewhat 
inherent in the changes in victim numbers. For example, in contrast to the identifiability 
of a single victim in need, masses ofpeople are difficult to identify at the same level. It 
is possible that even if one were to try to identify large number of displaced refugees in 
Africa by their name, age, and pictures, our perceptual and emotional systems would still 
have a difficult time comprehending the suffering ofthe masses. However, when small 
in number, identified victims are likely to evoke more affective responses (such as 
sympathy and compassion), and these emotions are a source ofmotivation to help (Kogut 
& Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Slovic, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). If masses of 
victims do not elicit these emotional responses, little motivation exists to intervene and 
provide help. 
Mechanisms Involved in Affective Perceptions of Victims 
Imagery. As mentioned in the previous section on number ofvictims and 
identifiability, single identified victims are typically more vivid and easier to imagine or 
mentally represent than groups ofvictims (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). Affective 
reactions to stimuli depend, at least in part, on the perceivers' ability to mentally 
represent them in a clear and concrete form (Damasio, 1994). A concrete mental image 
contains affective tags that signal to the decision maker how the object should be valued 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Slovic et al. (2002) formulated the 
"affect heuristic", which proposes that people's affective reactions are based on the 
degree to which they engage in mental imagery (Peters, Slovic, & Gregory, 2003; Peters 
& Slovic, 1996). These reactions then guide decisions (peters & Slovic, 2000) and are 
associated with the value that is placed on choice options (MacGregor, Slovic, Dreman, 
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& Berry, 2000). Applying these findings to the study of donations suggests that if a 
victim is represented in a concrete and affectively salient way (i.e., ifhe/she is identified), 
then the helpers' mental image ofthe victim should be clearer and lead to stronger 
affective reactions. 
It is likely that single victims are easier to mentally represent than groups of 
victims. Using abstract objects, Arie1y (2001) found that people are more accurate in 
mentally representing a single item compared to a group of items. However, it is also 
possible that information about a group ofstimuli is abstracted and stored in memory as a 
prototype (Posner & Keele, 1968). If this is the case, then donations and affective 
reactions to a group of victims might be based on a prototype. In the context of 
donations, it is presently not clear whether people use prototypes to mentally represent a 
group ofvictims. If the identifying information about individual victims is not 
abstracted, then single victims should be represented differently (and may be more 
affectively salient; Slovic et aI., 2002) than mental images ofa group ofvictims. Part of 
this dissertation will explore whether people have a clearer mental image ofa group or an 
individual victim. 
Entitativity. Another potential reason for people's differential affective reactions 
to changes in victim numbers and identifiability lies in the fact that our perception of 
groups often differs from our perception of individuals, even when equivalent identifying 
information is provided about both (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Evidence suggests that 
individuals are perceived differently than groups on a number ofpersonality and 
perceptual dimensions (McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997; Hamilton & Sherman, 
1996; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994). Specifically, a group ofpeople can be 
perceived as more diverse and less unitary than an individual, and it is likely that this lack 
ofunity leads to a less concrete and coherent mental representation of the victims. As 
affective reactions are usually stronger for concrete vs. abstract representations (Slovic et 
aI., 2002), the lack ofperceived unity contributes to the lack ofemotional reactions from 
potential donors. The predisposition to perceive groups as less unitary has been 
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addressed by research on entitativity7 (i.e., the tendency to perceive social targets to have 
unity and coherence). 
The concept of entitativity is closely connected to Gestalt theories ofperception, 
which highlight that perceptual processes are closely related to other, more complex 
impression formation processes (Kahneman, 2003). Principles such as common fate, 
similarity, proximity, and organization are Gestalt explanations for judgments of 
perceptual similarity, but can also be used for judgments ofpsychological similarities 
(Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Translating these Gestalt theories into 
impression formation terminology would suggest that group members are arguably 
perceived as having less common :tate (i.e., they differ in their actions and intentions), as 
being less similar (i.e., they differ in their appearance as well as their state and trait 
characteristics), and as having lower proximity and organization (i.e., they are perceived 
as less unitary and coherent). Susskind et al. (1999) found that perceived entitativity was 
predictive of stronger trait judgments, faster response times (indicative of on-line 
processing for individual targets vs. memory-based processing for groups), and greater 
confidence in these judgments for individuals vs. groups. This connection between 
Gestalt principles ofperception and impression formation is ofparticular interest, as 
perceptual processes impose limitations on our ability to process large numbers ofpeople 
in the same way that psychological processes may restrict our ability to feel compassion 
for large numbers ofvictims (Slovic, 2007). 
Attention. In addition to the role of imagery and entitativity perceptions as 
mechanisms involved in affective perceptions ofvictims, a critical analysis ofhow 
feelings determine helping behavior must take into account the role ofattention8 in the 
7 The concept ofentitativity applies to both groups as well as individuals, as groups can share certain 
psychological features that make them appear cohesive as a group and individuals might seem less unitary 
if they are inconsistent in their preferences or behavior (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). 
8 Research on attention, just as research on emotions, has progressed sufficiently to the point where it 
becomes problematic to use terminology that encompasses an array of different mechanisms and neural 
networks (e.g., Fan et aI, 2002; Posner, 1994; Posner & DiGiralamo, 2000; Posner & Raichle, 1994). For 
the purpose ofthe dissertation, "attention" refers both to focusing on a victim in terms ofvisually attending 
to him/her, as well as mentally representing the victim and hislher characteristics. 
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generation of feelings towards the victims. The complex interaction ofattention and 
emotions is observable on several levels. While emotions can direct attention to 
affectively salient objects (e.g., threatening faces; Fox, 2002; Ochsner & Phelps, 2007; 
Vuilleumier, 2005, Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003), attention is able to 
enhance as well as inhibit emotional reactions (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). For example, 
Vuilleumier (2005) reviews the effects that affective salience have on attentional 
processes, and proposes a two-stage model of emotional control ofperception. 
According to this model, perceptual (Le., visual) information is initially appraised by 
neural networks involving the amygdala before more elaborate processing takes place in 
the cortex. Encoding ofemotionally significant (vs. insignificant) information is 
enhanced resulting in better performance in reaction time and identification tasks (e.g., 
Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers, & Rotteveel, 2006). This 
lends further support to behavioral fmdings that stress the role of affect in information 
processing (e.g., Slovic et aI., 2002), specifically in the context ofprosocial behavior 
(Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Identified victims (e.g., when identified by a picture) may 
be more likely to capture attention than unidentified victims are, which leads to different 
encoding and processing9. 
Just as emotional salience can direct attention to particular stimuli (e.g., facial 
expressions, Fenske & Eastwood, 2003), focal (spatial) attention is needed for subsequent 
emotional processing and has a profound effect on the generation ofemotions (Holmes, 
Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003). For example, attending to a specific location in someone's 
field ofview is likely to enhance the emotional reaction to affectively salient objects that 
are focused on (Fenske & Raymond, 2006), while attention can also effectively regulate 
one's own negative emotional state (Gross, 2002; Posner & Rothbart, 2006; Rueda, 
Posner, & Rothbart, 2005). The effects of (visual) attention on the generation of 
emotions is effectively demonstrated in a series of experiments that highlight the 
emotional inhibitory consequences of attending to specific locations in one's visual field 
9 The effects ofthis 'enhanced' encoding and processing include greater affective reactions as well as 
greater attention to identified victims. 
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(e.g., Fenske et a1., 2005; Fenske, Raymond, & Kunar, 2004; Raymond, Fenske, & 
Tavassoli, 2003). These authors consistently show that not attending to 'distractor' 
stimuli devalues them on affective dimensions. For example, distractor faces were seen 
as less trustworthy than attended faces, and abstract mondrian stimuli were evaluated as 
more cheerful when attended vs. not attended. It is of interest that distractors in close 
proximity to the target were devalued more than those farther away (Raymond, Fenske, 
& Westoby, 2005). 
When confronted with victims in need, attentional networks interact with 
affective processes to direct people's focus to affectively salient information, which may 
or may not result in feelings related to the victims. This depends heavily on the 
characteristics of the victims one is able to focus on. When presented with an identified 
victim, we are able to attend to many features ofhislher individuating information and 
thus generate some kind offeeling for the victim. Conversely, when confronted with an 
abstract number ofunidentified victims, we are unable to focus on specific information 
that makes the victims more emotionally salient. Thus, the attentional mechanisms 
related to the generation ofemotions seem to playa vital part in analysis of the role of 
feelings in helping others. 
The Role ofDeliberation in Prosocial Behavior 
The review ofaffect and affective mechanisms in the context ofprosocial 
behavior must take the role of deliberation into account. While emotions can act as 
specific guides and motivations for behavior (e.g., Peters, 2006; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2006), it is important to address deliberative mechanisms that either interact with or result 
in these affective reactions. Just as people's affective reactions to victims vary (e.g., 
Batson, 1990), it is also likely that individual differences in deliberation contribute to 
helping (Small & Loewenstein, 2007). For example, recent research on individual 
differences in affective and deliberative information processing suggests that people 
differ in their ability to understand and draw meaning from numbers (e.g., Lipkus, Samsa, 
& Rimer, 2001; Peters et al., 2007, 2006; Schwartz, Woloshin, & Welch, 2005). When 
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presented with tragedies on the scale ofthose in Darfur or Rwanda, large numbers of 
killed, displaced, and otherwise injured victims are often represented as statistics. 
While it may be difficult to understand such large numbers affectively (Slovic, 
2007), people with better skills to draw meaning from numbers (i.e., high in numeracylO) 
might perceive the information differently. Some evidence exists that people with high 
numeracy skill are able to derive meaning from numbers regardless ofhow they are 
presented (e.g., in probability or frequency formats), and that people with low numeracy 
are sensitive to how concretely (vs. abstractly) numbers are represented (peters et aI., 
2006). These authors found that highly numerate individuals were less influenced by 
attribute framing, made more rational choices, and were able to derive more affect from 
abstract number comparisons than low numerate people. Based on these findings, it is 
possible to speculate that people with low numeracy skill are more likely to be affected 
by concrete processing and by the affective tags that are associated with particular 
outcomes. Thus, presenting concrete information (e.g., an identifiable victim) is likely to 
have a greater impact on the feelings of someone low in numeracy, while highly 
numerate persons may be better able to see the bigger problem and derive meaning (and 
feelings) from statistical representations oflarge numbers ofvictims. New York Times 
columnist David Pogue has speculated about the ability ofhigh numerate individuals 
such as Bill Gates to understand the greater tragedy that lies behind the statistics of 
victims in the following equation: "Preventable death = bad; preventable death x 1 
million people = 1 million times as bad" (David Pogue, The Psychology ofNumeracy, 
August 23,2007). 
In addition to numeracy, another important deliberative aspect ofhelping 
concerns the extent to which people engage in reasoning about moral and social 
obligations. In a seminal article on the (lack of) morality ofletting other people suffer, 
Singer (1972) proposed that in order to be moral, all one needs to do is to "prevent what 
10 Numeracy is also defined as the ability to deal "comfortablywith the fundamental notions ofnumbers 
and chance" (Paulos, 1988, pJ), and is, among other things, a measure ofhow good people are at 
understanding exceptionally large numbers and grasping infinity. 
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is bad and promote what is good" (p. 231). However, researchers and theorists disagree 
on whether the moral judgment of"goodness" and "badness" is driven primarily by 
deliberative or affective information processing. Theories about moral reasoning, which 
is defined as reasoning that is "intentional, effortful, and controllable", Haidt, 2001, p. 
818) have stressed the importance ofa cognitive (Le., deliberative) approach to 
successful resolution ofmoral dilemmas (Gibbs 2006; Kohlberg, 1973). These theories 
suggest that the highest form ofmoral reasoning is based on abstract reasoning. 
Nonetheless, moral judgments can also be reached without deliberation (Krebs & Denton, 
2005) and may rest more on affective responses than on deliberation. Theorizing by 
Haidt (2007, 2004, 2003, 2001) and colleagues (Greene & Haidt, 2002) question the 
causal link between moral reasoning and moral judgment (i.e., how good or bad an action 
or person is). Instead, they propose a social intuitionist model, in which people first react 
to a moral dilemma by moral intuition (and affectll ) and later search for reasons to justify 
their moral judgment. 
This kind ofmotivated reasoning is also proposed by Kunda (1990) and can 
explain how intuitive and affective information processing influence moral reasoning 
that, supposedly, is based solely on deliberation. According to Haidt's (2001) and 
Kunda's (1990) models, when people are confronted with the misery of a victim, they 
flISt react affectively to the situation (e.g., by having sympathy) and only then engage in 
moral reasoning related to their gut-reaction to provide help or not. Based on these 
theoretical considerations, it seems likely that deliberating about moral and social 
obligations is, at least in part, informed by one's affective and intuitive reactions to the 
victims, and that moral reasoning is not necessarily causally related to donations. 
Instead, affective reactions are often better predictors ofbehavior than deliberative 
reasons (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Peters & Slovic, 2000; Slovic et aI., 2002; Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2002). In sum, several aspects should be considered when attempting to answer 
11 Haidt (2001) emphasizes that the difference between moral reasoning and moral intuition is not one of 
cognition vs. emotion but rather one between two kinds of cognitions. However, he draws a distinct 
parallel to intuitive vs. reasoning Systems which include affective reactions and affective information 
processing (e.g., Epstein, 1994). 
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the questions ofwhy and under what conditions people help others in distress. Crucial to 
encouraging prosocial behavior and helping victims in need is one's propensity for 
experiencing feelings related to those victims. These feelings can be focused on the 
victims and their situation, or they can be focused more on the self, thus motivating 
behavior by prompting one to act to relieve a negative mood state that may arise from 
feelings ofguilt or anticipated regret. Whether feelings arise in the first place and if so, 
whether they motivate behavior through altruism (Le., based on sympathy and 
compassion for the victims) or through more self-focused ways (based on how one feels 
about oneself), possibly depends on the information processing mode that one engages in. 
Information processing theories will be reviewed next. Existing research on donations 
will be linked to these theories, and research questions will be extrapolated that address 
prosocial behavior in the context ofdual processing frameworks. 
Dual Information Processing Framework 
An extensive amount of research addresses the central question ofhow affect 
determines people's decision to help others in distress. Several theories ofhuman 
information processing point towards two qualitatively different yet interconnected 
processing modes12 (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000): One mode is 
characterized by relatively quick, automatic, effortless, associative, concrete and affective 
processing, while the other is thought to be more slow, effortful, rule-based, controlled, 
and abstract. These two processes are not orthogonal, and often inform and influence 
each other. In fact, their relationship is rather complex. Kahneman (2003) suggests that 
the slower and reason-driven process (System 2) can control the output of the more 
12 Research on dual processing has generated different terminology for the two different processes. This 
dissertation will adopt Stanovich and West's (2000) and Kahneman's (2003) terminology ofSystem 1 and 
System 2. 
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immediate and affective-driven process (System 1)13. While different theorists have used 
different labels for these two processes, the described effects of each processing mode are 
largely congruent across theories and are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Two Information Processing Modes 
Infonnation Processing Mode 
System 1 System 2 
• Fast • Slow 
• Automatic • Controlled 
• Parallel • Serial 
• Effortless • Effortful 
• Associative • Rule-based 
• Affective • Deliberative 
For example, Sloman (2002, 1996) suggests that two forms of conceptually 
different mental computations are performed by the associative System (i.e., System 1) 
and the rule-based System (i.e., System 2). System 1 is sensitive to perceptual 
similarities ofthe features in one's environment, and processes information based on the 
degree to which it can be meaningfully grouped into a coherent set ofclusters that reflect 
one's perceptual reality. System 2, on the other hand, processes information on the bases 
of abstractions and logical, rule-based reasoning. This formulation is largely compatible 
with Epstein's (1994) suggestion that information can be processed in an experiential 
way (Le., System 1) and an analytical way (i.e., System 2). 
An earlier proposition for a separation between affective and cognitive processing 
was advanced by Zajonc (1984, 1980), who suggested that (unconscious) emotions are 
13 Some dual process models incorporate the possibility that affective reactions can arise out ofprocessing 
information in deliberative ways in System 2 (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993). For the present discussion ofdual 
process models, I focus primarily on the fast and automatic affective reactions that are specific to the 
objects they are attached to. 
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able to precede cognitions14• Zajonc argued that unconscious emotions are not dependent 
on subjective, cognitive representations, yet they are able to substantially influence 
preferences and behaviors15• With the advent ofbrain imaging techniques and 
neuroscience, further support was found for a distinction between two systems of 
information processing (e.g., Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 
2000; Damasio, 1994). Damasio and colleagues found that neurological damage to 
specific brain regions (Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex; Brodmann's area 10 and 11) 
impedes affective processing without impairing deliberative ability. Similarly, Bush et 
al. (2000) review findings that point to different neural pathways in the anterior cingulate 
cortex for cognitive tasks (e.g., a counting stroop task) vs. affective tasks (e.g., an 
affective stroop task). 
Research on the operations of and connections between these two Systems has 
suggested that System 1 functions similarly to the perceptual System and is monitored by 
System 2 (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). System 1 processing shows parallels to 
perceptual systems as it seems to be tied to the concrete and associative processing 
reminiscent ofperceptual processes. These perceptual processes are the basis ofaffective 
reactions to victims who are perceived in a concrete and psychologically coherent (i.e., 
entitative) way (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). The perceptual system,just like System 1, 
handles large numbers differently than small numbers, and is responsive to a single, 
identified, and affectively meaningful and salient victim. Deliberative reasoning about 
victims and the victims' situations can interfere with the affective output of System 1. 
Specifically, deliberating about the victim can lead to a reduction ofthe impact of 
immediate affective responses and make the helper aware of the larger problem and 
14 The proposition that "reasons" and "passions" are separate, and often disparate influences on behavior 
actually dates back to more than 2,500 years in the works ofAristotle (cited in Zajonc, 2004). 
15 Lazarus (1991, 1982), disagreed with this and maintained that all emotions require prior conscious or 
unconscious cognitive appraisal mechanisms and that emotions cannot exist without prior appraisal. 
Depending on how broad "cognition" is defmed (e.g., including sensation, perception, and more complex 
deliberation), one could say that it always has to precede emotions. 
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realize that a donation would just be a drop in the bucket (Fetherstonhaugh et aI., 1997; 
Loewenstein & Small, 2007). 
The results reported in the literature on donations (and specifically the role of 
affect in donations) can be conceptualized in the dual processing framework presented in 
Table 1 and Figure 1. The framework in Figure 1 is the basis for the experiments in this 
dissertation. Different outcomes in the decision to help are expected depending on which 
system is engaged and has greater influence on information processing, Engaging 
System 2 processing by focusing on the many millions in need instead of a single victim, 
estimating the efficacy ofa donation (Le., how likely a donation would actually help), 
and reasoning about how deserving a victim is of a donation (possibly in the context of 
other victims; Loewenstein & Small, 2007), or thinking about other possible uses ofthe 
money are likely to reduce donations, affective reactions to the victim, and the extent to 
which donations are related to these affective reactions16• 
System 1 
High identifiability 
Few victims, Other-focused 
Helping 
Attention 
System 2 
Low identifiability 
Many victims, 
Abstract Reasoning 
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Figure 1: System 2 Inhibits the Generation and Impact ofOther-Focused Affect on 
Helping. 
16 However, in theory it is possible that System 2 processing also results in an affective reaction (e.g., 
higher-order affect), but this reaction is thought to be less strong and influential as immediate affective 
responses (Loewenstein et aI, 2001). 
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Conversely, if processing is done primarily with System 1, then affective 
reactions, donations, and the extent to which donations are related to affect might all 
increase. This is the case when victims are identified (e.g., Small & Loewenstein, 2003), 
and when only a single coherent victim is presented (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b, 
Viistfjiill et aI., in preparation). To map these findings onto a dual processing framework, 
we have to revisit the underlying mechanisms that lead to affective reactions (i.e., 
imagery, high perceived entitativity, and attention). When a single victim is identified, 
people's ability to attend exclusively to himJher (as there are no distractors), its high 
perceived entitativity, and its vivid mental image facilitate the generation of immediate 
affective reactions, which then guide people's decision to donate and influence 
construction of a donation amount. On the other hand, when victims are represented 
numerically (i.e., as statistics) then the mechanisms of System 1 (Le., entitativity, 
imagery, and attention) might not be as engaged (as there may be less perceived 
entitativity, imagery, and nothing affective to attend to) and System 2 processing 
becomes relatively more important. It should be noted that System 2 processing can be 
manipulated directly and indirectly. In contrast to presenting victim statistics (which is 
an indirect manipulation as it does not interfere with information processing directly), it 
is also possible to restrict people's deliberative capacity or prime them to feel vs. 
deliberate, which are examples of direct information processing manipulations. 
Note that the model presented in Figure 1 allows for direct interactions between 
System 1 and System 2, and also for the direct influence of System 2 on helping 
behavior. System 1 and System 2 information processing is generally thought to interact 
and influence each other (e.g., Kahneman, 2003), and their effects on affective reactions 
are only one of the ways that this interaction might take place. However, this dissertation 
will primarily focus on the role that affect plays in the decisions to donate. Furthermore, 
while deliberative (i.e., System 2) processing undoubtedly plays an important part in 
helping behavior, in this dissertation the investigation of the extent to which deliberative 
processing influences helping is limited to its impact on affective factors. 
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CHAPTER III 
PURPOSE AND OUTLINE 
The goal ofthis dissertation is to examine the role of information processing 
mode and the link between affect and decisions to help others. While research has 
demonstrated that feelings motivate helping behavior (e.g., Batson, 1990; Slovic, 2007), 
we have only begun to understand how different characteristics ofthe victims and the 
potential helpers influence such behaviors. Apart from examining the effects ofvictim 
identifiability, changes in victim numbers, imagery, perceptions ofentitativity, and 
attention on the generation and impact of feelings, the studies in this dissertation will take 
into account whether donations are motivated by feelings focused on the selfvs. others. 
Feeling sympathy and compassion for others in need can give rise to helping because one 
is aware of the need-arousing condition (e.g., famine or war). On the other hand, when 
confronted with the misery ofothers in need, one might also feel guilt and regret for not 
helping. Regret and guilt are reminders of social and moral obligations, ofhow we 
"should" treat our fellow human beings. It is crucial to identify how these feelings 
depend on information processing. Specifically, it is possible that different types of 
motivations surface depending on how information about victims is processed. 
At present it is not clear whether information processing moderates the impact of 
feelings that are focused on the self (e.g., regret) or those focused on others (e.g., 
sympathy for the victims) on people's tendency to help. While several studies (see 
literature review) have examined the effects ofidentifying victims and changes in the 
number ofvictims on people's willingness to help others, the studies in this dissertation 
will expand on those findings and provide a dual processing framework within which 
these effects can be conceptually understood. In five experiments, different aspects of 
the role ofdual information processing in prosocial behavior will be investigated. 
Information processing mode will be manipulated in both direct and indirect ways, and 
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the relationship between people's willingness to help and their feelings regarding 
themselves vs. the victims are ofprimary concern to this investigation. For a proposed 
model ofhow information processing may moderate the way feelings motivate behavior, 
refer back to Figure 1. 
In this conceptual framework, System 1 processing leads to affective reactions 
that predict helping motivated by self-focused affect and other-focused affect. System 2 
processing partially controls the output ofSystem 1 and may inhibit the generation of 
affect and its motivating influence on helping behavior. It is possible that the 
mechanisms for selfvs. other-focused affect are different (e.g., Batson, 1990) and 
dependent on information processing mode (Rossnagel, 2000). Feelings focused on the 
self are thought to be less effortful than feelings focused on others (Rossnagel, 2000; 
Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000) and might be less dependent on processing mode. Awareness 
of self-focused affect is more automatic and should be more difficult to disrupt by 
deliberative processing. Lamm, Batson, and Decety (2007) found that other-focused 
affect (such as empathy) depended on people's perspective taking and cognitive 
appraisal. This suggests that other-focused affect is moderated by the type of information 
processing mode. The question is whether a shift in processing from concrete affective 
processing (i.e., System 1) to more abstract processing (i.e., System 2) will increase or 
decrease affective reactions that are focused on others. While an increase in deliberative 
processing might increase perspective taking, it is also possible that a shift towards more 
abstract deliberative processing reduces sympathy, compassion, and other victim-focused 
affect because it takes attention away from the immediate need of the victims. This does 
not imply that more abstract processing necessarily results in less helping, as there are 
several ways in which abstract reasoning can result in prosocial behavior. The realization 
of one's social and moral obligations, for example, can emerge from a reasoned analysis 
of the problems that victims face, even if this reasoned analysis is informed by moral 
intuitions (Haidt, 2001). Moreover, individual differences in processing styles can lead 
some people (i.e., those high in numeracy) to process information more abstractly 
compared to others (those low in numeracy) 
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Some of the characteristics that research has identified as determinants ofhelping 
behavior (including victim identifiability and number ofvictims) are predicted to 
manipulate information processing mode in specific (and indirect) ways that are 
explained by the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1. For example, being 
presented with a single, identified victim is likely to encourage affective processing of 
System 1, while being presented with large numbers ofvictims in the form ofabstract 
statistics may encourage more deliberative processing17. Ifpresentation oflarge numbers 
increases abstract System 2 processing, then feelings such as sympathy and other victim­
focused affect should be lower and less related to helping behavior. Similarly, if people 
have a more vivid imagery of the victims, see them as more entitative, and focus their 
attention on them, System 1 processing should result in stronger affective reactions for 
those victims (e.g., sympathy) and use ofthat affect as a motivating source to entice 
helping. 
While presentation modes are thought to influence information processing (e.g., 
Slovic, 2007), they can also be manipulated directly. Instead of only focusing on the way 
that information about victims is presented, it is possible to manipulate the influence of 
System 2 by overloading its capacity (e.g., by a cognitive load paradigm; Shiv & 
Fedorikhin, 1999), or by sensitizing participants to deliberating vs. focusing on their 
feelings for the victims (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). These manipulations target 
information processing directly, and the proposed model predicts that if System 2 is 
overloaded or when people are primed to focus on their feelings (i.e., System 1), it is 
possible that the generation and use ofother-focused affect in the decision to help will 
not be disrupted. To test this, the experiments presented in Studies 1 - 4 employ both 
direct and indirect manipulations ofprocessing mode. Furthermore, they also address the 
effects that other research has identified as determinants ofhelping and how they are 
related to affective reactions. 
17 It should be noted that presentation ofnumbers does not automatically favor System 2 processing. Slovic 
et al. (2002) and Peters et al (2006) show that presentation of numbers can engage (higher-order) affective 
processing if they are affectively evaluable (i.e., comparable). 
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As outlined in Table 2, the main research questions revolve around the effects of 
dual information processing on peoples' donations, feelings, and the impact of feelings 
on donations. The mechanisms that play into these effects consist ofthe number of 
victims, entitativity perceptions, identifiability, numeracy, and attention. Number of 
victims, identifiability, and attention will be manipulated in the respective studies, while 
entitativity perceptions and numeracy are measured. 
Table 2: Main Research Questions Addressed in Each Study. 
Research questions and Studies 
specific psychological mechanisms 
2 3 4 5
 
1.	 What are the effects of dual processes on donations? x x x x
 
- Number of victims x x x x
 
- Entitativity x x
 
- Identifiability x
 
- Numeracy x
 
2. What are the effects of dual processes on feelings? x x x x x
 
- Number of victims x x x x x
 
- Entitativity x x
 
- Identifiability x
 
-Numeracy x
 
- Attention x
 
3. What are the effects of dual processes 
x x x x
on the relationship between feelings and donations?
 
- Number of victims x x x x
 
- Entitativity x x
 
- Identifiability x
 
- Numeracy x
 
Studies: 1= Cognitive Load; 2= Priming; 3= Rokia; 4= Serial Presentation; 5= Attentional Mechanisms 
In Studies 1 - 4, the focus is on people's willingness to help, as measured by how 
much money they are willing to contribute hypothetically (Studies 1, 2, & 4) and with 
real money (Study 3) to children in need. In Study 5, the main focus is on the role of 
attention in the generation of sympathy. The victims' situation and the reasons why they 
are in need ofmoney vary across studies. All studies either directly or indirectly 
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manipulate information processing and measure donations, affective reactions, and the
 
correlation between affect and donations.
 
ill addition to the three main research questions about how donations, affect, and 
the link between donations and affect depend on information processing mode, Table 2 
lists the mechanisms which are investigated. For example, varying the number ofvictims 
is one mechanism by which dual processes are manipulated in Studies 1,2,3, and 4. 
This is done for all three main research questions, and so the first four studies address the 
impact ofchanges in victim number as a means to manipulate information processing and 
observe effects on donations, affect, and the link between affect and donations. Before 
detailing each study, I present an overview ofthe general hypotheses. 
General Hypotheses 
Manipulating processing mode is expected to influence people's donations,
 
affect, and the relationship between their affective reactions and donations. These
 
~ affective reactions are broadly separated into those that are focused on the self (e.g., 
anticipated regret) and those that are focused on others (e.g., sympathy). If System 2 
processing regulates the affective output from System 1 and more deliberation results in 
more abstract information processing, then shifting processing towards System 1 might 
increase other-focused affective reactions (e.g., more sympathy). Moreover, a shift 
towards System 1 processing should increase the predictive strength ofother-focused 
affect (compared to a shift away from System 1 processing), as increased deliberation is 
expected to interfere with affective processing (e.g., Kahneman, 2003). Self-focused 
affect, on the other hand, might be less sensitive to processing modes (e.g., Rossnagel, 
2000), and a shift towards abstract deliberative processing should not affect self-focused 
emotions. For a summary ofthe studies and the research questions they address please 
refer back to Table 2. 
Studies 1 and 2 will directly manipulate information processing by means of a 
cognitive load task (Study 1) and a priming task (Study 2). Specifically, Study 1 
addresses how a reduction of deliberative capacity influences participants' affective 
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reactions towards victims in need, and the extent to which affect predicts their 
willingness to help. Furthermore, it investigates the role ofvarying the number of 
victims and how reductions in deliberation influence perceptions ofentitativity. Ifmore 
deliberation results in more abstract processing it is possible that lower processing 
capacity wi11lead to more sympathy, higher donations, and a stronger relationship 
between these two18• Moreover, lower processing capacity could lead to higher 
perceptions of entitativity, as a reduction in processing resources is likely to also reduce 
people's ability to focus on how different victims are from each other. Study 2 
manipulates processing mode by priming participants to evaluate the victims' lives either 
by means ofcalculation or feeling, and addresses whether a shift in processing mode as 
well as variations in the number ofvictims influence affective reactions and the extent to 
which these reactions predict willingness to help. It is predicted that shifting processing 
towards System 1 will increase victim-focused affect, donations, and the degree to which 
this affective reaction is related to donations. 
Studies 3 and 4 examine the effects of indirectly manipulating information 
processing, by presenting victims in ways that may change their affective salience. 
Specifically, Study 3 manipulates identifiability and availability ofbackground statistics 
about the size ofthe total victim group, and measured people's affective reactions, 
willingness to help, the extent that feelings are related to real financial contributions, 
participants' numeric ability, and perceptions ofentitativity. Identified victims are 
expected to elicit stronger victim-focused affect (e.g., sympathy), more donations, and the 
relationship between the two measures should be stronger compared to unidentified 
victims. Additionally, identifying victims is expected to increase entitativity perceptions. 
Study 4 manipulates information processing by showing a different number ofvictim 
pictures in serial order prior to presenting a "target" victim that participants can donate 
money to. Presenting victims prior to a target victim functions as a manipulation of 
victim number, and is designed to increase the number ofvictims participants process 
18 Ifdeliberation results in more perspective taking, then we should observe lower sympathy when 
cognitive capacity is restricted. 
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while holding the target victim constant (i.e., there is always only one target). The main 
hypotheses for this design are that affective reactions to the target victim will be 
modulated by the number ofvictims shown, and that these emotions predict donations 
differentially depending on the number ofvictims. 
Study 5 investigates the role of (visual) attention in the generation ofvictim­
focused affect. Target victims are presented either by themselves or among other 
distractor victims. Participants will be cued to a spatial location where the target picture 
will appear prior to its appearance or immediately after it. It is hypothesized that 
attending to a specific location prior to the appearance ofa victim will result in higher 
sympathy ratings compared to attending to it after the appearance. Additionally, 
presentation of a single victim should lead to higher sympathy compared to presentations 
of target victims flanked by distractor victims. 
General Methods 
All studies were run at the University ofOregon between September 2006 and 
August 2007, and used undergraduate as well as graduate students. Undergraduate 
students were primarily psychology and marketing students, and graduate students were 
recruited irrespective oftheir major. Studies 1,2,4 and 5 were run on a computer, 
whereas Study 3 used a paper-and-pencil format. Hypothetical donations were used as a 
dependent measure for Studies 1,2, and 4, whereas Study 3 used real donations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY 1: RESTRICTING DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES 
Rationale and Hypotheses 
Helping people in need has been linked to both affective and deliberative causes 
(Loewenstein & Small, 2007). Loewenstein and Small suggest that apart from distinct 
affective reactions to the victims, several relevant factors in decisions to donate are 
processed in deliberative fashion (e.g., how much money is available for a donation or 
likelihood that a donation would have an impact on the victim). When investigating the 
different roles that deliberation and emotional reactions have on donations, the dynamic 
interaction between thoughts and feelings has to be taken into account. This study was 
designed to further our understanding about the extent to which the underlying 
mechanisms ofdonations use affect (i.e., System 1) vs. deliberation (i.e., System 2) as a 
source ofinformation for decisions. 
A direct approach to investigate this relationship between affective vs. 
deliberative processing and willingness to contribute (WTC) is to restrict people's ability 
to deliberate about the victims and their predicament. One way to achieve this shift in 
processing is to employ a cognitive load paradigm, which is designed to tax the 
deliberative processing pathway (i.e., System 2). Research suggests that judgments and 
decisions that have affective processing as a basis are relatively unaffected by such 
processing restrictions (Pham, 2007). Affective aspects about an object (or person) are 
accessible even when cognitive resources are low (e.g., Slovic et aI., 2004), and are 
reached more quickly compared to those based on slow and careful deliberation (pham, 
2007). Thus, taxing deliberative processing should lead to decision making that relies 
more on affective input (e.g., Slovic et aI., 2002). Empirical support for this notion was 
found by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999), who administered a 7-digit memory load to 
decrease participants' ability to cogitate about their choices so that affective attributes of 
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options are given relatively more weight. Shiv and Fedorikhin report that their 
participants were more likely to choose an affectively salient snack option over a 
healthier (and deliberatively sound) option when they were under high cognitive load. 
However, the effects of cognitive load on emotional processing are not always 
straight-forward and seem to at least partly depend on the type ofdecisions and emotions 
involved. For example, Drolet and Luce (2004) found that participants under cognitive 
load exhibited relatively more normative behavior by reducing the need to cope with 
negative emotional consequences ofattribute trade-off making. These authors report that 
cognitive load served as a disruption ofparticipants , access of relevant self-goal 
information, which reduced participants' negative emotions that resulted from choosing 
one alternative and losing the benefit on another. 
On the other hand, cognitive load can also accentuate the role ofaffective 
information (Pham, 2007; Rottenstreich, Sood, & Brenner, 2007; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 
1999). Rottenstreich et aI. (2007) argue that when the ability to deliberate is available, 
mental processes are more elaborate and comparisons between choice options are made 
in a different way than when this ability is absent. Specifically, it is likely that the ability 
to reason about choices and weigh the different attributes and consequences will lead to 
different outcomes compared to when choices are based on feelings. The pivotal role of 
affect towards victims has been demonstrated in various studies on donations (e.g., Kogut 
& Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Slovic, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007), and Small, 
Loewenstein and Slovic (2007) suggest that increased deliberation may have the effect of 
reducing donations. 
To investigate the extent to which System 1 vs. System 2 processing influences 
donations, the current study manipulated cognitive load and the number ofvictims. The 
reduction ofdeliberative resources could have two, generally opposite effects. 
Deliberative thought can increase (higher-order) emotional reactions, possibly through 
attributional and appraisal processes or other cognitive mechanisms (e.g., comparisons of 
victim numbers, Peters et aI., 2006). This would lead to higher-order affect, which is 
based on thoughts more than on immediate affective responses to the victim (e.g., 
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Berkowitz, 1993: Loewenstein et aI., 2001; Slovic et aI., 2002). However, it is also 
possible that deliberative processes reduce (i.e., over-ride) immediate affective reactions 
(e.g., Slovic et aI., 2004; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007) and, because affective 
reactions are thought to be primarily a product of System 1, restricting cognitive load 
should result in an increase of donations, affective reactions, and the relationship between 
affect and donations. Thus, Study 1 was designed to explore the effects ofcognitive load 
on decisions and emotional reactions in a donation task. The emotional reactions 
typically measured in studies on helping are related to other-focused affect (e.g., 
sympathy and compassion, Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b), but should also include a 
measure of self-focused affect (e.g., anticipated regret, Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). 
The following exploratory hypotheses are based on the assumption that 
participants under high cognitive load will engage in more System 1 processing 
compared to participants in the low cognitive load condition. Given the important role of 
System 1 in donations (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007), this would lead to the 
following predictions: 
Hypothesis 1: High cognitive load should lead to less deliberation (i.e., System 2 
processing). Less deliberation, in turn, is expected to result in greater affective 
reactions. These affective reactions might be different for selfvs. other-focused 
emotions. If self-focused affect is easier to access and more robust than other 
focused-affect, then the difference between high and low cognitive load should be 
particularly visible for victim-focused affect, but not necessarily for self-focused 
affect. 
Hypothesis 2: Following from Hypothesis 1, stronger affective reactions should lead 
to higher donations. These affective reactions might be a function ofthe 
participants' ability to deliberate about the victims and their situation. If affective 
reactions to the victims are primarily driven by System 1 processing, then high 
cognitive load should lead to stronger emotions, and, in turn, to higher donations. 
It is possible that the effect ofcognitive load is different for single victims vs. a 
group ofvictims. Affective reactions for a group ofvictims might be reduced if 
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participants are able to deliberate about the effectiveness oftheir donation, and 
should therefore increase if deliberative capacity is reduced. 
Hypothesis 3: Depending on whether the ability to deliberate leads participants to 
process victims individually and notice their differences (when part ofa group), it 
is possible to speculate that a reduction in deliberation can lead participants to 
perceive victims as more entitative. Ifparticipants are able to deliberate about the 
victims, they might pay attention to a less cohesive set ofcharacteristics of the 
targets and lower entitativity perceptions. This would suggest that a reduction of 
deliberative processing can lead to a more entitative perception of the victims. 
However, ifdeliberation leads to an abstraction or formation ofa mental 
prototype ofthe victims, then the ability to deliberate might increase entitativity 
perceptions. 
Hypothesis 4: Higher cognitive may increase the role that affect plays as a source of 
information in the decision to donate. Consequently, one might expect that 
feelings towards the victims (e.g., sympathy) will be more predictive of donations 
in the high vs. low cognitive load condition. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and ninety-three undergraduate students at the 
University of Oregon took part in this study. The mean age was 22.3 years (SD = 2.9), 
and 51 % of the participants were female. 
Design. In a 2 cognitive load (high vs. low) x 2 number ofvictims (one vs. eight) 
between-subjects design, cognitive load was manipulated by randomly selecting half of 
the participants to remember a lO-letter sequence (high load) and the other half a two­
letter sequence (low load). The number ofvictims were manipulated by randomly 
presenting either one victim (identified by age, name, and picture) or eight victims (also 
identified by their ages, names, and pictures). Willingness to contribute (WTC) to the 
victim(s) and participants' feelings towards the victims were the main dependent 
variables of interest. 
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Materials and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
independent conditions (high vs. low load x one vs. eight victims). All materials were 
presented on a computer screen (screen resolution = 1024 x 768). The instructions 
informed participants that they were to memorize a given letter sequence, rehearse them 
throughout the task, and that they would be asked to recall it at the end of the experiment. 
In the low-load conditions, participants saw a randomly generated two-letter sequence 
("XD"), whereas in the high-load condition participants saw a randomly generated 10­
letter sequence ("DKZZVHTRKJ"). Half ofthe participants were randomly selected to 
be in the one-victim condition, and the other half to be in the eight-victims condition. 
After viewing the information about the victim(s) and being informed that he/she is (they 
are) in danger from an unspecified life-threatening disease, participants indicated whether 
they would make a (hypothetical) financial contribution to the victim(s). If so, they were 
next asked to enter the amount they would be willing to contribute. Several questions 
related to the participants' feelings towards and perceptions of the victim(s) followed on 
a second page. These questions included how much participants were worried about the 
victim(s), how much sympathy and compassion they felt, how much they would regret 
not donating, how much better they felt if they donated, how much a donation would 
help, and how clear a feeling and how coherent a picture they had ofthe victim(s). Of 
these questions, the first four (worry, sympathy, feeling better, and anticipated regret) 
were designed to measure affect. Ratings ofhow much a donation would help measures 
participants efficacy judgments. The last two questions (clear feeling and coherent 
picture) were designed to measure participants' entitativity perceptions. After answering 
the questions, participants were instructed to recall their letter-sequence (see Appendix A 
for details). 
Results 
Descriptive andPreliminary Analyses. Ofthe 193 participants, 41 (21%) either 
failed to follow instructions or did not accurately recall their letter-sequence. Eight (4%) 
ofthese were in the low-load condition, and the remaining 33 (17%) in the high-load 
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condition. Analyses of these participants' willingness to contribute (WTC) scores show 
that they did not differ significantly from participants who recalled their letter-sequence 
correctly, but they were excluded on the grounds that it is not clear whether they actually 
followed instructions and rehearsed the letters of the cognitive load task during the 
experimene9. 
Descriptive analyses showed that two variables of interest (WTC and sympathy) 
were significantly skewed2o. Four percent ofWTC scores were winsorized before all 
WTC scores were log-transfonned. The extreme positive skew and hypothetical nature 
of the donation justify this statistically corrective procedure, which is common with these 
kinds ofmeasures (e.g., Peters, Slovic, & Gregory, 2003). 
Affect Structure. Before testing the effect ofcognitive load on participants' affect 
responses, the underlying structure of participants' affect and related responses were 
investigated. Analyses ofcorrelational patterns showed that all affect variables had a 
significant positive relationship to each other (see Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations ofWTC and Affect Variables 
Standard 
Dependent Variable N Mean Deviation 
WTC 152 88.02 303.62 
WTC" 152 2.53 1.89 
Worry 151 3.04 1.68 
Sympathy 151 4.19 1.53 
Sympathl 151 19.84 10.76 
Feel better 151 2.70 1.54 
Anticipated Regret 151 2.48 1.97 
Donation help 151 2.30 1.62 
Clear a feeling 151 2.55 1.59 
Coherent a picture 150 2,48 1.58 
"Log-transformed variable bSquared variable 
Note: All variables except WTC were measured on a 1-7 point Likert scale. 
19 Inclusion of these participants resulted in the same general pattem. See Appendix A for details. 
20 Sympathy was negatively skewed due to 72% ofparticipants using the upper halfofthe 7-point Likert 
scale). Willingness to contribute was positively skewed due to the top four percent reporting donations 
between $500 - $3000, while the bottom 82.5% indicated donations ranging from 0$ to $50. 
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Table 4: Correlations Between WTC and Affect Variables 
Feel 
WTCa Worry Sympathy better 
WTCa 
Regret 
Donation 
help 
Clear 
Feeling 
Worry 
.42** 
Sympathl 
.35** .66** 
Feel better 
.42** .42** .34** 
Anticipated 
Regret .44** .48** .36** .50** 
Donation 
help .38** .38** .31 ** .49** .25** 
Clear 
feeling .37** .55** .37** .36** .25** .47** 
Coherent 
picture .30** .45** .36** .42** .35** .41 * .64** 
** p<.Ol **p<.05 aLog-transfonned variable bSquared variable 
Variables in order: Willingness to contribute; Worry, upset, and sad; Sympathy and compassion; 
Feel better if donation is made; Regret if donation would not be made; How much a donation 
would help; How clear a feeling participants' had about the victim(s); How coherent a picture of 
the victim(s) participants had. 
While all variables are positively correlated, closer inspection of Table 4 shows 
that some variables are slightly more related than others. For example, a strong 
relationship exists for how clear a feeling participants had and how coherent a picture of 
the victim(s) (r = .64). Both ofthese were designed to measure participants' entitativity 
perceptions. Furthermore, sympathy and worry are highly correlated (r = .66). Worrying 
about the victim and feeling sympathy and compassion are arguable measurements of 
participants other-focused affect (e.g., Batson, 1990). How much better they felt about 
themselves after donating and how much regret they anticipated for not donating are 
arguably measurements of self-focused affect. Participants' judgments ofhow much 
better a donation would make them feel and how much regret they anticipated ifthey did 
not donate also correlated highly (r = .50). To investigate whether the data support a 
distinction between selfand other-focused affect, a principle components analysis (peA) 
was performed on these four affect variables. An unrotated solution with eigenvalues 
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above 1 as a criterion suggests that worry, sympathy, feel better, and anticipated regret all 
load on one affect component (see Table 5 for details). 
Table 5: Component Loadings for Affect Variables on Single Component
 
Amct Amct
 
Variables: Component
 
Sympathy .794 
Worry .843 
Feel better .719 
Anticipated Regret .747 
Eigenvalue 2.4 
Percentage of Variance explained 60.4 
However, a varimax-rotated21 two-factor solution with eigenvalues above 1 
revealed that sympathy and worry load on a different factor than feeling better and 
anticipated regret (see Table 6 for details. The first rotated component (other-focused 
affect) accounted for 41.5% ofthe variance ofthese four affect variables, while the 
second rotated component (self-focused affect) accounted for 38%. The component 
loadings in Table 6 suggest that sympathy and worry are indeed structurally different 
from feeling better due to a donation and anticipated regret. 
Table 6: Component Loadingsfor Affect Variables on Other- and Self-Focused Affect 
Components 
Affect Other-focused Self-focused 
Variables: Affect Affect 
Sympathy .909 .184 
Worry .852 .318 
Feel better .192 .853 
Anticipated Regret .269 .811 
Eigenvalue 1.7 1.5 
Percentage of Variance explained 41.5 38.0 
21 While it is not hypothesized that affect focused on the self is orthogonal to affect focused on others, a 
varimax rotation was applied to obtain a more conservative estimate ofthe relationship between the affect 
variables of interest. A principal components analysis with oblique rotation showed similar results. 
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Hypothesis 1 addressed the possible effects ofcognitive load on affective 
reactions. If deliberation leads to less affective processing then a reduction in 
deliberation due to high cognitive load could produce higher affective ratings towards the 
victims. Results of a factorial ANOVA with a combined other-focused affect rating 
(consisting ofthe sum of sympathy and worry towards the victims) revealed that victims 
evoked slightly higher affective ratings in the high-load condition (M = 7.5, SD = 3.0) 
than in the low-load condition (M = 6.8, SD = 2.9), but this difference failed to reach 
significance, F(1,147) = 2.l,p < .2, 11/ = .01. Groups ofvictims (M= 7.7, SD = 2.6) 
elicited significantly higher other-focused affective ratings than single victims (M = 6.7, 
SD = 3.2), F(1,147) = 4.l,p < .05, 11/ = .03 (see Figure 2). Neither the cognitive load 
manipulation nor varying the number of victims had an effect on self-focused affect, as a 
similar ANOVA with anticipated regret and feeling better as dependent variables showed, 
Fs < 1, ns. Additionally, a similar 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA with judgments ofhow much 
a donation would help the victim(s) showed no significant results, F < 1, ns. 
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Figure 2: Other-Focused Affect by Cognitive Load and Number of Victims 
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Donations. Ofthe 152 participants who recalled their letter sequence correctly, 
112 (74%) indicated that they would donate money towards the victims (see Table 7 for 
details). 
Table 7: Frequency Counts (and Percentages) ofContributors by Cognitive Load andNumber of 
Victims 
Low Cognitive Load High Cognitive Load Totals 
One victim 24000 (80%) 30 of42 (71%) 540f72 (75%) 
Eight victims 27 of41 (66%) 32 009 (82%) 590f80 (74%) 
Totals 51 of7l (72%) 620f8l (77%) 113 of 152 (74%) 
A I test of independence revealed that the frequency ofparticipants who 
indicated that they would donate did not depend on the number ofvictims and cognitive 
load /0, N = 112) = 2.56,p > .1. However, inspection of Table 7 suggests that a higher 
percentage ofparticipants donated to one victim (80%) than to eight victims (66%) in the 
low load condition. The opposite pattern was observed under high load, where a higher 
percentage ofparticipants donated to eight victims (82%) than to one victim (71%). 
Goodness of fit I tests for cognitive load (high vs. low) and victim number (one vs. 
eight) were not significant,ps > .5 
The preliminary analyses reported in Table 7 suggest that the patterns of 
participants' decision to donate are different for the cognitive load conditions. To test 
whether these donation decisions are related to participants' affect in the high vs. low 
cognitive load condition, logistic regression analyses were performed for each cognitive 
load condition with the four affect variables ofinterest (sympathy, worry, feeling better, 
and anticipated regret) and with participants' judgment about how much a donation 
would help. Based on theoretical considerations and the peA analysis presented in Table 
6, sympathy and worry were combined into one variable to denote other-focused affect, 
while anticipated regret and how much better a donation made participants feel were 
combined to denote self-focused affect. Results are presented in Table 8, and indicate 
that regression models with these three independent variables were significantly 
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predictive of donation decisions. Examination ofthe individual predictor variables 
reveals that participants' efficacy judgment ofhow much a donation would help was 
predictive of donation decisions under low load, but not under high load. Under low 
cognitive load, an increase in efficacy judgments was accompanied by participants being 
2.3 times more likely to donate. The odds ofdonating (related to changes in efficacy 
judgments) were almost reduced by half (1.2) under high load. Furthermore, self-focused 
affect was highly predictive ofdonation decisions in both high and low load conditions. 
Table 8: Affective Predictors ofDonation Decisions by Condition 
Model Individual Predictors Exp(b) Wald p 
Other-Focused Affect 1.031 .05 .819 
Low Cognitive Load: 
l (3) = 28.5, P < .001 Self-Focused Affect 1.532 8.05 .005 
Donation Help 2.314 5.70 .017 
Other-Focused Affect 1.075 .04 .526 
High Cognitive Load: Se1f-Focused Affect 1.811 11.98 .0011(3) = 29.9, P < .001 
Donation Help 1.222 .76 .384 
To test the effect ofcognitive load on participants' donation amounts (Hypothesis 
2), a factorial ANOVA was run on the non-linearly transformed WTC-variable with 
cognitive load and number ofvictims as factors. Results indicate a marginally significant 
main effect for cognitive load, so that participants in the high-load condition (M = 2.8, SD 
= 1.94) donated more money than participants in the low-load condition (M = 2.3, SD = 
1.8), F(1,148) = 2.9,p = .09,71/ = .02. Inspection of the means presented in Figure 3 
suggests that groups ofvictims elicited higher donations than the single individual under 
high load, and that this difference did not exist under low cognitive load. Although the 
interaction between number ofvictims and cognitive load was not significant (p < .2), 
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simple effects analyses showed that groups received higher donations under high-load (M 
= 3.2, SD = 2.0) compared to low-load (M= 2.2, SD = 2.0), t(78) = 2.0,p <.05, r 2 = .05, 
and that groups received marginally higher donations than individuals (M= 2.4, SD = 
1.8), t(79) = 1.81,p <.08,?= .04 (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: WTC for Cognitive Load by Number ofVictims 
It was further investigated whether participants' perceived entitativity of the 
victims (as measured by clearer feelings and a more coherent picture of the victims) 
depended on cognitive load and victim number. Groups might be seen as more unitary 
and more coherent when participants have less cognitive resources to process the 
members ofa group individually. To test this possibility, a 2 x 2 factorial univariate 
ANOVA was performed with the combination ofhow clear a feeling and how coherent a 
picture the participants had ofthe victims. Results revealed a significant main effect for 
cognitive load, such that participants reported higher entitativity perceptions in the high­
load condition (M = 5.6, SD = 2.7) than in the low-load condition (M = 4.4, SD = 2.9), 
F(1,146) = 6.I,p < .05,11/= .04 (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Perceived Entitativity for Cognitive Load by Number ofVictims 
Closer inspection of this main effect showed that participants reported higher 
perceived entitativity for the group of victims in the high-load condition (M= 5.6, SD = 
2.7) than in the low-load condition (M= 4.2, SD = 2.6), t(77) = 2.3,p < .05, Cohen's d= 
.53. The difference between entitativity judgments for single victims in the high load 
condition (M= 5.6, SD = 2.7) did not significantly differ from that in the low-load 
condition (M= 4.6, SD = 3.4), t(69) = l.3,p > .2, Cohen's d = .23. Neither the main 
effect for number ofvictims nor the interaction between cognitive load and number of 
victims was significant. 
Finally, a reduction in deliberative capacity might influence participants' use of 
affect as a source of information when constructing their donation amount. To test this, 
regression analyses ofdonation amounts were run separately for each ofthe cognitive 
load conditions22• Self- and other-focused affect were used as affective predictors of 
WTC (see Table 9 for results). For high-load, these affective predictors significantly 
predicted WTC, F(2,78) = l6.5,p < .01, adjR2= .28. Both affective measures 
22 Similar analyses were conducted for one vs. eight victims and are presented in Appendix A. 
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independently predicted WTC in this model, fJ = .23, t(78) = 2.2,p < .05; and fJ = .40, 
t(78) = 3.7,p < .01, for other- and self-focused affect, respectively. The same model also 
significantly predicted WTC in the low-load condition,F(2,67) = 12.8,p < .01, adjR2 = 
.26, but only self-focused affect was independently predictive of donations, fJ = .37, t(67) 
=2.8,p < .01, while other-focused affect was not,fJ = .21, t(67) = 1.6,p >.1. Feelings 
directed towards the self (i.e., anticipated regret and how much better a donation would 
make one feel) are predictive ofWTC regardless ofload, whereas feelings directed 
towards the victim(s) (i.e., sympathy and worry about the victims) are predictive ofWTC 
when participant's deliberative capacity is restricted. 
Table 9: Regression Analyses ofAffect Predicting WTC by Cognitive Load Condition 
Model Individual Predictors fJ p 
Low Cognitive Load Other-focused affect .21 1.6 .112 
F(2,67)=12.8, 
Self-focused affect .37 2.8 .006p<.Ol, adjR2=.26 
High Cognitive Load Other-focused affect .23 2.2 .031 
F(2,78)=16.5, 
040 3.7 .001Self-focused affect p<.Ol, adjR2=.28 
Discussion 
Study 1 was designed to investigate the effects ofcognitive load on affective 
reactions and donations to others in need ofa financial contribution. Of special interest 
was whether a reduction in processing resources would lead to higher or lower affective 
reactions, and whether differences emerged for self- vs. other-focused affect. It was 
expected that participants under high cognitive load would engage in more affective (i.e., 
System 1) processing and show a stronger relationship between their affective reactions 
and donations. This was taken as an indication that they used these feelings as a source 
of information to guide their donation decisions. 
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Analysis of the affect variables shows some support for a distinction between self­
and other-focused affective reactions. While a principle components analyses revealed 
only one affect component for sympathy, worry, feeling better, and anticipated regret, a 
rotated two-factor solution clearly indicated that sympathy and worry loaded on a 
different factor than feeling better and anticipated regret. This distinction between self­
and other-focused affect dovetails nicely with research on different motivations for 
prosocial behavior (Batson 1990). 
A central question was whether the initial decision to donate (irrespective ofthe 
amount) depended on participants' affective reactions, and whether this relationship was 
moderated by the availability ofprocessing resources. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) 
suggest a two-step model by which decisions to pay for a gamble are different from 
decisions concerning how much to pay. Similarly, it is possible that different 
mechanisms govern decisions to donate money compared to decisions on how much 
money to donate. Results indicated that under low load slightly more participants 
donated to a single victim than to a group ofvictims. This pattern reversed when 
participants were under higher cognitive load. A logistic regression showed that 
participants' self-focused affect was predictive oftheir decision to donate under high and 
low load, but that their efficacy judgment ofhow much a donation would help the victims 
predicted donations only under low load. Several different variables are important when 
people decide whether to donate or not, and it is possible to speculate that participants' 
judgments ofhow much a donation would help are an indication ofa more deliberative 
factor in the decision to donate (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). While no difference in 
these efficacy judgments was found under high and low load, they predicted participants' 
decision to donate only when participants were under low load and presumably more able 
to deliberate. 
Further analyses were performed to investigate whether the donation amount 
differed by cognitive load and victim number. Results suggested that participants 
reported higher donations for groups ofvictims in the high load condition compared to 
the other three conditions. One explanation ofwhy a group ofvictims received higher 
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donations than a single victim in the high load condition is that each victim in the group 
picture was assessed individually (i.e., in a serial fashion) and that this taxed the 
deliberative processing capacity on top ofthe cognitive load manipulation. The 
compound effect ofhigh cognitive load together with the demands ofprocessing a group 
of victims likely contributed to the highest donations in this condition. Thus, the present 
results suggest that the mere availability ofdeliberative resources can have a negative 
effect on the level ofdonations people are willing to give. Another explanation for this 
effect is the possibility that participants engaged in deliberative processing about other 
uses oftheir money or the bigger problem at hand (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). When 
the capacity to engage in these forms of deliberation is reduced, however, the relative 
weight ofother-focused affect becomes more relevant in the decision to donate. 
This notion is supported by results showing that high cognitive load produced 
higher (albeit not significant) ratings ofworry and sympathy towards the victims. These 
affect ratings mirror the donations in that the highest affect was reported for the group of 
victims in the high load condition and the lowest for the single victim in the low load 
condition. Feelings focused on others (e.g., sympathy towards the victims) seem to be 
sensitive to the cognitive load manipulation, whereas feelings focused on the self(e.g., 
anticipated regret) are more robust against possible disruptive effects ofdeliberative (i.e. 
System 2) processing. Research on empathy and perspective taking supports this result 
by showing that self-focused affect is easier to access and less effortful than other­
focused affect (Batson, 1990; Hodges & Wegner, 1997; Rossnage1, 2000; Sabbagh & 
Taylor, 2000). 
The effect ofhigh cognitive load on slightly higher other-focused affect for 
groups ofvictims might also be partially explained by possible differences in group 
perceptions. Higher entitativity should lead to clearer images, and consequently, stronger 
affective reactions (Slovic, 2007). Results support this and show that high cognitive load 
leads to more extreme judgments on group coherence and clarity of feelings towards the 
victims. Specifically, participants reported having clearer feelings towards the groups 
and a more coherent picture when they were under high load. This finding can be 
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explained by participants with more deliberative resources being able to form a more 
diverse mental representation of the victims. In contrast, participants with low processing 
recourses formed a mental representation that is not sensitive to the individual members 
of the victim group. Otherwise their entitativity judgments would likely be lower. The 
present results suggest that the capacity to process information in a more deliberative way 
can lead to lower entitativity judgments, lower affect directed towards the victims, and 
lower donations. 
Results from Study I further supported that participants' other-focused affect was 
more related to donation amounts under high vs. low cognitive load. Specifically, 
feelings focused on the victims were predictive of donations only in the high cognitive 
load condition. Feelings focused on the self were predictive of donations regardless of 
cognitive capacity. This finding suggests that feelings focused on others are accessed 
when other, competing calculations or judgments cannot be carried out while deciding to 
donate to the victims due to less available deliberative capacity. When the processing 
resources allow for mental computations that do not necessarily involve affective 
processing, feelings like sympathy might lose importance and do not predict donations 
amounts23 • 
These results offer tentative support for a model ofhelping behavior that posits 
System 2 as a potentially disruptive influence on the effects of other-focused affect (see 
Figure 1). In the next study, information processing was manipulated by a priming 
paradigm to investigate whether the general findings ofthis study could be replicated 
with a different processing manipulation. 
23 The above interpretations rest on the assumption that deliberative capacity was used to detract from 
affective reactions towards the victims. It is also possible that more deliberation leads to higher-order 
affect (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993), but our data do not support this explanation as affect towards the victims 
was slightly lower when participants were under low cognitive load. Another caveat of the present 
interpretation is that memory load paradigms do not control for the possibility of information being shifted 
to long-term memory and thus freeing deliberative resources. 
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CHAPTER V 
STUDY 2: AFFECTNE VS. CALCULATION PRIMING 
Introduction and Rationale 
The following study was designed to test the effect of shifting the balance 
between deliberative and affective infonnation processing by means ofa priming 
paradigm. Research in both social psychology (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) and 
judgment and decision making (e.g., Fedorikhin & Cole, 2004; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004) has used priming manipulations to influence participants' infonnation processing 
in both subtle (i.e., "suboptimal") and perceptible (i.e., "optimal") methods. For 
example, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) compared the impact ofsuboptimal and optimal 
primes that were either affect-rich (happy and angry facial expressions) or affect-poor 
(small and large polygon shapes) on attractiveness judgments ofChinese ideographs. 
Their results suggest that affect-rich primes lead to higher attractiveness ratings than 
affect-poor primes, which is indicative of differential infonnation processing depending 
on the affective content of the primes. 
Using perceptible (i.e., optimal) primes, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) had their 
participants either focus on calculations or feelings to construct a value for a consumer 
good (Madonna CDs). Hsee and Rottenstreich demonstrate that it is possible to prime 
participants to use either a more deliberative (i.e., calculation-based) approach or a more 
affective (i.e., feeling-based) approach in the construction ofprices for either five or ten 
CDs. Results indicate that priming participants to focus on their feelings resulted in a 
different valuation process and outcome compared to when participants were primed to 
calculate. Specifically, priming calculation resulted in pricing sensitive to the quantity of 
the consumer good (i.e., participants were willing to pay more money for greater 
quantities). Further research on the effect of affective primes was conducted by 
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Fedorikhin and Cole (2004), who contend that the extent to which mood influences 
information processing is a function ofboth mood valence and level ofprocessing. 
According to affect priming models, inducing a particular mood in people will make it 
more likely that information with congruent mood states is recalled and processed 
(Forgas, 1995; Bower, 1981). It is likely that affective information (compared to non­
affective information) about a specific stimulus can become more salient if participants 
are already focused on their affective state. 
Similar to Hsee and Rottenstreich's (2004) manipulation, participants in the 
current study will be presented with an optimal affect prime, optimal deliberation prime, 
or with a no-prime control. It is hypothesized that affect-rich priming will focus 
participants on their feelings, which should make them more sensitive to the affective 
aspects ofthe victims and their predicaments. In contrast, priming affective-poor 
information processing by means of a calculation prime should focus participants on 
deliberative aspects ofthe victims' situation (e.g., how much money each victim receives 
if$X are donated) and be less sensitive to the affective aspects. This difference in 
information processing gives rise to the following predictions: 
Hypothesis 1a: Participants will report higher other-focused affective ratings (e.g., 
sympathy) in the affect prime condition vs. the calculation prime condition. 
Hypothesis 1b: Based on results from Study 1, it is possible that a greater number of 
victims evokes stronger affective reactions than a single victim24• This should 
particularly be true for the affective prime condition, as it will shift information 
processing towards affective valuations and away from deliberative (i.e., 
calculation-based) valuations (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). 
It is ofnote that only affect that is focused on the victim should be influenced by 
the affective prime condition. As in Study 1, self-focused affect (e.g., how the participant 
feels about him/herself if they donate money) is expected to be robust to information 
processing manipulations because participants should access information focused on 
themselves more effortlessly compared to affect focused on others (Rossnagel, 2000; 
24 Reducing deliberative capacity resulted in greater affective reactions for groups vs. single victims. 
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Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). Based on Hypotheses 1a and 1b, ifdonations are informed by 
the level of affect that is attached to the victims, higher affect should lead to higher 
donations. Therefore, it is further hypothesized that donations will be dependent on 
priming and victim number. 
Hypothesis 2: Affective priming will lead to higher donations compared to neutral 
and calculation priming. Additionally, in line with Study 1 and Hypothesis 1b, a 
greater number ofvictims are expected to elicit stronger affective reactions and 
higher donations. This should be particularly true for affective priming, as 
participants will engage in more affective information processing (compared to 
deliberation). 
It is further expected that affective priming makes the affective features ofthe 
victims more salient. With a shift towards affective processing, these (affective) features 
should increase the relationship between emotions that are based on the victims and their 
situation (e.g., sympathy, compassion, and worry about the victim) and donations. Self­
focused affect, on the other hand, is expected to be related to donations regardless of 
processing mode. 
Hypothesis 3: Affect towards the victims will be more predictive ofdonations in the 
affective priming condition compared to the calculation priming condition. 
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred and fifty-six undergraduate students at the University 
of Oregon took part in this study. The mean age was 22.1 years (SD = 2.4), and 52% of 
the participants were female. 
Design. In a 3 prime (calculation vs. affective vs. neutral) x 2 number ofvictims 
(one vs. eight) between-subjects factorial design, prime was manipulated by asking 
subjects to either engage in mathematical calculations (adapted from Hsee and 
Rottenstreich, 2004), emotional processing, or neither (neutral prime). Number of 
victims was manipulated by showing participants either one victim or eight (adapted from 
Kogut & Ritov, 2005a). The dependent variables ofinterest were participants' 
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willingness to contribute (WTC) a hypothetical financial donation, as well as 
participants' affective reactions. 
Materials and Procedure. At the beginning ofthe experiment, participants were 
randomly assigned to one ofthe six independent conditions (calculation vs. affect vs. 
neutral prime by one vs. eight victims). All materials were presented on a computer 
screen (screen resolution = 1024 x 768). Participants in the calculation prime condition 
were asked to perform six mathematical algebraic calculations (e.g., "If an object travels 
at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet will it travel in 360 
minutes?"), whereas those in the affective prime condition were asked to describe in 
writing (one attribute) how they felt about specific objects or people (e.g., a newborn 
baby or George Bush; see Appendix B for details). These affective primes were designed 
to prime participants to access their feelings, but were also intended to be balanced in 
valence (three positive and three negative objects) to not strongly bias participants' 
moods. Participants in the neutral prime condition were not primed to calculate or 
express their feelings about anything. Half of the participants were randomly selected to 
be in the one-victim condition, and the other half in the eight-victim condition. Victims 
were identified by picture, name, and age. The identifying information about the victims 
was identical to the stimuli used in (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; see also Study 1). 
After viewing the information about the victims and that they are in danger from an 
unspecified acute life-threatening disease, participants indicated whether they would make 
a hypothetical fmancial contribution to the victim(s). Four questions about the participants' 
feelings towards the victim(s) followed on a second page (e.g., how much they were 
worried, upset, and sad about the victim(s), how much sympathy they felt for the victim(s), 
how much they felt for the victim(s), and the extent to which participants felt better if they 
donated money. All four affect variables were measured on a 1-7 point Likert scale; see 
Appendix B for details). 
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Results 
Manipulation Check and Descriptive Analyses. An analysis ofparticipants' 
responses to the algebra questions in the calculation condition showed that, on average, 
participants answered more than halfofthe six questions correctly (M= 3.94; SD = 1.14). 
Ofall n = 87 participants in this condition, 76 (87.4%) answered at least halfofthe 
questions correctli5• Two subjects did not answer any ofthe questions correctly and 
were excluded from further analysis. 
To analyze participants' responses in the affect priming condition, each response 
was individually and independently coded by two coders blind to the hypotheses (inter­
rater reliability r = .83). The responses were coded for positive and negative valence, and 
each participant's total number ofpositive minus number ofnegative emotional 
responses was computed. As the priming condition featured three positive and three 
negative items, it was intended that, on average, participants would express three positive 
and three negative emotional states. Analyses showed that ofthe n = 87 participants in 
this condition, 44 (50.6%) reported three positive and three negative emotional reactions. 
Ofthe remaining participants in this condition, 22 (25.3%) expressed more negative than 
positive emotions, and 21 (24.1%) expressed more positive than negative emotions26• 
Affect Structure. Before testing the effect ofpriming on participants' affect 
responses, the underlying structure ofparticipants' affect responses was investigated. 
Analyses ofcorrelational patterns showed that feelings focused on the victims were all 
highly correlated (pearson's r ranged from .72 to .78). It should be noted that feelings 
focused on the self (i.e., the extent to which donating would make the participants feel 
better) were also significantly positively correlated with the other affect measures, 
however less strongly so (pearson's r ranged from .39 to .41). See Tables 10 and 11 for 
details. 
25 For a more detailed description ofparticipants' calculation responses and their relationship to other 
variables of interest in this study please refer to Appendix B. 
26 For a more detailed description ofparticipants' affective responses and their relationship to other 
variables of interest in this study please refer to Appendix B. 
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Table 10: Means and Standard Deviations ofWTC andAfJect Variables 
Standard 
N Mean Deviation 
WTC 254 409607.1 6375654.2 
WTC' 254 3.56 1.87 
Sympathy 254 3.98 1.54 
Worry 254 2.94 1.60 
Feel for victims 254 2.74 1.54 
Feel better if! donate 254 2.71 1.60 
WTC' = log-transformed variable 
Note: All variables except WTC were measured on a 1-7 point Likert scale. 
Table 11: Correlations Between WTC and AfJect Variables 
Feel for Feel better 
WTC' Sympathy Worry victims if I donate 
WTC' 
Sympathy 
.33** 
Worry 
.38** .73** 
Feel for 
.39** .72** .78**
victims 
Feel better 044** .39** Al ** Al ** if! donate 
** p<.OOI WTC'= log-transformed variable 
To investigate whether these four affect variables are best explained by one or 
two factors, a principal components analysis was conducted. Using an unspecified 
number ofcomponents with an eigenvalue above 1 as a criterion, results show that all 
four affect variables load on one factor. This component had an eigenvalue of2.8 and 
accounted for 69.1% ofthe variables' variance (see Table 12). 
Table 12: Component Loading ofAfftct Variables on Single Component 
Affect Affect 
Variables: Component 
Sympathy .875 
Worry .902 
Feel for victims .900 
Feel better if I donate .612 
Eigenvalue 2.8 
Percentage of Variance explained 6004 
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As indicated in Table 12 when only one component is extracted, sympathy, 
worry, and feeling for the victims are somewhat better explained than feeling better due 
to a donation. A rotated two-factor solution with eigenvalues above 1 revealed that the 
fIrst rotated component (other-focused affect) accounted for 60% of the variance ofall 
affect variables, while the second rotated component accounted for 27%. The component 
loadings (i.e., the proportion ofeach variable's variance that is accounted for by the 
principal components) are represented in Table 13, and strongly suggest that feelings 
focused on the victim and feelings focused on the selfare best represented by two 
different components. 
Table 13: Component Loadings ofAffect Variables on Other- and Self-Focused Affect 
Components 
Affect Other-focused Self-focused 
Variables: Affect Affect 
Sympathy .873 .195 
Worry .895 .211 
Feel for victims .892 .214 
Feel better if I donate .227 .974 
Eigenvalue 2.4 1.1 
Percentage ofVariance explained 60.3 27.0 
While the first component accounts for 87.3 - 89.5% ofthe variance ofthe affect 
variables that are focused on the victim, it only accounts for 22.7% ofthe variance ofthe 
feelings focused on the self (i.e., "feeling better" ifmoney is donated). The second 
component shows a reversed pattern, where the variability of feelings focused on others 
are accounted for by only 19.6 - 24.1%, and the variability of feelings focused on the self 
is accounted for by 97.3%. Based on these findings, participants' sympathy, worry, and 
feelings for the victims were averaged into one variable measuring the extent oftheir 
affect towards the victim(s). Feelings focused on the selfwere measured by how much 
better participants felt due to a donation. 
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Effect ofPriming on Affect. It was hypothesized that affective reactions focused 
on the victim(s) (e.g., the combination of sympathy, worry, and feelings for the victims) 
are higher in the affective prime condition compared to the other conditions. 
Results of a 3 (prime) x 2 (number ofvictims) ANOVA confirmed that other­
focused affect was dependent on priming condition, F(2,248) = 5.7,p < .01,11/= .04. A 
planned contrast showed that affective priming (M = 3.6, SD = 1.5) led to higher victim­
focused affect than calculation priming (M = 3.0, SD = 1.4), t(248) = 2.8,p < .01,11/ 
=.03. In addition to the significant main effect for priming, the factorial ANOVA also 
revealed a marginally significant interaction between priming and victim number, 
F(2,248) = 2.3,p =.1,11/=.02. Inspection ofFigure 5 suggests that this interaction is a 
result ofaffective priming increasing feelings focused on others especially when 
participants rated multiple victims. However, this pattern was not present in the 
calculation prime and no prime conditions. The main effect for number ofvictims was 
not significant, F < 1, ns. These results corroborate and extend findings presented in the 
previous, because more affective processing led to stronger victim-focused affect similar 
to the high cognitive load condition in Study 1. 
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Figure 5: Effect ofPriming and Victim Number on Feelings Focused on Others 
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To investigate the effect ofpriming on self-focused feelings, the same factorial 
analysis was conducted with participants' report ofhow much better they feel if they 
donate money as a dependent variable. Results indicate no significant effects ofeither 
priming or number ofvictims, Fs < 2,ps > .15. 
Donations. Willingness to contribute responses were winsorized (less than 4% of 
the data) and then log-transformed to reduce skewness. Of the 254 participants, 228 
(90%) indicated that they would donate money towards the victims. The percentage of 
participants in each prime condition (calculation vs. affect vs. no prime) x victim number 
condition (one vs. eight victims) who chose to donate money ranged from 81 percent (for 
a group ofvictims presented in the calculation prime condition) to 100 percent (for a 
group ofvictims in the affect prime condition). A -I test of independence and goodness 
of fit tests for number ofvictims and prime condition showed that no significant 
difference existed in participants' proportion to donate. However, when averaging across 
victim number, the lowest proportion ofdonations was found in the calculation prime 
condition (83%) and the highest was in the affect prime condition (96%). This gives 
tentative support to the possibility that priming participants to deliberate (i.e., calculate) 
reduces the likelihood for a donation compared to the affective prime and no prime 
conditions. 
To test whether participants' decisions to donate are related to participants affect 
in the high vs. low cognitive load condition, a logistic regression analysis was performed 
for each priming condition with the two different types of affect (self- and other-focused). 
Results are presented in Table 14 below. The model with self- and other-focused affect 
significantly predicts donation decisions for the calculation and affect prime conditions. 
For these two conditions, affect discriminates between participants who donated and 
those who did not. Examination ofthe individual predictor variables reveals that only 
participants' self-focused affect was predictive ofthe decision to donate. An increase in 
self-focused affect made participants 3.1 times more likely to donate in the calculation 
prime condition, and almost 5 times as likely to donate in the affect prime condition. 
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Table 14: Affective Predictors ofDonation Decisions by Condition 
Model Individual Predictors Exp(b) Wald p 
Calculation Prime Other-Focused Affect .804 .69 .405 
l (2) = 18.4, P < .001 Self-Focused Affect 3.143 10.38 .001 
No Prime Other-Focused Affect 1.306 .77 .379 
l (2) = 4.2,p >.1 Self-Focused Affect 1.444 1.58 .209 
Affect Prime Other-Focused Affect 1.256 .36 .547 
l (2) = 11.3, P < .01 Self-Focused Affect 4.986 4.00 .046 
It was hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) that affective priming would lead to higher 
donation amounts compared to calculation priming. Results of a 3 (prime) x 2 (victim 
number) ANaYA revealed amain effect for prime, F(2,248) = 6.0,p < .01, 1]p= .05. A 
planned contrast between calculation priming and affective priming supported the 
hypothesis that affective priming led to higher WTC (M = 4.1, SD = 1.7) than calculation 
primini7 (M= 3.1, SD = 1.9), t(248) = 3.4,p < .01, 1]p= .05. Neither the main effect for 
number ofvictims nor the interaction between number ofvictims and prime were 
significant, Fs < .1, ns (see Figure 6). Even though no significant difference was found 
for number ofvictims, the difference between one victim and a group ofvictims was 
largest in the affect prime condition. Similar to Study 1, participants reported higher 
donations for a group ofvictims when primed affectively. 
27 A Tukey post-hoc test found no other pahwise comparisons significant. 
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Figure 6: WTC for Prime Condition by Number ofVictims 
Finally, it was hypothesized (Hypothesis 3) that affective reactions towards the 
victims would be predictive ofdonation amounts in the affective priming condition, but 
not in the calculation prime condition. Feelings that are focused on the victims should be 
more salient and easier to access when participants are primed to evaluate others on 
affective dimensions (i.e., with System 1). Feelings focused on the self, on the other 
hand, should be less influenced by the priming manipulation. To test this hypothesis, 
regression analyses were run with feelings focused on others (i.e., the combination of 
sympathy, worry, and feelings for others) and feelings focused on the self (i.e., how much 
better participants felt due to donating money) as the predictor variables and donation 
amount as the criterion variable. Separate regression analyses were run for each ofthe 
three priming conditions (calculation prime, affect prime, and no prime). Table 15 details 
the zero-order correlations and Table 16 presents the results of the regression analysis. 
Table 15: Zero-order Correlations ofDonations and Affective Predictors by Condition 
Calculation Prime No Prime Affect Prime 
(N=87) (N=82) (N=87) 
Affect focused on victims .33** .42** .39** 
Affect focused on self .52** .34** .47** 
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Table 16: Regression Analyses ofAffect Predicting WTC by Priming Conditions 
Overall Model Individual Predictors fJ t P 
Calculation Prime Affect focused on victims .07 .64 .522 
F(2,82) = 15.3, 
p<.OOI, adjR2=.26 Affect focused on self .48 4.28 .000 
No Prime Affect focused on victims .35 3.26 .002 
F(2,79) = 11.2, 
p<.OOI, adjR2=.20 Affect focused on self .20 1.84 .070 
Affect Prime Affect focused on victims .24 2.31 .023 
F(2,84) = 15.2, 
p<.OOI, adjR2=.25 Affect focused on self .37 3.65 .001 
These results indicate a clear difference in the predictive strength of affect 
focused on the selfvs. on others on donation amount. As expected, affect focused on the 
selfwas predictive ofdonations in all priming conditions (albeit only marginally in the no 
prime condition). However, and more importantly, affect focused on others was 
predictive ofdonations in the affective prime and no prime condition, but not in the 
calculation prime condition. 
To further explore the impact ofpriming on affect and donations, a mediation 
analysis was conducted. This explorative analysis was motivated by Viistfjiill et al. (in 
preparation), who found that willingness to donate money was mediated by the level of 
affect felt towards the victims. Using Baron & Kenny's (1986) regression approach to 
mediation analyses, the current study found that the impact ofpriming was partially 
mediated by other-focused affect. A test of the indirect effect (Sobel, 1982) of affect on 
donations was significant, Sobel test statistic = 2.55,p<.05, supporting the mediator role 
of affect focused on the victim. This suggests that the effect ofpriming on donations is, 
at least partly, better explained by its effect on other-focused affect. A similar analysis 
with how much better participants felt due to a donation revealed that these self-focused 
feelings did not mediate donations, Sobel test statistic = .77,p > .4. 
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Discussion 
Study 2 used a priming manipulation to focus participants' information processing 
on either more affective (i.e., System 1) or deliberative (i.e., System 2) dimensions. 
Affective priming consisted ofasking participants to answer six questions about how they 
feel concerning specific objects or people, while priming deliberation involved solving 
mathematical calculations. Both ofthese priming manipulations were not directly 
relevant to the donation task, but instead were designed to focus participants on affective 
aspects of the donation task (e.g., how they felt towards the victims) or the deliberative 
aspects (e.g., using a calculative approach to valuing the victims lives). Furthermore, 
number ofvictims was manipulated similarly to Study 1. 
Affective priming highlights participants' emotional reaction towards the victims 
compared to the affect-poor calculation priming condition (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). 
Consequently, it was predicted that affective priming will lead to higher affective 
reactions as well as higher donations in comparison to the calculation priming condition. 
As expected, participants who were primed to feel reported higher other-focused affect 
towards the victims in conjunction with greater willingness to donate. A mediation 
analysis found that other-focused affect (e.g., sympathy) is a partial mediator for 
participants' willingness to donate in the affective and calculation priming conditions. 
Even though other-focused affect did not fully mediate the effect ofpriming on 
donations, the indirect effect ofpriming through other-focused affect was significant. It 
is therefore likely that the effect ofpriming on donations is better explained by changing 
people's other-focused affect towards the victims, which, in tum, predicts donations. 
The priming paradigm was effective in manipulating participants' focus on 
different aspects of the donation task. Asking participants to perform mathematical 
calculations prior to being exposed to the victims had the effect oflowering affective 
reactions and donations, indicating that emotional reactions towards the victims were of 
lesser intensity (and importance). Conversely, asking participants to focus on their 
feelings about unrelated objects and people resulted in greater affective reaction towards 
the victims and higher donations. Inspection of the donation means suggests that the 
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calculation prime reduced the donation amount relative to the no-prime control condition, 
whereas affective priming increased it. Feelings focused on the victims were similar for 
the calculation and no-prime conditions, and lower compared to the affective prime 
condition. 
Investigating participants' willingness to donate (vs. not donate) suggests that 
self-focused affect is more important in the initial decision to donate. For both affective 
and calculation prime conditions, the degree to which a donation would make participants 
feel better is more important than other-focused affect. This result, together with Study 
1, suggests a two-step process ofpeople's donation decisions. They rely more on social­
egoism motivations (Batson, 1990) when deciding on whether to donate or not, but the 
donation amount is also based on other-focused affect when participants focus on their 
feelings (i.e., engage in System 1 processing). 
No significant differences were found for the number ofvictims manipulation. 
The largest difference between a group and a single victim was found in the affective 
prime condition. This suggests that a shift from deliberative to affective processing 
might benefit a group of victims more than a single victim. These results are in line with 
Study 1, where a group ofvictims was valued more when participants were unable to 
deliberate (and therefore presumably System 1 processing was not regulated or disrupted 
by System 2 processing). Relative to a group ofvictims, single individuals are valued 
higher when participants are able to engage in deliberation and use a deliberative (i.e., 
calculation-based) approach to donations. 
Taken together with the results ofStudy 1, Study 2 supports a model which posits 
differential information processing strategies as a cause for differences in the 
construction of donation values28. Specifically, priming participants to use System 1 
processing resulted in higher victim-focused affect, higher donations, and a stronger 
28 While the general model is supported, both Study I and 2 failed to find evidence of the "singularity" 
effect (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a), as groups ofvictims always received either close to or greater donation 
amounts than single victims. However, it is possible that a key difference in the reported study and Kogut 
and Ritov is use ofdirect information processing manipulations (e.g., cognitive load and priming 
paradigms), and possibly the fact that children in need were culturally different from the donors. 
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relationship between these two. Priming to calculate (i.e., using System 2) produced the 
opposite effects on victim-focused affect and its use in the construction ofdonation 
values. Furthermore, the structural and functional difference between these self- and 
other-focused affect reported in this study are consistent with results reported in study 1. 
To provide further evidence for the proposed model in Figure 1, Studies 3 and 4 were 
conducted in order to manipulate information processing in an indirect way by varying 
the presentation modes ofthe victims. 
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CHAPTER VI 
STUDY 3: IDENTIFIABILITY AND BACKGROUND STATISTICS 
Rationale and Hypotheses 
To rally support for the victims of famine, disease, and warfare, (to name only a 
few calamities) humanitarian aid organizations typically identify a few individual victims 
who people can donate to. While these identified victims are only a disproportionately 
tiny fraction of the suffering total, this form ofpresentation is thought to entice potential 
donors to form an emotional impression ofvictim and increase the likelihood ofa 
contribution (Slovic, 2007). However, even ifonly a few victims are identified to the 
potential donors, these victims are representative for a faceless mass ofunidentified 
victims. Study 3 investigates whether reminding people ofthis faceless mass by adding 
statistical background information of the victims (e.g., how many other victims are 
suffering in addition to the identified victim) to the individuating information has a 
deleterious effect on donations and affective reactions. 
Research on the effects of identifying victims suggests that presentation of 
identified victims results in higher donations. Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 2005b) presented 
their participants with either identified or unidentified victims ofa life-threatening 
disease, and found that they donated more money to victims identified by name, age, and 
picture. This "identified victim effect" seems to impact both affective responses to the 
victim as well as people's willingness to contribute (WTC) to a humanitarian cause. It is 
easier to attach emotional impressions to an identified victim due to a more concrete level 
of mental representation (Slovic et aI., 2002) and higher entitativity (Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1996). Viewing an identified victim is likely to result in stronger affective 
reactions, and can lead donors to base their decisions on these affective reactions. 
Conversely, presenting a victim in an unidentified way may engage abstract thinking and 
less affective information processing. To some people, an unidentified victim is just an 
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abstract mental figure or a number without emotional significance, which should have 
similar effects on donations and affective reactions as adding background statistics. 
Supporting this notion, Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) found that adding 
background statistics to an identified victim reduced donations to the victim. 
Their results point towards an affective account ofthe drop in the bucket effect. 
Specifically, presenting background statistics might encourage participants to calculate 
the (small) probability of actually making a difference or deliberate about the 
deservingness ofone out ofmany victims. Even though presenting background statistics 
can impact both System I and System 2 processing, results from Study I and Study 2 
suggest that it is likely that these calculations and deliberations are based more on System 
2. Thus, adding background statistics can have the effect that both affective reactions to 
the victim (e.g., sympathy) and the reliance on affective processing in donation decisions 
are reduced. 
The present study was designed to manipulate information processing indirectly 
by varying victim identifiability and number of victims. Specifically, a single victim was 
either identified or not, and was presented by herself or as part of20,000 other victims. 
These 20,000 other victims serve as a background statistic similar to Small, Loewenstein, 
& Slovic (2007i9, and function as a reference group to the single victim. Even though 
results from Study I and 2 found no support for this, research on donations has found that 
donations to a single victim are sometimes special in that affective reactions are strongest 
for an individual victim (Kogut & Ritov, 2005b; Slovic, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & 
Slovic, 2007). Moreover, when people engage in System I processing they have been 
found to be less sensitive to changes in the number ofvictims than when they are 
processing information with System 2 (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). Thus, the present 
study explored whether the affective reactions arising from System I are malleable when 
background information about the size of the victim reference group is presented, and 
29 These authors used numbers that were larger (ranging into the millions), but the effect on information 
processing should be similar since the affective system is sensitive to changes only when numbers are quite 
small (e.g., 1 vs. 2 victims; Vlistj1ill et aI, in preparation). 
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whether manipulating the identifiability ofa victim increases victim-focused affective 
reactions. 
It is not clear how the presentation impacts self- vs. other-focused affect. If adding 
statistics increases deliberative processing, as suggested by Small, Loewenstein, and 
Slovic (2007), then this deliberation might have negative effects on the System 1 output. 
To the extent that self- and other-focused affect spring out of System 1 processing, both 
should be reduced when statistical background information is added to a single victim. 
However, Studies I and 2 have shown that other-focused affect is more sensitive to how 
information is processed, and shifting people's information processing towards 
deliberation could reduce other-focused affect more than self-focused affect. 
Nonetheless, self-focused affect could also be impacted by changes in background 
statistics, but not because of changes in deliberative vs. affective processing. For 
example, if the motivation to help others springs out of a need to make oneself feel better, 
then the efficacy of the donation should be ofmore importance. If a donation is judged to 
have a larger impact on one identified victim (vs. an identified victim that is part of a 
larger mass of victims) then it is likely that more help is provided to a victim that is 
presented alone without statistics. Donating to a large group ofvictims, where the 
donation has little impact, could reduce the extent to which one would feel better after 
making a donation. 
If the target is emotionally salient (i.e., an identified victim), it should be less 
dependent on changes in the referent group size. Conversely, if the target is not 
affectively salient, then changing the size ofthe referent group may produce a "drop in 
the bucket" effect, produced by participants' sensitivity to the size ofthe reference group. 
It is possible that participants' numeric ability influences their perception ofthe 
victims that are presented with background statistics. High numeracy is thought to enable 
people to derive meaning even from abstract numbers (e.g., percentages: Peters et aI., 
2006), and might lead them to react differently to the addition ofvictim statistics. Higher 
numeracy might lead to more abstract (i.e., System 2) processing, and lower affective 
reactions (e.g. sympathy towards victims). This shift in processing might also impact 
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participants' entitativity perceptions, as people with greater deliberative capacity have 
been shown to see groups as less entitative than people will less capacity (e.g., Study 1). 
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: If the target victim is identified, it should be less dependent on changes 
in the size ofthe referent group (i.e., whether victims are part of a bigger group). 
Thus, an interaction is predicted so that presenting a victim alone will produce 
higher donations compared to when it is presented as part of a larger group only 
when it is unidentified. 
The predicted interaction between identifiability and numbers ofvictims is based 
on the notion that when victims are not emotionally salient (i.e., unidentified), donations 
to them will be sensitive to the referent group size. Helping unidentified victims who are 
part of a bigger group would thus appear to be just a drop in the bucket. Furthermore, 
identifYing a victim is predicted to increase System 1 processing and lead to stronger 
victim-focused affective reactions. 
Hypothesis 2: Providing identifYing information for a single victim should increase 
participants' affective responses. 
Feelings such as sympathy and compassion are hypothesized to be sensitive to 
how information is processed, while affect focused on the self (e.g., anticipated regret) 
should not be dependent on identifiability because it does not take the individuality ofthe 
victim into consideration (after all, the focus ofthe affective reaction is on the self). 
Additionally, victim-focused affect is expected to predict participants' willingness to 
contribute only when information processing depends on System 1 (Le., when the victim 
is identified). IdentifYing a victim should lead to more affective information processing, 
which should not only influence mean differences in victim-focused affect, but also in the 
extent to which this affect is used in the decision to donate money 
Hypothesis 3: It is expected that affective reactions related to the victim will predict 
willingness to contribute in the identified condition. Other-focused affect should 
predict donations only when the victim is identified and presented alone. Self­
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focused affect should be less sensitive to presentation mode and predict donations 
regardless ofidentifiability. 
Finally, the tendency to deliberate about choices has been, at least in part, found to 
be dependent on people's numeric ability (peters et ai., 2006). Higher numeracy should 
lead to more abstract processing and less reliance on immediate affective reactions in the 
decision to donate. Conversely, low numerate persons base their decisions to donate 
more on affective (Le., System 1) processing. Thus, less numerate persons may rely 
more on their immediate affective reactions when forming an impression ofthe victim 
and might therefore perceive higher victim entitativity than high numerate people. 
Hypothesis 4: Low numerate persons are expected to have clearer (and less abstract) 
mental representations and clearer feelings for the victim. This should be 
especially the case when the victim is identified. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and sixty-eight students at the University of Oregon took part 
in this study. Ofthese participants, 52% were graduate students. The mean age was 25.8 years 
(SD = 7.6), and 51% of the participants were female. 
Design. In a 2 identifiability (identified vs. unidentified) x 2 background statistics 
(one victim vs. one out of20,000 victims) between-subjects design, victim identity was 
manipulated by randomly selecting half ofthe participants and presenting them with 
identifYing information about a victim (picture, name, and individuating information) 
while the other half did not see this information. Presentation ofbackground statistics 
was manipulated by presenting the victim alone or informing the participants that the 
victim was part of20,000 victims in a similar situation. The dependent variables of 
interest included participants' willingness to contribute (WTC) a real donation to the 
victim, as well as participants' feelings in regard to the victims and the victim's situation. 
Materials and Procedures. The materials to this study were presented as part ofa 
larger survey unrelated to the present experiment. Participants completed a portion of 
another study and were then paid $14 for their participation together with a charity 
request letter and an envelope. The experimenter instructed them to read the charity 
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request letter, fill out several questions on the letter, and return the letter together with 
any money they wished to donate in the envelope. Participants were instructed to fill out 
the charity request letter even if they did not want to donate any money, and further 
requested that they sealed the envelope before returning it. This was done purposefully 
to minimize experimenter demand effects on participants' donations. The charity request 
letter used similar information as a study done by Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic (2007), 
and informed participants that: 
"You have the opportunity to donate any ofyour just-earned money to the 
humanitarian aid organization Save the Children. Any money that you donate 
will go toward relieving the severe food crisis in Southern Africa." 
Halfofthe participants were presented with detailed information of the victim, 
while the other half was only informed that they would be able to donate to "a child in 
Africa". The detailed information included a picture (used previously by Vlistfjlill et aI., 
in preparation), the victim's name (Rokia) and age (7 years old). Depending on which 
condition participants were assigned to, they were then further informed that: 
"Rokia (the child) is desperately poor, and faces a threat of severe hunger or even 
starvation. Her (his or her) life will be changed for the better as a result ofyour 
fmancial gift. With your support, and the support of other caring sponsors, Save 
the Children will work with Rokia's (this child's) family and other members of 
the community to help feed her and provide her (him or her) with education, as 
well as basic medical care and hygiene." 
Victim identity (identified vs. unidentified) was crossed with background 
statistics (one victim vs. one out of20,000 victims), so that halfofthe participants were 
presented with additional information that Rokia (the child) is "one of20,000 needy 
children in the same region who are desperately poor. .." to increase the dimension ofthe 
tragedy. (See Appendix C for details). After reading their respective information about 
the victim, participants were asked to indicate whether they would be willing to make a 
fmancial contribution and, if so, to state the amount. On a second, attached page 
participants were asked several questions with 7-point Likert response scales that targeted 
their feelings in regard to the victim and victim's situation (e.g., how much worry and 
sympathy they felt for the victim). Finally, participants were asked to put the completed 
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charity request letter in an envelope and return it to the experimenter. After the charity 
request letter was turned in, the experimenter handed the participants other, unrelated 
materials to complete (e.g., Liplcus' numeracy scale; Peters et aI., 2006). The numeracy 
scale consisted of 15 questions that test participants' ability to correctly answer 
mathematical questions related to percentages, fractions, and probabilities. For example, 
participants were asked to identify which ofthe following represents a greater risk of 
getting a disease: 1%, 10%, or 5%. The complete numeracy scale is presented in 
AppendixC. 
Results 
Descriptive and Preliminary Analyses. Ofthe 168 participants, 113 (67%) 
donated money to the victim. The percentage ofparticipants who contributed per 
condition ranged from 64 - 71 %, and a i test of independence failed to reach 
significance,IO, N=168) = .19, ns. Descriptive analyses showed that several variables 
of interest were significantly skewed and were therefore non-linearly transformed to 
conform to the assumptions ofnormality. Specifically, these variables included 
participants' WTC scores, sympathy, clear and coherent picture ofthe victim, the impact 
of the donation, and numeracy. 
Affect Structure. Before testing the effects of identifiability and presence vs. 
absence ofbackground statistics on donations and affective reactions, descriptive zero­
order correlational analyses were performed (see Tables 17 and 18). 
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Table 17: Means and Standard Deviations ofWTC and Affect Variables 
Identified Identified Unidentified Unidentified Totals 
Single Victim with Single Victim with Across 
Victim Statistics Victim Statistics Conditions 
(N=42) (N=42) (N=42) (N=42) (N= 168) 
Means (SD) Means (SD) Means (SD) Means (SD) Means (SD) 
WTC 2.76 (4.0) 2.57 (3.0) 3.26 (4.23) 2.38 (3.39) 2.74 (3.7)
 
WTCa .94 (.84) .96 (.81) 1.03 (.90) .86 (.82) .95 (.84)
 
Worry 4.3 (1.6) 4.0 (1.7) 3.8 (1.5) 4.1 (1.8) 4.0 (1.6)
 
Sympathy 5.4 (1.3) 5.3 (1.4) 4.6 (1.7) 5.0 (1.8) 5.1 (1.6)
 
Sympathy" 30.1 (12.8) 30.5 (13.9) 24.3 (14.2) 28.4 (16.4) 28.5 (14.5) 
Feel better 3.5 (1.9) 3.1 (1.8) 3.5 (1.7) 2.8 (1.5) 3.2 (1.7) 
Anti. Regret 3.8 (2.2) 3.5 (2.2) 4.0 (1.9) 3.4 (2.1) 3.7 (2.1) 
Impact 3.1 (1.7) 2.7 (1.4) 3.0 (1.6) 2.5 (1.4) 2.8 (1.6) 
Impact" 1.3 (.42) 1.2 (.37) 1.3 (.39) 1.2 (.39) 1.6 (.45) 
Clear Feeling 3.8 (1.6) 3.8 (1.6) 3.2 (1.7) 3.2 (1.6) 3.5 (1.6) 
Coherent 3.6 (1.9) 3.1 (1.6) 2.9 (1.7) 2.6 (1.6) 3.0 (1.7)Picture
 
Coherent
 1.8 (.52) 1.7 (.47) 1.6 (.52) 1.5 (.49) 1.7 (.50)Picturea
 
aNon-linearly transformed variable
 
Note: All variables except WTC were measured on a 1-7 point Likert scale.
 
Table 18: Correlations Between WTC and Affect Variables 
Feel ClearWTC Worry Sympathy Regret ImpactBetter Feeling 
WTC 
Worry .02 
Sympathy .12 .68** 
Feel better .22** .31 ** .26**
 
Anticipated
 
.33** .29** .28** .59**Regret
 
Impact .26** .33** .34** .43** .31**
 
Clear
 
.10 .56** .61 ** .28** 28** .42**Feeling
 
Coherent
 
.16* .38** .39** .66** .33** .30** .47**Picture 
* = sig. at p<.05; ** = sig. at p<.OI 
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Results show that all variables were positively correlated. Of special interest are 
those affect variables that are thought to measure self- vs. other-focused affect. 
Participants' sympathy and worry ratings were highly correlated (r = .68), as were their 
ratings of how much better they felt due to donating and their anticipated regret (r = .59). 
Entitativity perceptions, measured by how clear a feeling and how coherent a picture 
participants had of the victim was also highly positively correlated (r = .47), but both 
variables also highly correlated with the other affect variables. 
Similar to Study 1 and Study 2, a principle components analysis was conducted 
with sympathy, worry, feeling better, and anticipated regret. Results with an eigenvalue 
above 1 as a criterion reveal two affect components, which account for 82.5% of the 
variables' variance (see Table 19). While all four variables load highly on the first factor, 
a second factor seems to distinguish between those variables that measure self- vs. other­
focused affect. 
Table 19: Component Loadings ofAffect Variables on Unrotated Affect Factors 
Affect Affect Affect 
Variables: Component 1 Component 2 
Sympathy .756 -.524 
Worry .776 -.485 
Feel better .720 .541 
Anticipated Regret .727 .526 
Eigenvalue 2.2 1.1 
Percentage ofVariance explained 55.5 27.0 
A rotated component solution shows a similar pattern as the principle components 
analyses in Study 1 and 2 (see Table 20). Specifically, sympathy and worry load highly 
on the first component ("affect focused on others") and feeling better and anticipated 
regret load highly on a second factor ("affect focused on self'). 
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Table 20: Component Loadings ofAffect Variables on RotatedAffect Factors 
Affect Other-focused Self-focused 
Variables: Affect Affect 
Sympathy .909 .140
 
Worry .879 .183
 
Feel better .150 .888
 
Anticipated Regret .165 .882
 
Eigenvalue 1.7 1.6
 
Percentage of Variance explained 42.0 40.5
 
Effects ofIdentifiability and Victim Number on Donations. A logistic regression 
analysis was run for each ofthe four experimental conditions to test whether participants' 
decision to donate any money at all was dependent on their affective responses. Findings 
from Study 1 and 2 suggest that the decision to donate anything is more related to self­
vs. other- focused affect, which is the reason why only these two variables were used as 
predictors3o. Results are shown in Table 21, and indicate that self-focused affect is 
indeed predictive of the initial decision to donate in all conditions. An increase in self­
focused affect increases the odds of making a donation. As in the previous studies, other­
focused affect did not significantly predict participants' decision to donate. 
30 Inclusion of the other individual difference variables yielded identical results, but to test the model that 
the initial decisions to donate are based on affect, only self- and other focused variables are included here. 
In a full model, none ofthe other predictor variables (i.e., impact of donation, clear feelings, and coherent 
picture ofthe victim) significantly predicted donation choices in any condition. 
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Table 21: Affective Predictors ofDonation Decisions by Condition 
Overall Model Individual Predictors Exp(b) Wald p 
Identified Other-Focused Affect 1.379 .82 .365 
Victim 
l(2)= 17.5,p<.001 Self-Focused Affect 1.573 8.90 .003 
Identified Victim Other-Focused Affect .989 .01 .970 
with Statistics 
l (2) = 17.2, P < .001 Self-Focused Affect 1.792 9.03 .003 
Unidentified Other-Focused Affect .999 .01 .996 
Victim 
l (2) = 5.5, P < .07 Self-Focused Affect 1.321 4.18 .041 
Unidentified Other-Focused Affect .627 2.58 .108 
Victim with Statistics 
l (2) = 16.8, P < .001 Self-Focused Affect 1.898 8.442 .004 
To test the effect ofvictim identity and background statistics on participants' 
donation amount, a 2 (identified vs. unidentified) x 2 (one victim vs. one out of20,000 
victims) factorial ANOVA was run on the dependent variables. It was hypothesized that 
identifying the victim by a picture, name, and age (as was done in Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; 
2005b) would increase participants' WTC. Additionally, it was expected that increasing 
the number ofvictims by adding statistics (i.e., 20,000 victims) would decrease 
participants' WTC to the target victim. Contrary to expectations, results show that 
neither identification ofthe victim nor the addition ofbackground statistics had a 
significant effect on WTC (reported in Table 17). Furthermore, the predicted interaction 
also failed to reach significance, allFs (1,164) < 1, ns. 
Effects ofIdentifiability and Victim Number on Affect Focused on Others. Similar 
ANOVAs were run on participants' affective responses to the victim. Of particular 
interest were feelings that are focused on others (e.g., sympathy and worry about the 
victims) vs. feelings focused on the self (e.g., regret and feeling better if a donation was 
made). As expected, participants' sympathy ratings for the victim were higher (M= 5.4, 
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SD = 1.4) when identified compared to when she was unidentified (M= 4.8, SD = 1.7), 
F(1,163) = 4.7,p < .05, y/p=.03. Adding background statistics did not have a significant 
impact on sympathy ratings, and neither did the interaction between identification and 
background statistics, Fs(1 ,163) < 1, ns. Participants further reported a higher degree of 
worrying about the victim in the identified conditions (M= 4.1, SD = 1.6) than in the 
unidentified condition (M = 3.9, SD = 1.6), but this difference failed to reach 
significance, F(1,162) < 1, ns. As with sympathy, worry also did not depend on whether 
background statistics were provided or not, and the interaction between background 
statistics and victim identifiability was also not significant, Fs(1, 162) < 1.5, ns. A 
combination of sympathy and worry showed no significant main effects or interaction, Fs 
< 2.1,p >.1. 
Effects ofIdentifiability and Victim Number on Affect Focused on Self Similar 
ANOVAs with feelings focused on the self as dependent variables showed a significant 
main effect ofbackground statistics on how much better participants felt if a donation 
was made, F(1, 163) = 4.2, p<.05, y/p=.03. Specifically, participants reported that a 
donation would make them feel better when the victim was presented without statistics 
(Le., by herself) (M= 3.5, SD = 1.8) than when statistics were included (i.e., as part of 
20,000 other victims) (M= 2.9, SD = 1.7). No other effects were significant, F(1,163) < 
1, ns. Results with anticipated regret as a dependent variable showed similar, but non­
significant patterns. A combination of anticipated regret and the extent to which 
participants felt better due to a donation showed higher self-focused affect when the 
victim was presented without statistics (Le., by herself) (M= 7.4, SD = 3.4) than when 
statistics were included (i.e., as part of20,000 other victims) (M= 6.4, SD = 3.5), 
F(1,162) = 3.6,p < .06, y/p=.02. 
The results ofhigher self-focused affect when victims were presented without 
statistics point to the possibility that this type ofaffect is sensitive to how effective one's 
donation would be. To test this, participants' impact judgments were analyzed. A 2 
(identifiability) x 2 (background statistics) ANOVA with impact judgments as a 
dependent variable (Le., how much ofan impact a donation would make to the victim's 
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situation) revealed a marginally significant main effect, so that participants reported their 
donations to have a greater impact when the victim was presented by herself (M = 1.7, SD 
= .47) than when she was presented as part of a bigger group (M = 1.5, SD = .42), 
F(1,156) = 3.0,p<.09, IJp=.02. This result dovetails with the main effect ofbackground 
statistics found for self-focused affect. The potential mediating effect ofimpact 
judgments on feelings focused on the selfwas tested with an 2 (identifiability) x 2 
(background statistics) ANCOVA, and found that after controlling for the significant 
effects of impact judgments, F(1,155) = 36.7,p < .001, IJp= .19, the main effect of 
background statistics on feelings focused on the self (i.e., feeling better about the self) 
was no longer significant, F(1 ,155) = 1.3, P > .2, IJp= .01. 
Before testing the hypothesis that affect predicts donations better in the identified 
conditions (Hypothesis 3), a correlational analysis was performed on zero-order 
correlations between WTC and the individual variables in each of the four experimental 
conditions31 . The correlations of each variable with WTC are presented in Table 22 
(means were presented in Table 17). 
Table 22: Correlations Between WTC andAffect Variables by Condition 
Identified 
Single Victim 
Identified 
V · t' 'th1C 1m WI 
St t · t' a IS 1CS 
.. 
UmdentlfiedS' 1 V' . 
mg e 1ctlm 
Unidentified 
Victim with 
Statistics 
Worry .18 .01 -.04 .00 
Sympathy" .39* .14 -.01 .06 
Feel better .45** .27 .15 .35* 
Anticipated Regret .47** .45** .30* .43** 
Impact" .36* .25 .22 .21 
Clear Feeling .27 .00 -.09 .27 
Coherent Picture" .27 .12 .12 .26 
* = sig. at p<.05; ** = sig. at p<.OI; aNon-linearly transformed variable; 
31 For complete correlation tables including the relationship of the affect variables to each other, see 
Appendix C. 
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Inspection of Table 22 shows that feelings focused on the victim (i.e., worry and 
sympathy) are more positively correlated to WTC when the victim was identified and 
presented without statistics. Feelings focused on the self(i.e., anticipated regret and how 
much better participants felt about themselves if they donated), on the other hand, are 
significantly positively correlated with WTC in all conditions. To test whether victim­
focused affect was differentially predictive ofWTC while controlling for self-focused 
affect, separate regression analyses were run in each condition with sympathy and regret 
as predictor variables and WTC as the dependent variable32• Results are shown in Table 
23 and suggest that, when controlling for the impact ofregret, sympathy is only 
predictive ofWTC in the identified single victim condition. Anticipated regret, on the 
other hand, was predictive of donations in all conditions33. Thus, it appears as though 
feelings focused on the self(as measured by anticipated regret) are robust predictors of 
donations, regardless ofvictim identifiability or whether statistics were shown. Feelings 
focused on others (as measured by sympathy and compassion) show a different pattern, 
and are only predictive ofdonations when a victim was identified and presented without 
statistics. 
32 Using combinations of sympathy and worry as indicators of other-focused affect and anticipated regret 
and feel better as indicators of self-focused affect revealed that only self-focused affect was predictive of 
donation amount. However, a more nuanced approach (informed by the main effects identified earlier) 
with only sympathy and anticipated regret as predictors is presented here. 
33 A similar regression analysis that substituted how much better participants felt if they donated money to 
the victim for regret showed the same general results. 
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Table 23: Regression Analyses ofAffect Predicting WTC by Identification x Background 
Statistics 
Overall Model Individual Predictors pfJ 
.05Identified Single Victim Sympathy .25 1.7 (one-tailed) F(2,38)=7.3,p < .01,
 
adjR2= .24 Anticipated Regret .38 2.5 .015
 
Identified Victim with Sympathy .06 .4 .688Statistics
 
F(2,38)=4.9,p < .05,
 Anticipated Regret .44 3.0 .005
adjR2= .16 
Unidentified Single Sympathy -.1 0 .6 .552Victim
 
F(2,39) 2.1, p>.1,
 Anticipated Regret .32 2.0 .050
adjR2= .05 
Unidentified Victim Sympathy -.09 -.6 .576
with Statistics
 
F(2,39)=4.7,p < .05,
 Anticipated Regret .46 3.0 .004
adjR2= .15 
Effects ofNumeracy. Finally, it was hypothesized that affective responses to the 
victim depend on participants' numeracy (Hypothesis 4). Specifically, it was expected 
that higher numeracy will lead to more abstract (i.e., System 2) processing of the 
infonnation and, possibly, less concrete mental representation of the identified victim. 
To test this, a correlational analysis of identified vs. unidentified conditions34 was 
conducted and is presented in Table 24. 
34 Results for presentation ofa single victim with and without statistics are presented in APPENDIX C. 
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Table 24: Correlations with Numeracy {or Identified vs. Unidentified Victim 
Identified Victim Unidentified Victim 
WTC" .25* .13 
Worry -.21 -.07 
Sympathy" -.21 -.10 
Clear Feeling -.22* -.04 
Feel better .07 .05 
Anticipated Regret .08 .01 
Impact" -.08 -.19 
Coherent Picture" -.31 ** .07 
* = sig. at p<.06 ** = sig. at p<.Ol; "Non-linearly transformed variable 
Inspection of Table 24 shows that numeracy was only related to donations and 
entitativity perceptions (i.e., "clear feelings" and "coherent picture") in the identified 
victim conditions. Specifically, numeracy was positively correlated to WTC, and 
negatively correlated with how clear a feelings participants had and how clear and 
coherent a picture they had ofthe victim. This supports the notion that although higher 
numeracy may lead to higher WTC, it is also related to a less clear and possibly less 
concrete representation of the victim. To test this directly, a factorial ANOVA with 
identifiability (identified vs. unidentified victim) and a median split for numeracl5 (high 
vs.low) as between-subject factors was conducted with "how clear and coherent a 
picture" participants had ofthe victim as a dependent variable. Results showed that 
participants in the identified condition (M = 1.74, SD = .49) had a significantly clearer 
picture of the victim than those in the unidentified condition (M = 1.58, SD = .50), 
F(l,162) = 4.4,p < .05, 'lp= .03. Furthermore, high numerate participants (M= 1.58, SD 
= .49) had a significantly less clear picture of the victim than low numerate ones (M= 
1.73, SD = .21), F(l,162) = 4.0,p < .05, 'lp= .02. In addition to these main effects, 
numeracyand identifiability showed a significant interaction, F(l,162) = 6.6,p < .05, 'lp 
= .04. Low numerate participants (M= 1.91, SD = .43) had a clearer picture of the victim 
compared to high numerate participants in the identified condition (M = 1.56, SD = .46). 
35 A median split for numeracy was justified due to its significant skewness (McCallum et aI, 2002; Peters 
et aI, 2006). 
81 
However, this difference was not present in the unidentified conditions, where high and 
low numerates had a similarly clear picture of the victim (M = 1.56, SD = .52; and M = 
1.55, SD = .49. for high and low numerates, respectively). A combination ofhow clear a 
feeling and how coherent a picture measured participants' entitativity perceptions, and 
showed a significant main effects for numeracy and identifiability, as well as a significant 
interaction. Results showed that participants in the identified condition (M = 3.58, SD = 
1.47) reported significantly higher entitativity perceptions than those in the unidentified 
condition (M= 2.97, SD = 1.55),F(1,163) = 4.9,p < .05, 1]p= .03. Furthermore, high 
numerate participants (M= 2.95, SD = 1.48) reported significantly lower entitativity 
perceptions than participants low in numeracy (M= 3.56, SD = 1.53), F(1,163) = 5.9,p < 
.05, 1]p= .04. In addition to these main effects, a statistically significant interaction was 
found, F(1,163) = 5.7, p < .05, 1]p = .03. Inspection ofFigure 7 reveals that low 
numerate participants reported higher entitativity judgments than other participants. A 
simple effects analysis showed that when presented with an identified victim, low 
numerate participants (M= 4.03, SD = 1.38) reported significantly higher entitativity 
perceptions than high numerate participants (M= 2.93, SD = 1.37), t(8l) = 3.6,p < .01. 
When the victim was unidentified, the difference between high and low numeracy 
disappeared. 
5 Iiiiil Low Nmneracy t§.:I High Nmneracy 
0+--­
Unidentified Identified
 
Note: Error bars denote 95% Confidence Intervals. 
Figure 7: Entitativity Perceptions as a Function ofNumeracy and Identifiability 
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These results suggest that low numerates' mental representation ofthe victim is 
sensitive to the presentation format. Specifically, they seem to be dependent on concrete 
representations in order to have concrete mental images. High numerate participants, on 
the other hand, do not show a difference due to identification and their representation of 
the victim is less influenced by identifying information36. 
While higher numeracy resulted in less concrete representations and lower victim­
focused affect, the correlational results presented in Table 24 further suggest that high 
numerate people may have donated more money than low numerate individuals. The 
direct effect ofnumeracy on participants' WTC was highlighted by separating numeracy 
scores into four quartiles and performing a linear trend analysis37 with WTC as a 
dependent variable. Descriptive statistics for the quartile split are presented in Table 25. 
Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for Quartile Split on Numeracy 
Lowest Low High Highest 
Numeracy Numeracy Numeracy Numeracy 
Numeracy score 4-10 11-12 13 14-15 
N 37 52 44 35 
WTC 1.81 2.62 3.22 3.77 
Sympathy 5.54 5.21 4.93 4.66 
Results of the trend analysis showed a significant linear trend, F(1 ,164) = 4.9,p 
<.05, tip = .03, such that as numeracy increased participants donated more money. The 
differential impact ofnumeracy on WTC and victim-focused affect was demonstrated by 
a similar trend analysis with sympathy as the dependent variable. As expected, results 
showed that as participants' numeracy increased, sympathy for the victim decreased, 
36 Similar factorial ANOVAs were run for "how clear a feeling" participants had for the victim, and also 
with variables measuring self- (e.g., anticipated regret and feeling better) vs. other-focused (e.g., sympathy 
and worry) affect. Results are presented in APPENDIX C, and suggest that self-focused affect does not 
depend on victim identifiability and participants' numeracy. However, other-focused affect is consistently 
lower for high numerates compared to low numerates, which supports the notion that high numerates 
engage less in System I processing and have a less concrete picture of the victim. 
37 Analyses that retain the continuous scale ofnumeracy are congruent with the results ofthe quartile split, 
and presented in APPENDIX C. 
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F(l,163) = 6.8,p < .01, I1p = .04, see Figure 8). A similar trend analysis with self-focused 
affect (anticipated regret and feeling better) as the dependent measure was not significant. 
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Figure 8: Sympathy and WTC by Numeracy 
Discussion 
The main purpose of the present experiment was to test the effects of 
identifiability and background statistics on participants' use of self- vs. other-focused 
affect in the decision to donate money to a victim in need. Participants saw one of four 
conditions, in which a victim was either identified (or unidentified) and either presented 
by herselfor as part of 20,000 other victims similar to her. Results suggest that while 
these (indirect) manipulations ofprocessing mode had no direct effect on participants' 
WTC, it did affect participants' feelings focused on the victim. As expected, identifying 
a victim by name, age, and picture led to higher reported sympathy and worry about the 
victim. The background statistics manipulation had a significant effect on feelings 
focused on the self (i.e., anticipated regret and how much better participants felt about 
themselves if a donation was made), such that participants reported stronger self-focused 
feelings when the victim was presented alone and not as part ofa group. 
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These results point to the possibility that feelings are more malleable than actual 
donations, but they also suggest that self- vs. other-focused affect is sensitive to different 
aspects ofthe presentation of the victims. While more sympathy is generated for 
identified victims, presenting a victim singly (as opposed to as part of a group) can evoke 
stronger feelings ofanticipated regret if one doesn't help, and makes people feel better 
about themselves ifthey do. Participants also reported that they believed their donation 
would have a greater impact when the victim was presented by herself (vs. as part of 
20,000). After controlling for the effects ofhow much impact a donation would have, the 
effect ofadding background statistics on self-focused feelings disappeared. Thus, self­
focused affect may be sensitive to background statistics due to the fact that these feelings 
are primarily a motivator to regulate one's own emotional state. If the donation is judged 
to have little impact, then self-focused feelings are probably not very motivating to help, 
as the donation is likely not changing how one feels. 
The role of impact judgments can also potentially explain why participants did not 
feel better about themselves for donating to one out ofmany victims (Le., to a larger 
problem). While there are self-focused emotions that can be associated with helping a 
larger group (e.g., pride), these feelings might be dependent on the donation actually 
having some impact. The current study found tentative support for the notion that adding 
background statistics reduced the judged impact ofa donation and the associated emotion 
as well. If a donation is judged to have little impact then donating is unlikely to change 
one's negative emotional state. However, this also suggests that self-focused affect is 
not entirely self-focused, but also takes infonnation about the victims and the impact of 
one's donation into account. Thus, it appears as that both other- and self-focused affect 
might be sensitive to the state and condition ofthe victims at least to some degree. As 
the correlational analyses revealed, self-and other-focused affect variables are usually 
positively correlated, and it is likely that these two types offeelings infonn each other. 
While feelings focused on the selfdepended on the presentation ofbackground 
statistics, feelings focused on the victim were higher when the victim was identified. 
Other-focused feelings seem to be sensitive to how tangible and concretely the victim 
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was presented. An identified victim is more tangible and easier to affectively focus on 
compared to a nameless and unidentified one. 
More central to the discussion ofdonations and dual information processing in the 
present experiment, an analysis ofparticipants , decision to donate showed further support 
for a two-step model by which people decide whether to donate and then construct the 
donation amount. As found in Study 1 and 2, participants' self-focused affect was 
predictive of decisions to donate any money at all. After this initial decision, the 
donation amount was also dependent on victim-focused affect in the condition where 
information was presented in an affectively salient way. Specifically, victim-focused 
affect was predictive ofdonations only when the affective salience of the victim was 
enhanced by its identifiability and not diminished by adding statistics (i.e., information 
about a larger group ofvictims). Thus, the present results extend Small, Loewenstein, & 
Slovic's (2007) contention that adding statistics changes participants' reliance on feelings 
in the decision to donate. Results of the current experiment suggest that the type of 
feelings (self- vs. other-focused affect) is sensitive to different aspects of information 
processing changes. Other-focused affect (as measured by sympathy and compassion) 
was dependent on victim identifiability, suggesting presentation of an identified victim 
results in more affective (i.e., System 1) information processing. Self-focused affect, on 
the other hand, was sensitive to the addition ofbackground statistics. 
Finally, it was expected that people with lower numeric ability process 
information in a more concrete (and less abstract) way than those with high numeracy. 
Results confirmed this prediction and showed that low numerate persons had a more 
entitative perception (i.e., clearer feelings and more coherent picture) of the victim than 
highly numerate individuals. Moreover, this difference was only significant when the 
victim was identified, suggesting that high numerate people do not process concrete 
information in the same way that low numerate people do. It should be noted that while 
numeracy was negatively correlated with sympathy, it was also positively correlated with 
donations. Thus, even though individuals with high numeric skill had lower sympathy 
for the identified victim than people with low numerate skill, they still donated more. 
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The fact that high numeracy leads to higher donations in spite ofthe comparatively lower 
victim-focused affect suggests that high numerate people may not rely as much on this 
type ofaffective reaction to concrete stimuli when constructing their donation amount. 
Specifically, ifhighly numerate people process information more abstractly, then their 
System I processing may not generate the same emotional reactions for the victims. 
An alternative explanation would take into account that high numerate 
participants are demographically different than low numerate participants. It is possible 
that prosocial behavior has been modeled by their (probably highly numerate and 
successful) parents, and that higher contributions from high numerates are a sign of 
learned behavior in this respect. However, since no data was collected on participants' 
income or the educational level of their parents, the current study cannot address these 
speculations. 
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CHAPTER VII 
STUDY 4: SERIAL PRESENTATION 
Rationale and Hypotheses 
It is common practice by charity organizations to identify single victims in 
graphical forms (e.g., by pictures). Using this format, several victims are presented one 
at a time in serial fashion before the potential donor decides whether to make a financial 
contribution. 
While research on donations has started to examine the effect ofpresenting 
several pictures ofvictims, the emphasis is usually on comparing one vs. a group of 
victims. Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 2005b) compared donations to one vs. a group of 
victims and found that higher donations and stronger affective reactions for a single 
picture compared to victims presented in a group picture. However, results do not 
uniformly support the notion that affective responses towards one target victim are 
always higher compared to several victims. Specifically, while Kogut & Ritov (2005a) 
found that a single identified child received higher donations, Hsee & Rottenstreich 
(2004) did not fmd a difference in donations for one vs. four pandas when presented as a 
picture. Furthermore, Studies 1 and 2 in this dissertation also did not find support for 
single victims receiving higher donations than groups ofvictims. 
Recent research comparing the influence of serial presentation ofvictims (as 
opposed to presenting all at once) suggests that affective reactions are stronger for 
victims presented last in such a sequence (van Boven, SJDM 2007). People's attention 
seems to be drawn to more immediate information, while information about victims 
presented earlier might become less accessible over time. Van Boven found that 
participants displayed an affective 'immediacy bias' and judged a second crisis as more 
severe than a previously viewed crisis. 
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However, it is also possible that presenting several victims one at a time (opposed 
to a group picture) may have the unexpected effect ofdistracting from the eventual target 
victim. Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic (2007) found that adding statistical background 
(with information on a food crisis) to an identified victim reduced donations in 
comparison to identifying the victim without the added information. These authors 
speculate that additional (affect-poor) information leads to more System 2 processing and 
weaker affective responses to the target victim. Evaluation of the identified victim with 
additional statistical information may reduce caring because it requires analytic and 
deliberative thought. Study 3 in this dissertation found some support for the notion that 
affective reactions are dependent on how a victim is presented (e.g., as part of a larger 
group). The current study will address the question of whether presenting victims one at 
a time has a similar effect. Instead ofadding background statistics, as was done in Study 
3, several identified victims will be added prior to presenting a single target victim. 
Furthermore, the present study also manipulates the identity ofthe target by 
either presenting different victims or presenting the target victim several times before a 
donation could be made. Keeping the target victim identical while manipulating both the 
dimension of the tragedy (i.e., number ofvictims) and the identity of these victims 
(similar to the victim vs. identical to the victim) un-confounds the effects ofchanges to 
the victim number (i.e., one vs. four vs. eight) and the effects ofvictim identity. 
Additionally, the current study investigates whether perceptions of relevance are a 
critical factor in the decision to donate money. Loewenstein and Small (2007) suggest 
that donations, as well as emotional responses, are related to how similar victims are to 
the potential donor. Higher perceived similarity and higher personal relevance judgments 
are usually expected to lead to more caring about the victims. 
The design and manipulation of the current study gave rise to the following 
considerations regarding hypotheses. The target victim was kept constant in all 
conditions for purposes of comparisons that are specific to a single victim with and 
without prior exposure to other victims. Since the target was always the same, it is 
possible that WTC will not be markedly different for each condition. Furthermore, affect 
89 
felt for the victims is also expected not to vary between conditions, as affect elicited by 
the victim should be the same for identical target victims38. 
However, the main hypothesis of interest for the current study did not concern 
mean level differences in feelings or donations, but primarily concerned the use ofaffect 
as a source of information when it comes to deciding how much to donate towards the 
target victim. It is hypothesized that affective vs. deliberative information processing 
depends on the number and identity of the victim. Seeing more victims in serial order 
might increase deliberative information processing because it allows for comparative 
evaluations while at the same time taking attention away from the target victim (see 
Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007, Unger, 
1995). Specifically, as found in Studies 1 through 3, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to contribute will depend on participants' affective 
responses. 
Presenting more victims will lead to less reliance on affect (e.g., sympathy) 
towards the target victim. Since the target victim is the same in each condition affective 
reactions are not expected to differ substantially between conditions. However, viewing 
additional victims in serial order should reduce the impact of sympathy on donations 
because ofa shift towards more deliberative processing. Feelings that are focused on the 
self, on the other hand, are thought to be more robust against changes in processing mode 
(e.g., Rossnagel, 2000). The moderating effect of information processing mode on the 
predictive strength ofvictim-focused affect on donations is hypothesized to produce the 
following result: 
Hypothesis 2: Affect towards the victim will be more predictive of donations in the 
single target condition compared to the conditions where additional victims are 
shown. 
The last hypothesis concerns the effect of the identity of the additional victims. It 
is possible that an effect ofpresenting these additional victims may be due to their 
38 Itwould be possible to expect differences in affect towards the target victim if a sufficient amount of 
distractor victims was shown to produce compassion fatigue or psychic numbing (Slovic 2007). 
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different identities. For example, different victims might give rise to comparative 
processes on affective dimensions. One way to keep the number ofvictims that are 
processed constant while manipulating the victim identity is to present the target victim 
several times before one can make a donation. Presenting the same target victim several 
times does not give rise to comparative evaluations to other victims, but it may reduce 
affective processing by increasing the time between forming an affective impression of 
the victim (when first seeing the target) and making a donation response (after seeing the 
last target picture). Furthermore, repeated exposure to the same victim may allow 
participants to become used to the victim and may reduce the use of immediate affective 
responses in the decision to donate. Additionally, presenting the target victim several 
times might induce deliberation by counting the number oftimes the victim appeared 
(Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). 
Hypothesis 3: Presenting participants with the target victim several times prior to the 
elicitation of a donation will decrease affective information processing and reduce 
the impact that affect towards the target victim has in determining participants' 
donations. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and thirty-three undergraduate students at the 
University of Oregon took part in this study. The mean age was 22.7 years (SD = 1.8), 
and 54% of the participants were female. 
Design. In a between-subjects design, presentation frequency ofvictims was 
manipulated in four conditions (single picture, four different pictures, eight different 
pictures, and eight identical pictures). The main dependent variables of interest were 
willingness to contribute (WTC) a (hypothetical) financial donation to a victim in need, 
and several affect measures relating to the target victim (including sympathy, worry, how 
much donating would make the participant feel better, and how relevant the story of the 
victim was to the participant; see Appendix D for details). 
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Materials and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one offour 
presentation frequency conditions (single picture, four different pictures, eight different 
pictures, and eight identical pictures). In the second and third condition (i.e., four and 
eight different pictures), participants saw the additional victims (3 or 7) before seeing the 
target picture. In the fourth condition (i.e., eight identical pictures), the target picture was 
presented 8 times. Pictures were shown on a computer screen viewed at approximately 
70 cm distance and pictures size was 4.5 0 at 1024 x 768 pixel screen resolution. Pictures 
appeared at different locations on the screen and participants had to click on a button to 
view the next picture. The target picture was always the last picture shown and the same 
in all conditions. A graphical representation of the design is depicted in Figure 9. 
No Three Seven Seven 
Additional Additional Additional Targets + 
Victims Victims Victims Target 
+ Target +Target + Target 
I 
I I I 
I I 
II I I\ 
-
,. 
I 
I 
- It 
1 
'­
Target Victim (identical in all conditions) 
Figure 9: Serial Presentation Study Design of Study 4 
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To reduce carry-over and contrasts effects from the other victims to the target 
victim, the order of the additional victims was counterbalanced in the conditions where 
four and eight different victims were shown. The last condition (eight sequential 
presentations of the target) served as a control condition for the condition with seven 
additional victims, and was included to allow for separate conclusions about the impact 
ofvictim number and identity. 
Before participants saw any of the pictures, they read a short cover story about 
living conditions ofchildren in Mali, Africa, and were told that they might have the 
possibility to donate money towards one of these children: 
In Mali, Africa, severe rainfall deficits have resulted in a sharp drop in maize 
production for 2006. The resulting food shortage has especially impacted the 
quality of life for the children in Mali, who are facing the possibility 0 f starvation. 
To alleviate the food shortage, the organization "Children in Africa" is pairing 
individual sponsors with specific children in need ofhelp. Imagine that you have 
the possibility to contribute a donation to one ofthese children. 
Participants in the conditions with four different pictures, eight different pictures, 
and eight identical pictures were further informed that they will now see "some children 
that are in need ofcontributions and that [they] may be able to contribute to one ofthem". 
Participants in the single target condition did not see this statement. The target picture 
appeared always last in all conditions (in the single target condition it was the only 
picture that appeared), and was accompanied by identifying information about the victim: 
"This is Moussa, a 5-year old boy from Mali. Any money that you donate will go 
directly to the effort to help feed Moussa." Participants were then asked whether they 
would be willing to donate money to help feed Moussa, and if so, to indicate the 
(hypothetical) amount. Finally, participants answered a series of affect-related questions 
about the target victim and his predicament on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by "not at 
all" and "very much". Specifically, these affect-related questions were (I) how much 
emotion they felt while reading Moussa's story, (2) how worried they were about 
Moussa, (3) how much sympathy and compassion they had towards Moussa, (4) how 
close they felt towards Moussa, (5) how much donating would make them feel better, (6) 
93 
how much donating would help, and (7) how relevant the story is to them (see Appendix 
D for details). 
Results 
Descriptive and Preliminary Analyses. To test for possible order effects of the 
additional victims, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on WTC and affect ratings for the 
target victims. Results showed that victim order did not influence donations or affective 
ratings for the target victim (all Fs < 2,ps > .1). Therefore, WTC ratings were combined 
across the different presentation orders within each condition, and affect ratings as well. 
Willingness to contribute (WTC) ratings were significantly positively skewed, and were 
winsorized (less than 5% of the data) and then log-transformed. 
Affect Structure. Before testing the effect of serial presentation of additional 
victims on WTC, the underlying structure of the affect variables was investigated. 
Descriptive analyses revealed that two variables (how close participants felt toward the 
target victim and how relevant the victim's story is to the participants) were significantly 
positively skewed. This positive skew is at least partially the result of the majority of 
participants indicating that they did not feel close to the target victim and did not think 
the story was relevant to them (MClose= 1.07 and MRelevan/= 1.71 on a 1-7 point Likert 
scale). These two variables were nonlinearly transformed (log-transformed and square­
rooted for "closeness" and "relevance", respectively) to reduce skewness and all further 
analyses were performed with these transformed variables. Correlational analyses were 
then conducted to investigate the relationship between the different affect variables and 
WTC39• Results are presented in Tables 26 and 27. 
39 For correlations between the individual affect questions and WTC by condition, please see Appendix D. 
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Table 26: Means and Standard Deviations ofWTC and Affect Variables 
Standard 
N Mean Deviation 
WTC 133 20.93 27.86 
WTCa 133 2.05 1.66 
Emotion intensity while reading victim's story? 132 2.87 1.55 
Worry, upset, and sad 132 2.38 1.57 
Sympathy and compassion 131 3.63 1.56 
Feel better ifdonation is made 132 2.57 1.92 
How much donation would help 132 2.64 1.70 
Closeness to victim 131 1.07 1.29 
Closeness to victima 131 .56 .55
 
Relevance of story to self 131 1.72 1.50
 
Relevance of story to self' 131 1.11 .70
 
aLog-transformed variable bSquare-rooted variable 
Note: All variables except WTC were measured on a 1-7 point Likert scale. 
Table 27: Correlations Between WTC and Other Variables 
Emotion Feel Donation 
WTCa 
WTCa 
1 
intensity Worry Sympathy better help Closeness 
Emotion 
intensity .39** 
Worry 
.39** .72** 
Sympathy 
.39** .71 ** .61** 
Feel better 
.39** .44** .57** .53** 
Donation 
help .39** .31 ** .42** .29** .44** 
Closeness 
.32** .42** .44** .32** .51 ** .44** 
Relevance 
.25** .36** .44** .38** .43** .22* .53** 
** p<.01 **p<.05 aLog-transformed variable 
Variables in order: Willingness to contribute; Emotion intensity while reading victim's story?; 
Worry, upset, and sad; Sympathy and compassion; Feel better if donation is made; How much a 
donation would help; Closeness to victima; Relevance ofstory to self' 
Inspection of these correlations reveals that all affect variables, as expected, are 
positively correlated with WTC (.25 < r < .39). Closer exammation reveals that some 
affect variables are differentially correlated with each other. Specifically, emotion 
intensity, worry, and sympathy are highly correlated amongst themselves (.61 < r < .72) 
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and to a somewhat lesser degree with the other affect variables (.29 < r < .57). To test 
whether self- vs. other-focused affect showed the same structure as in studies 1-3, a 
principal components analysis with varimax rotation was conducted. Specifically, using 
similar variables as in the previous studies, a principle components analysis with 
sympathy, worry, and how much better participants anticipated to feel after donating was 
conducted. A two-factor solution with eigenvalues above 1 revealed that the first rotated 
component (other-focused affect) accounted for 46% ofthe variance ofthese affect 
variables, while the second rotated component accounted for 41 %. The component 
loadings (i.e., the proportion ofeach variable's variance that is accounted for by the 
principal components) are represented in Table 28, and suggest sympathy and worry 
about the target victim are best explained by a different affect component than judgments 
ofhow much better participants would feel. However, it should be noted that "worry" 
loads highly on both components, albeit stronger on the first. Based on these results 
sympathy and worry were combined into one variable measuring other-focused affect, 
and the extent to which participants anticipated to feel better after a donation was taken 
as an indication ofself-focused affect. 
Table 28: Component Loadings ofAffect Variables on Other- and Self-Focused Affect 
Components 
V
Affect 
ariables: 
Other-focused 
Affect 
Self-focused 
Affect 
Sympathy 
Worry 
Feel better 
.927 
.675 
.271 
.229 
.549 
.938 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage ofvariance explained 
1.4 
46.1 
1.2 
41.1 
Effects ofFrequency Manipulation on WTC and Affect. Inspection of the number 
ofparticipants who donated showed that the percentage ofparticipants who chose to 
donate money was between 64.4%-70.4%. A goodness of fit £ test ofequal proportions 
revealed no effect of condition on the number ofparticipants who contributed, 1(3, N = 
133) =.46, ns. To determine whether self- vs. other-focused affect towards the victim 
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predicted participants' initial decision to donate any money, a logistic regression was run 
for each ofthe four experimental conditions (see Table 29). 
Table 29: Affective Predictors ofDonation Decisions by Condition 
Overall Model Individual Predictors Exp(b) Wald p 
No Additional Victims Other-Focused Affect 1.951 3.86 .050 
+ Target 
l (2) = 13.1, P < .001 Self-Focused Affect 1.430 .68 All 
Three Additional Victims Other-Focused Affect 1.448 1.51 .220 
+ Target 
l (2) = 18.2, P < .001 Self-Focused Affect 2.263 3.98 .046 
Seven Additional Victims Other-Focused Affect 1.047 .06 .802 
+ Target 
l(2)=1.7,p>A Self-Focused Affect 1.298 .90 .343 
Seven Targets Other-Focused Affect 1.195 1.05 .305 
+ Target 
l (2) = 8.5, P < .05 Self-Focused Affect 1.354 1.799 .180 
While feelings focused on others are significantly predictive ofparticipants , 
decision to donate in the condition where only a single target victim was presented, 
feelings focused on the self are predictive of the initial decision to donate when three 
additional victims were presented. In both conditions, stronger affective reactions led to 
higher likelihood ofparticipants donating. In the conditions where eight pictures were 
shown (seven additional victims + target, and seven targets + target), neither self- nor 
other-focused affect predicts the choice to donate any money. 
To see whether the donation amount was dependent on sequential presentation 
and number ofvictims, a one-way Analysis ofYariance (ANOYA) was run on 
participants' responses in each ofthe four conditions. As expected, results indicated that 
WTC did not differ by frequency condition, F (3,129) <1, ns. Inspection of the means 
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shows that participants' hypothetical contributions to the target victim are virtually the 
same in all conditions (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: WTC by Serial Presentation Condition 
To examine whether this pattern of results was mirrored by participants' affective 
responses, two univariate ANOVAs were run with affect focused on the self ("feel 
better") and on others (Le., "sympathy" and "worry") as the dependent variables. Results 
show that neither of them was dependent on condition, Fs < I, ns. Thus, both WTC and 
affect were not significantly different for each of the four frequency conditions. This is 
not particularly surprising given that the target victim was the same in all conditions. 
However, it was also hypothesized that as the frequency ofadditional victims increases, 
participants would process information more with System 2 and base their decisions less 
on System I-dependent affective responses (i.e., sympathy). 
To test this hypothesis, separate regression analyses were run with self-focused 
and other-focused affect as predictor variables and WTC as the dependent variable40• 
40 Another analysis strategy combines all the affect variables into three different, theoretically informed 
factors: (1) affect focused on others (sympathy and worry), (2) affect focused on the self (feeling better due 
to donation and how much a donation would help), and (2) personal relevance (relevance and closeness to 
victim). Results for this analysis are generally similar to the here presented findings regarding the effect of 
sympathy on donations, and are presented in Appendix D. 
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Results for the regression analysis are depicted in Table 30 and zero-order correlations 
are presented in Table 31. 
Table 30: Regression Analyses ofAffect Predicting WTC by Condition 
Overall Model Predictors tfJ P 
Single Target Other-focused Affect .66 3.6 .002 
F(2,24) = 7.2,p<.01,
 
adfi2=.35 Self-focused Affect -.06 -.3 .76
 
Three additional Other-focused Affect .37 2.0 .059
victims + Target
 
F(2,26) = 17.7,
 Self-focused Affect .45 2.5 .021p<.001, adfi2=.55 
Seven additional Other-focused Affect .09 .42 .677Pictures + Target
 
F(2,28) = 1.l,p>.3,
 Self-focused Affect .21 .97 .339
adfi2=.01 
Eight Targets Other-focused Affect .26 1.3 .195 
F(2,36) = 2.9,p<.07,
 
adfi2=.08 Self-focused Affect .12 .6 .548
 
Table 31: Zero-Order Correlations Between WTC andAffect Components by Condition 
Three Seven 
Additional Additional 
Single Victims Victims 7 Targets 
Target + Target + Target + Target 
Other-focused 
.63** .69** .21 .34*Affect 
Self-focused 
.28 .71 ** .27* .31 * Affect
 
** p<.01 **p<.05
 
Careful inspection of Table 30 shows that the regression models differ in their 
predictiveness of donation amount. Self- and other-focused affect are better predictors of 
donation amount when the total number ofvictims did not succeed four, while the 
adjusted R2-values are smaller for the conditions where a total ofeight victims was 
shown. The regression results for the individual predictors (i.e., se1f- and other-focused 
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affect) support the hypothesis that affect focused on the victim is most predictive ofWTC 
when only the target victim was presented to the participants. The predictive strength of 
victim-focused affect declines as more victims are shown prior to the target victim. This 
is in line with results from Study 3, which suggest that identified victims who are 
presented without statistics or additional (potentially competing) victims are more 
affectively processed, which increases the relationship between victim-focused affect and 
donations. However, it should be noted that victim-focused affect is not predictive of 
WTC when the target picture was shown a total of eight times. This is tentative evidence 
that the number ofexposures to any victims (regardless of victim identity) prior to seeing 
a target victim can be distracting and have a detrimental effect on the degree to which 
victim-focused affect is related to participants' decisions to donate. 
Discussion 
The current study manipulated the number and identity ofadditional victims (i.e., 
pictures ofvictims who participants are not able to donate money to), and investigated 
participants' use of affect in the decision to make a hypothetical donation. Results 
showed that no main effects ofthe manipulation existed on either WTC or affective 
responses. This is not surprising as the target victim was kept constant across conditions 
and participants. It is likely that presenting other victims prior to the target victim was 
too subtle a manipulation to change participants' donations and affective reactions. 
An investigation ofwhether affect was predictive ofthe decision to donate 
revealed that higher victim-focused affect increased participants' likelihood ofdonating 
when only the target was presented, while higher self-focused affect increased this 
likelihood only when a few additional victims were presented before the target victim. 
Studies 1-3 showed that self-focused affect was more important than other-focused 
affect in the initial decision to donate, and the current results only partially support this 
claim. It seems more likely that the decision to donate is dependent on how the victims 
are presented (i.e., with or without prior-shown victims). 
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As expected, participants' affective responses were differentially predictive in the 
different conditions. Specifically, sympathy and worry for the victim was predictive of 
donations when no additional victims were shown, and as the number ofvictims 
increased the relationship between victim-focused affect and donations decreased. 
Moreover, affect focused on the victim was also not predictive when the target picture 
was shown several times before participants were able to specify a donation. Thus, it 
appears as though presenting any picture a sufficient number oftimes prior to the victim 
can have this effect. 
Conversely, affect focused on the self(Le., how much a donation would make 
participants feel better) shows a different pattern: when controlling for victim-focused 
affect, it was only predictive ofdonations when a few additional victims were shown. An 
explanation ofthe differential predictive strength ofvictim-focused affect needs to take 
into account the differences in information processing in each condition. Specifically, 
when additional victims were shown, participants were able to engage in comparative 
evaluations, which are likely to induce more deliberative processing (e.g., Small, 
Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). 
In contrast to the conditions with additional victims, no direct comparative 
evaluations were possible in the conditions where only the picture ofthe target victim 
was shown. When the target victim was shown only once, victim-focused affect was 
more predictive ofdonations than when the target victim was shown eight times. This 
difference can be explained by the fact that presenting the target victim several times 
might have induced less affective and more deliberative processing by causing 
participants to count the number oftimes the victim appeared (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004) and also increased the time between the first exposure to the victim to the time 
participants could make a donation. Increasing the time between first exposure and 
evaluation is likely to reduce reliance on affective reactions (e.g., Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, VanBoven, SJDM 2007). Additionally, the results showed 
that affect was less predictive ofdonations when several victims were shown, regardless 
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of the type of affect and the kind ofvictims (e.g., whether one target was preceded by 
seven additional victims or by seven targets). 
In sum, the present study provides support for differential use ofaffect depending 
on the kind of information processing used in the decision to help a single victim in need. 
Results suggest that showing pictures of additional victims in serial order increases 
deliberative processing and reduces the impact of other-focused feelings on people's 
willingness to make a financial contribution to a single identified target. Together with 
Study 3, the current study suggests that indirect (and subtle) manipulations of information 
processing have a greater impact on the link between other-focused affect and donations 
than on mean-level changes ofaffect per se. Specifically, no main effects ofvictim 
number or identifiability manipulations were found in either study, but increased 
deliberation had a deleterious effect on the relationship between sympathy and donations. 
An important limitation of the current study is that it is not clear how participants 
represented the additional victims shown prior to the target victim. The design of the 
study did not allow testing participants' perceptions ofthe additional victims, and it is 
quite possible that although they were presented serially they could be represented by a 
single average image or value. If this is the case, then substantial variations in sympathy 
judgments ofthe additional victims could influence perceptions ofthe target victim. It is 
likely that information about the other victims influences participants' ratings of the 
target, and contrast or carry-over effects are to be expected. However, the present design 
attempted to minimize these biasing effects by randomizing the order ofthe additional 
victims prior to the target victim. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
STUDY 5: ATTENTIONAL MECHANISMS 
Rationale and Hypotheses 
Research shows that affective reactions towards identified victims are usually 
more intense and meaningful compared to unidentified victims or statistics (e.g., Small, 
Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). Information about the 
victim is processed more affectively when victims are shown in vivid and concrete form 
(e.g., with a picture). Furthermore, sometimes pictures of single individuals produce 
more intense affective responses (and higher donations) than pictures of several victims, 
and guide donation behavior. 
As shown in studies 1 - 4, information processing mode can influence people's 
affective responses to identified and affectively vivid victims. Depending on the level of 
detail with which pictures are encoded, fewer pictures are arguably easier to process than 
several ofthem. Thus, it is likely that a single picture is less effortful to process (i.e., 
encode, retrieve, and judge) than a group picture, given that the level ofdetailed encoding 
remains constant. 
Research on the perception ofgroups ofstimuli suggests that we are quite able to 
estimate average quantities (such as average height or size), but not as good in 
recognizing individual members (Ariely, 2001). It is possible that the quantity of 
information about a group is compressed and transformed into an average across the 
group. Seminal research on abstraction ofvisual patterns into prototype formations 
suggests that people are efficient in learning about visual prototypes and able to abstract 
the visual information (posner & Keele, 1968). However, when presented with a picture 
of a group ofpeople in need, it is not clear what kind ofvisual information about the 
individual members is abstracted, and how it is used to form an affective impression of 
either the individuals or the entire group. 
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Hamilton and Sherman (1996) point out that individuals are often seen and 
processed as a coherent psychological unit, whereas groups are seen as more diverse and 
less unitary (Le., entitative). They propose that different processes are involved in 
personality judgments that are made online (Le., while a target is perceived) vs. those that 
are based on memory. Online impression formations are most likely to occur when the 
target is perceived to have high entitativity (Hastie & Park, 1986), which should lead to 
integrative encoding ofthe targets' characteristics (McConnell, Sherman, &Hamilton, 
1997). Targets low in entitativity (such as a group), on the other hand, should lead to 
impression formations that are made based on memory retrieval oftheir social aspects 
(e.g., dispositions and behaviors). Support for this was found by McConnell et al. (1994) 
and STUll, Lichtenstein, and Rothbart (1985), who found better recall ofbehavioral 
aspects ofindividuals compared to group targets. 
An additional mechanism that may play into these entitativity judgments may be 
whether people pay attention to the target (Slovic, 2007). Visually more complex stimuli 
(e.g., such as a picture ofa group ofvictims) have more information and might require 
more cognitive resources to process than relatively simple stimuli (e.g., a picture of only 
one victim). The complexity of the stimuli might impact both entitativity judgments as 
well as affective reactions. It is ofnote that these affective reactions may occur at several 
different stages, even quite early in the information processing stream. For example, an 
affectively salient stimulus is able to direct people's attention even before conscious 
recognition, and then influence subsequent processing involved in the evaluation of the 
information (Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Some evidence exists that that visual attention plays an important role in the 
generation of emotions for single and group targets. For example, Fenske and Raymond 
(2006) report that stimuli that are actively inhibited and not attended to are affectively 
devalued. Specifically, human faces that were outside the spatial focus and served as 
distractor stimuli to a target stimulus were judged to be less trustworthy compared to 
target stimuli. This suggests that a single target within the spatial focus is processed 
differently than distractor stimuli, and possibly differently when presented alone 
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compared to when it is presented next to other stimuli. The implications for research on 
donations is two-fold: First, it seems likely that presenting a group ofvictims in a picture 
makes it more difficult to focus on any single individual and that this lack ofvisual 
attention leads to lower sympathy. Second, while scanning a group picture it is possible 
that victims outside the spatial focus are devalued on an affective dimension. 
In sum, research from several different lines of research suggests that information 
about groups vs. individuals seems to be processed differently on cognitive and 
emotional levels (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 
2005b). Judgments about single targets are often made online and based on coherent and 
unitary individuating information. Judgments about group targets, on the other hand, 
seem to be based more on memory representations. Furthermore, targets presented 
among other, distractor stimuli are more difficult to focus on. This should result in less 
concrete, emotional (i.e., System 1) processing than when targets are presented by 
themselves. Based on this reasoning, the following hypotheses concerning affective 
processing towards visually presented victims were made: 
Hypothesis 1a & 1b: Visual distractors negatively influence the attention needed to 
generate sympathy towards the target victim. Sympathy is therefore expected to 
be higher for a single target victim presented alone compared to a target victim 
presented among other, distractor victims. The distracting effect of other victims 
is predicted to occur when participants are able to specifically focus on the target 
and form an online impression as well as when they are unable to focus and make 
sympathy judgments from memory. 
Hypothesis 2: Emotional reactions are hypothesized to be stronger when forming an 
online impression. This should particularly be the case when victims are flanked 
by other, distractor victims. Therefore, it is predicted that participants will report 
higher sympathy for individual victims when forming an online emotional 
impression compared to when forming the emotional impression from memory of 
the victim. 
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Hypothesis 3: Directly comparing emotional reactions for a single vs. a group of 
victims should reflect the joint evaluation mode and reveal greater sympathy for 
the group (Kogut & Ritov, 2005b). 
Method 
Participants. A total of 61 participants completed the experiment. The average 
age was M = 21.9 (SD = 4.5) and were 79% female. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
Design and Materials. Two independent variables (cue type and number of 
victims) were manipulated in a fully factorial within-subjects design. Cue type consisted 
of three levels (seeing a spatial cue before presentation ofthe picture(s), seeing a spatial 
cue after presentation of the picture(s), and presentation of the picture(s) without a spatial 
cue). Number ofvictims was manipulated by showing one vs. eight pictures ofthe target 
stimuli. The primary dependent variable was sympathy ratings for the target stimuli. 
Reaction times for these sympathy ratings were also recorded. Table 32 details the 
conditions ofthe factorial design. 
Table 32: Factorial Design {or Study 5 
Cue Before Picture Cue After Picture No Cue 
Single Picture CellI Cell 3 Cell 5 
Eight Pictures Cell 2 Cell 4 Cell 6 
A total of eight victim pictures (four female children and four male children) were 
used for this study (taken from Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). The pictures were 
presented so that participants saw each picture an equal number oftimes in each ofthe 
cue conditions ("cue before pictures", "cue after pictures", and "no cue"). In the first two 
cue conditions (i.e., "cue before picture" and "cue after picture"), pictures were either 
presented by themselves (i.e., "single picture") or among seven other, distractor victims 
(i.e., "eight pictures). For cells 2 and 4, it is important to note that although eight pictures 
were shown on the screen, only one picture denoted by the cue was actually the target. In 
cells 1 through 4, each ofthe eight possible pictures from Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 
• • 
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2005b) served as the target victim twice, resulting in 64 trials41 • In the "no cue" 
condition, pictures were not preceded or followed by a cue. Cell 5 was identical to cells 
1 and 3, with the exception that no cue was shown. When eight pictures were shown in 
the "no cue" condition (cell 6), all of them constituted the targets and sympathy was 
judged for all of them together. Thirty-two trials were run in the "no cue" condition, 16 
in cell 5 and another 16 in cell 6, which resulted in 96 total trials for each participant. All 
64 total trials in cells 1 - 4 were run before the 32 trials in cells 5 and 6. 
The 96 total trials were split into 48 pairs of the same cue type ("cue before 
pictures", "cue after pictures", and "no cue"). These pairs consisted always of one 
picture presented alone and another picture flanked by the other seven pictures. The pairs 
were nested in each cue condition, so that if the first picture ofa pair was presented after 
the spatial cue appeared, then the second picture ofthat trial was also presented after the 
spatial cue. Similarly, if the first trial of a pair was presented before a cue appeared, then 
the second picture was also presented in the same cue condition and presented before the 
cue. A schematic ofa segment of the experiment (cells 1 and 2) is presented in Figure 
11: 
Cue-Before: Cue-Before:
 
Single Picture Eight Pictures
 
150 ms Fixation Cross + + 
500 ms Cue 
........
 
Picture(s)
3000 ms .. ..". 
SympathyI I-ms Rating 
Figure 11: Design Schematic (Cue-Before Pair) for Attentional Mechanism Study 
41 Eight pictures x two times the target x four cells = 64 trials. 
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After making their sympathy judgment for the ftrst trial of each trial pair, 
participants' response was marked as an anchor on the sympathy scale during the second 
trial. This ordering ofthe trials and carrying participants' responses over to the second 
trail ofeach pair was designed so that differences between conditions would not be a 
chance product. Instead, ftnding differences in spite ofthe close proximity ofthe same 
cue type for each trial pair would be more likely due to the manipulations of number of 
victims (i.e., presence or absence of distractor victims). The experiment was designed so 
that the trials in the cue conditions (cue preceding or following the pictures) were 
presented prior to the no cue conditions.. 
Apparatus and Procedure. Participants were seated 65cm in front ofa 17" 
computer screen (screen resolution = 1024 x 768). At the beginning participants were 
informed that they will see a number ofchildren in need of a ftnancial contribution due to 
a life-threatening disease at a local hospital. They were informed that they would see 
sometimes see an individual child and other times several children, and that they would 
see each child more than once. Participants were further informed that the child that 
elicited the highest average sympathy would possibly receive a donation from the 
experimenters on behalf of the participants. The experimenter explained the task to the 
participants and started the practice trials. The practice trials resembled the actual 
experimental trials except in two details: 1. instead ofpictures of children the practice 
targets were squares and circles, and 2. instead ofsympathy ratings participants had to 
judge how much they liked the target stimuli. After the practice trials the instructions for 
the experiment were presented on the computer screen and the experimenter made sure 
that the instructions were understood before starting the experiment. Either before or 
immediately after a picture of the child came onto the screen participants saw a red dot 
which denoted the spatial location to focus on in order to see the target picture on the 
screen. After seeing the target picture, participants rated how much sympathy they felt, 
using the mouse to indicate their sympathy on a sliding scale. Each trial started with a 
ftxation cross which was presented for 150ms at the middle of the screen. Then 
participants either saw a red dot cue (size = .5°) or one or eight pictures (size = 4.5°). 
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There were eight locations on a vertical line in the middle ofthe screen, one for each 
picture. Each picture always appeared in the same space. The dot cues were always 
presented at the center ofthe space ofthe pictures. Dot cues were shown for 500ms, 
pictures for 3000ms, and between dots and pictures a 150ms blank screen was 
interleaved. After this blank screen participants saw a vertical sliding scale (300 pixels = 
8.7°) with a vertically movable cursor on it, which responded to movement of the mouse. 
The vertical scale was anchored by "Very much sympathy" and "No sympathy at all", to 
indicate the level ofsympathy felt by the participants. Once they moved the cursor and 
clicked on the mouse button to indicate their sympathy level, the next trial started. The 
presentation of the pictures followed the above described pattern oftrial pairs nested in 
each condition. The actual order ofpictures presented was determined with a Latin­
square to ensure that any effect of picture order on sympathy would be counterbalanced. 
After 64 trials (2/3 ofthe experiment) participants saw another instruction screen 
informing them that now they would see the same children again but without cues. When 
only one picture was shown they were to rate their sympathy towards that single child, 
and when all eight were shown they were to rate their overall sympathy towards the 
group. They were further informed that these group ratings would go towards their 
average sympathy rating for each child. The experiment stopped after 96 trials and 
participants filled out a demographics sheet, were debriefed, and thanked for their 
participation. 
Results 
Descriptive Analyses. A preliminary descriptive data analysis inspected each 
participants' reaction times for each trial. Three participants had unusually fast average 
reaction times (less than 1000ms) and were deleted from the data analysis. The data for 
the remaining 58 participants was split by cue type (cue before, cue after, and no cue) and 
by number ofvictims. 
Sympathy Ratings. Recall that the cue trials (cue before and cue after) consisted 
ofpairs in which one trial featured a single victim and the other eight victims. For the 
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cue trials, participants always rated only one victim (because only one cue appears per 
trial). When only one victim was shown, sympathy ratings were specific to that victim. 
When eight victims were shown but either preceded or followed by a cue, then the victim 
that appeared in the location of the cue was the target and the others assumed a distractor 
role. Average sympathy ratings for the first four conditions (cells 1 - 4 in Table 32) are 
depicted in Figure 12. Sympathy ratings could range from "no sympathy at all" 
(Sympathy score = 0) to "very much sympathy" (Sympathy score = 300). 
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Figure 12: Mean Sympathy Ratings for Cue Conditions x Trial 
Each pair ofbars in Figure 12 represents a specific trial pair type. There are two 
basic trial pairs possible from the employed design: Either the first trial is a single target 
picture presented by itself (e.g., bars 1,4, 5, and 8 in Figure 12 denote trials where a 
single victim was presented without distractors), or it is one target out ofeight pictures 
(bars 2, 3, 6, and 7 in Figure 12 denote trials where one victims was presented among 
seven distmctor victims). For example, the first two bars depict the first and second trials 
in the "Cue-Before" condition that featured trial pairs which consisted offirst showing 
one picture (single victim), and on the following trial showing a target as part ofeight 
pictures. Inspection ofthis type of trial pair in Figure 12 suggests that when cues 
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preceded the pictures, a single target received higher sympathy ratings than one out of 
eight targets. It is important to note that the order of the trials within each pair (i.e., 
whether the single picture was shown on the first trial or the second) did not make much 
difference in the direction ofthe effect. Sympathy for a target victim presented alone was 
higher compared to a target victim flanked by other victims regardless oftrial order (Le., 
in Figure 12, bars 1 and 4 are higher than bars 2 and 3, respectively). Similarly, when the 
cue was shown after the presentation of the pictures ("Cue-After" condition), this 
difference between trials was even more pronounced than in the conditions where cues 
were shown before the pictures. 
Inspection of the no cue conditions (cells 5 and 6 in Table 32), which presented 
either one target victim or all eight targets at the same time shows that eight victims 
received higher sympathy ratings than single victims. This difference in sympathy did 
not appear to be trial-order specific, since ratings for eight victims are higher than ratings 
for single victims regardless ofwhether the eight victims were shown before (Le., trial 1) 
or after (Le., trial 2) the single target (see Figure 13 for details). 
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Figure 13: Mean Sympathy Ratings for No Cue Conditions x Trial 
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Given that the order of the trials did not appear to be of importance to 
participants' sympathy ratings, trials in the same condition were collapsed across order 
for the following analyses. Collapsing across order resulted in one measure of sympathy 
for each ofthe six different trial types (reported in Table 32). These data are presented in 
Figures 14 and 15. Note that the general pattern is similar to the data that was split for 
trial order (Figures 12 and 13). 
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Figure 14: Mean Sympathy Ratings for Cue Conditions 
The data presented in Figure 14 suggest that regardless ofwhether the spatial cue 
preceded or followed the picture presentations, target victims received higher sympathy 
ratings when they were not flanked by distractor victims. Sympathy ratings were lowest 
when the target victim was presented with distractors and the spatial cue followed the 
picture presentation. To test Hypothesis 1a (a single target will receive higher sympathy 
ratings when it is preceded by a cue and presented alone vs. flanked by several distractor 
victims), a repeated measures t-test was conducted for the two conditions with cues 
preceding the presentation ofthe pictures (bars 1 and 2 in Figure 14). Results indicate 
that this comparison is marginally significant, t(57) = 1.8,p < .08, 1=.05. As predicted, 
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subjects expressed higher sympathy for single pictures (M = 183, SD = 70) compared to a 
single picture flanked by 7 others (M= 176, SD = 71). 
Hypothesis 1b investigated the same difference between a single target presented 
alone vs. among a group ofother victims when participants were unable to attend to the 
spatial location where the target victim was presented (bars 3 and 4 in Figure 14). 
Results support the prediction and corroborate fmdings from Hypothesis la, t(57) = 3.8,p 
< .01,'; = .20. As predicted, participants expressed higher sympathy for single targets 
(M= 184, SD = 70) compared to a targets picture flanked by others (M= 163, SD = 75). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted sympathy responses to be stronger when forming an 
online impression compared to sympathy judgments based on memory. The lack of 
attention towards the single victim was expected to have a more negative effect on 
sympathy ratings when single victims were presented along distractor victims following 
the spatial cue (bar 4 in Figure 14) than when preceding it (bar 2 in Figure 14). In this 
condition (i.e., bar 4) participants had to process all eight presented victims and then wait 
for the cue to inform them which one ofthe victims was the designated target oftheir 
sympathy. Since the cue appeared only after the pictures had already disappeared, the 
sympathy judgment had to be made from memory. Results showed that sympathy ratings 
were significantly higher for single victims flanked by other victims when these pictures 
followed the spatial cue (M= 176, SD =71) compared to when they preceded the cue (M 
= 163, SD = 75), t(57) = 3.6,p < .05 (Bonferroni correction), r2=.19. A similar 
comparison for targets that were presented alone showed no significant difference 
between sympathy ratings for targets following vs. preceding the spatial cue, t(57) = 1.3, 
p >.18. Comparing sympathy ratings for the condition without a spatial cue showed that 
participants' responses were slightly higher when judging eight target victims together 
than a single target (see Figure 15). 
113 
220 
200 
:>-. 180 
;9
il 160 
~ [/) 140 
120 
100 +----­
No Cue (one victim) No Cue (eight vicitms) 
Figure 15: Mean Sympathy for No Cue Conditions 
Hypothesis 3 addressed the difference between single targets vs. an entire group 
of targets. Results show that participants expressed more sympathy towards the group of 
victims (M = 207, SD = 82) compared to single victims (M = 198, SD = 71), but this 
result failed to reach significance, t(57) = -1.2,p>.2,,J = .02. 
Reaction Time Analysis. Exploratory analyses for participants' reaction times 
were conducted on the average reaction times for sympathy judgments by condition. 
Averages are shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Mean Reaction Times for Each Cue Condition. 
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Inspection ofFigure 16 reveals that distinctly longer reaction times were observed 
when a single target was presented with a group of distractor victims preceding the 
spatial cue (i.e., "Cue After" condition). In this condition, participants could not make 
their sympathy judgments online but had to consult their memory to identify the target 
and then indicate their sympathy for the target victim. Recall that sympathy ratings were 
lowest in this condition, and it appears as though longer reaction times are associated 
with lower sympathy ratings. A repeated analysis ofvariance (ANOVA) found that 
reaction times varied significantly by condition, F(5, 205) =7.9,p<.01.11/= .12. A 
contrast comparing reaction times for a single target with distractors in the "cue after" 
condition to a combination ofall other conditions showed that participants took 
significantly longer to make their sympathy judgment in this condition, F(l ,57) = 29.8, p 
< .01, l1p2 = .34. 
Correlational analyses show that in some conditions shorter reaction times are 
correlated with higher sympathy ratings, albeit not significantly so. These correlations 
suggest that shorter reaction times are related to higher sympathy ratings when 
participants were presented with only a single target (and no distractors). Table 33 
details the correlations between sympathy ratings and reaction time. 
Table 33: Correlations Between Mean Reaction Time and Sympathy Across Trials 
Cue Before Picture Cue After Picture No Cue 
Single Picture -.19 -.12 -.12 
Eight Pictures -.10 .01 .01 
N=58 
Discussion 
Study 5 was designed to investigate the effect of attending to a target victim on 
participants' sympathy ratings. Interpretations of the results need to take the specific 
design into account. Recall that the experiment was split into two different phases. In 
phase one (the cue conditions), participants saw a spatial cue either before or after being 
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presented with a target picture. In the second phase, participants did not see a cue and 
rated either one target or eight targets. This second phase (the "no cue" trials) always 
followed the first phase (the cue trials). This design ensured that participants would not 
be biased in their sympathy ratings during phase I by being able to rate all eight targets at 
once. However, a drawback to this design is that trials in phase 2 were potentially 
influenced by phase 1 trials. Furthermore, trial pairs consisted ofalways showing a 
single picture on the first trial and then eight pictures on the second trial (or vice versa). 
In the "no cue" conditions, this resulted in single targets being paired with eight targets in 
close temporal proximity and a potential carry-over effect of sympathy ratings from eight 
to one target. 
It was hypothesized that visual distractors (i.e., other victims presented 
concurrently with the target) negatively influence the attention needed to generate 
sympathy towards the target victim. Results support the hypothesis that a single target 
victim evokes more sympathy when presented alone and not flanked by distractor 
victims. This effect is present when judgments are made online as well as from memory, 
however it seems to be especially pronounced when affect judgments are made based on 
people's memory. Online judgments are typically subject to more vivid images than 
judgments that rely on images stored in memory (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). More 
vivid images can influence judgments by making affective characteristics more salient 
(Slovic, et aI., 2002; Loewenstein et aI., 2001), and evaluable (Hsee & Zhang, 2004). 
Results further support the notion that attention is a factor in the generation of 
sympathy. In the trials that featured cues, sympathy ratings were higher in conditions 
where participants were able to discern the spatial location where the individual target 
victim would appear. It is noteworthy that this difference was most evident when 
participants rated one victim that was presented within a group (i.e., with distractors). 
These distractors have a negative impact on sympathy ratings, especially when judgments 
were based on memory. 
The finding that presentations ofvictims with distractors can reduce affective 
ratings is an extension ofFenske and Raymond's (2006) distractor devaluation effect. 
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Fenske and Raymond found that distractors presented outside an attended visual area 
were emotionally devalued (i.e., less cheerful and less trustworthy) compared to an 
attended target. This devaluation was partly dependent on the distance between target 
and distractors, with smaller distance leading to more devaluation. While the present 
study did not specifically look at devaluations ofvictims presented next to the target, it 
demonstrates that affective ratings decrease as the ability to focus on the target decreases. 
Thus, distracting attention away from a target can lead to affective devaluations of the 
target. 
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that in joint evaluations a group ofvictims 
would elicit more sympathy compared to an individual member of this group (Kogut & 
Ritov,2005b). Even though mean levels were in the expected direction (i.e., a group of 
victims elicited higher sympathy than single victims), no statistical difference was found 
to support this hypothesis. 
A limitation of the current study design was that it is not possible to compare the 
effects of cue vs. no cue without risking potentially biasing effects of the employed trial 
order. It is therefore not possible to conclude that spatial attention increases sympathy 
ratings per se. However, the effect of attending to visual information is visible when 
comparing participants' sympathy ratings for trials where they made online judgments vs. 
memory judgments. 
In sum, Study 5 lends some support to the model proposed in Figure 1. 
Attentional mechanisms seem to be an important ingredient in the generation of 
sympathy. Inability to attend to a single victim leads to lower sympathy ratings. That is, 
our capacity to generate other-focused affect seems to depend on our giving specific 
attention to one victim at a time. 
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CHAPTER IX 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Research Questions and Methodology 
The experiments in this dissertation were designed to investigate the role of 
affective vs. deliberative information processing in decisions related to prosocial 
behavior. Of specific interest was the effect that different modes ofprocessing (i.e., 
System 1 vs. System 2) have on people's willingness to contribute financially to victims 
in need, the generation ofaffective reactions towards the victims (and their predicament), 
and the extent to which donations in this context were related to these affective reactions. 
A distinction was made between feelings that were predominantly focused on the self 
(i.e., anticipated regret ifno donation was made, and how much better people felt if they 
made a donation) and those focused on other people (i.e., sympathy and compassion for 
the victim). Even though these two types ofaffect are not expected to be independent of 
each other, this distinction nonetheless gave insight into people's underlying motivation 
to help others in need. It further extended existing research on prosocial decision making 
(e.g., Batson, 1990; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Small, 
Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Slovic, 2007) by showing that self- vs. other-focused affect 
is differentially related to donations depending on what information processing mode 
people engage in. The moderating effect ofSystem 1 vs. System 2 processing on self- vs. 
other-focused affect was explored by manipulating information processing directly in 
Studies 1 and 2, as well as indirectly by varying how victims were presented (Studies 3 
and 4). Additionally, a fifth study investigated the role of attentional mechanisms in the 
generation of affective responses focused on the victims. 
The experiments that directly manipulated information processing were designed 
to change participants' ability to deliberate, as well as the degree to which they focused 
on affective or deliberative processing. In Study 1, participants' deliberative capacity 
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their ability to engage in deliberative processing. According to dual process models (e.g., 
Kahneman 2003; Epstein, 1994), a reduction ofdeliberative processing results in System 
1 being less influenced (and possibly interrupted) by System 2 processing (Shiv & 
Fedorikhin, 1999). To test the effect of augmenting System 1 processing directly, Study 
2 used a priming manipulation to focus participants' towards either their feelings or 
deliberative aspects, and to engage them into affective or calculation-based valuation of 
the victims (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). 
Two additional experiments were designed to manipulate information processing 
indirectly via different presentation modes ofthe victims. In Study 3, the victim's 
identifiability (identified vs. unidentified) was varied along with whether she was part of 
a bigger group or not. Identifying a victim may lead to more affective processing (Small 
& Loewenstein, 2005; 2003), and presenting victim statistics may induce a comparative 
process42 that increases System 2 processing (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). Both 
of these manipulations are subtle, and influence information processing not by preventing 
one processing route (i.e., either deliberative or affective), but instead entice people to 
pay attention to specific features ofthe victim and victim situation that increase the 
likelihood ofone type ofprocessing (Slovic et aI., 2002). In addition to manipulating 
victim identifiability and number ofvictims, a fourth experiment manipulated 
presentation mode by showing several additional victims in sequence before the target 
victim (see Study 4). This manipulation was designed to elucidate the effect of 
increasing the dimension ofthe tragedy not by means ofa number (as in Study 3), but by 
graphically presenting the victims in serial order. Increasing the number ofvictims was 
expected to decrease affective processing as it is more difficult to affectively process 
larger groups (Slovic, 2007). 
Finally, to further investigate the role ofvictim-focused affect in donation 
decisions, a fifth experiment was designed to examine the extent to which attentional 
mechanisms are involved in the generation ofsympathy. The ability to visually focus on 
42 This comparative process is based on people's awareness ofhelping one individual victimwhile at the 
same time not helping (or not being able to help) a much bigger group ofvictims (e.g., Unger, 1995). 
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a target in order to feel sympathy is constrained when several victims are presented at the 
same time, which is the case in several research studies that use group pictures ofvictims 
in need (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). In the experiment reported in Study 5, 
victims were presented either by themselves or among distractor victims, and participants 
made sympathy judgments either online or from memory. As shown in Study 5 and 
related research (Fenske & Raymond, 2006), presentation ofadditional, potentially 
competing and distracting victims divides people's attention to the victim, thereby 
reducing affective reactions towards the victims. Based on these studies, it seems likely 
that the presentation ofdistractors has deleterious effects on affective processing because 
ofa lack ofvisual attention. Moreover, a shift in processing modes from System 1 to 
System 2 is also possible due to the filct that distractor victims can provide a contrast that 
resembles a joint evaluation mode, which tends to increase comparative and deliberative 
processing (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). Thus, presenting a target victim with 
distractors is likely to decrease affect-related processing and increase deliberation43 . 
Summary ofGeneral Findings 
Effects ofInformation Processing Mode on Donations. Manipulating information 
processing mode by means ofa cognitive load paradigm resulted in slightly, albeit not 
significantly higher donation amounts when participants were under a high memory load 
vs. low memory load. This result was significant when (hypothetical) donations were 
elicited for groups ofvictims. Apparently, reducing deliberative capacity may have a 
positive effect on donations when people are confronted with several victims. 
Conversely, being able to deliberate reduced donations, especially when the target ofthe 
donation is a group. From a theoretical perspective, it is possible that high cognitive load 
could negatively influence how much attention is paid to the victims. This should result 
43 An increase in System 1 processing is not synonymous with a decrease in System 2 processing. These 
Systems have different mechanisms that govern their respective level ofprocessing (e.g., Kahneman, 
2003). However, it is also possible that a decrease in System 1 processing is accompanied by an increase in 
System 2 processing, which is likely to have an even greater impact on decision outcomes compared to 
when just one of these processing routes changes (i.e., increases or decreases processing). 
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in lower donations for higher cognitive load. However, results do not support this 
prediction. In Study 1, it is more likely that a high memory load decreased the disruptive 
influence that deliberation has on sympathy. For example, deliberations about the 
victims' situation, their deservedness of a donation, potential other uses ofthe money, 
and other deliberative processing was reduced by the cognitive load. A reduction in 
deliberative capacity should have reduced these kinds of thoughts while leaving affective 
reactions unchecked by System 2. However, since no explicit deliberations were 
measured in Study 1, it is impossible to identify the nature ofparticipants' thoughts and 
this needs to be addressed by future research. 
Results from Study 2 supported the notion that more deliberation reduced 
donations (see also Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). Priming participants to 
evaluate the victims by calculations reduced donations compared to priming them to 
focus on their feelings. Thus, it seems as though direct attempts to manipulate 
information processing influence donations in a consistent direction. More deliberation 
(and calculation) leads to lower donations, compared to affective information processing. 
As feelings are an important motivating factor and ingredient in donation decisions 
(Slovic, 2007; Viistfjiill, in preparation), it is not surprising that focusing on one's 
affective response increases donations. 
The results of the direct information processing manipulations (i.e., Study 1 and 
2) are contrasted by the effects of the indirect manipulations attempted in Studies 3 and 4. 
These indirect manipulations are more subtle and rely on the presentation format to 
change information processing. Varying the presentation mode ofthe victims revealed 
that donations were neither dependent on victim identifiability (Study 3) nor changes in 
number ofvictims (Studies 1,2, 3, and 4). The specific manipulation ofvictim-number 
also had little impact on donations, as adding numeric background statistics about the size 
of the entire group (Study 3) was as ineffective in changing donations as was 
manipulating the size ofthe group by serial picture presentations of individual victims 
(Study 4). It is possible that the indirect manipulations were too subtle to cause a 
substantial shift in information processing to see changes in donations due to 
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identifiability and victim number manipulations. Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) suggest 
that sensitivity to numbers ofvictims is a function ofaffective strength towards an object 
(or person). A subtle processing manipulation might not produce this sensitivity to 
changes in victim number with the highly emotional stimuli used in this dissertation. All 
of the employed stimuli represented suffering of real (and sometimes even identified) 
human beings, and this could explain the failure to produce sensitivity to numbers. 
Additionally, the null effects ofvictim-number manipulations on donations could 
be explained by the fact that donations depend on several different factors (such as 
participants' socio-economic status, personal experience, prior donation behavior, moral 
reasoning, and judgment of deservingness, to name just a few) and affective reactions to 
the victim are just one (albeit central) piece ofthe prosocial behavior puzzle 
(Loewenstein & Small, 2007). Not surprisingly, the effect sizes for variables predicting 
donations are typically quite low throughout the reviewed literature (but see Viistfjiill et 
aI., in preparation, for an exception) and also in the studies presented in this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, the failure to replicate the singularity effect that Kogut and Ritov (2005a) 
found despite using similar stimuli suggests that further research is needed to understand 
the effects ofvictim numbers on donation amounts. 
Finally, in addition to the direct and indirect information processing 
manipulations, Study 3 found support for donations being dependent on people's 
numeracyability. Those skilled at numeric manipulations (i.e., high in numeracy) 
donated more money than those who were low in numeracy. It is possible to speculate 
that high numerate people were able to abstract the problem and make their donation 
decisions less dependent on an immediate affective reaction towards the victim. They 
might also have realized the bigger problem and reacted to that instead of the victim­
focused affective responses that drove donations for low numerate people. Further 
research is needed to elucidate the role ofnumeracy in donations and specifically 
examine whether high numerate people process information related to donations more 
abstractly than low numerate people. 
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Effects ofInformation Processing Mode on Affective Reactions. Affective 
reactions were divided into self-focused and other-focused affect. The latter was 
primarily investigated by measures of sympathy and worry about the victim, while the 
former was assessed by participants' anticipated regret and indications ofhow much a 
donation would make them feel better. The distinction between self- and other-focused 
affect does not represent an empirical or theoretical independence of these two types of 
feelings, but reflecting different sources ofmotivations ofhelping (Batson, 1990). Of 
primary interest for the studies in this dissertation was the influence of information 
processing on self- vs. other-focused affect. 
Across the different studies, results suggest that sympathy for the victim is 
dependent on information processing mode. Processing the victim under high cognitive 
load slightly increased sympathetic responses compared to a low load condition. The 
result that sympathy under low load was reduced indicated that sympathy is unlikely to 
spring solely from deliberative processes, as models ofpure cognitive appraisal and 
higher-order affect would suggest (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993). More likely, sympathy and 
other-focused feelings in general are sensitive to how the victim information is 
affectively represented by the participants. This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that priming participants to evaluate the victims by means ofcalculation mechanisms led 
to lower sympathy compared to affective priming. Asking participants to affectively 
evaluate objects and people unrelated (and prior) to the donation task had the effect of 
increasing sympathetic responses to the victims, presumably because participants were 
cued to focus on the now more salient affective information from the victims. 
In addition to the direct manipulations ofprocessing modes, indirect attempts to 
alter information processing by varying the presentation mode ofthe victims revealed 
that more sympathy was expressed for identified victims compared to unidentified 
victims. Identifying victims by name, age, and picture resulted in more concrete mental 
representations that, in tum, made them affectively more salient. Thus, sympathy 
judgments seem to be responsive to the level ofabstraction that victims are represented 
in. Unlike victim identifiability, changing the number ofvictims did not seem to have a 
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reliable effect on sympathy ratings for individual victims. When identified, groups 
elicited higher sympathy ratings compared to single victims. However, neither the 
addition ofbackground statistics about a larger group ofvictims nor the serial 
presentation ofpictures ofadditional victims seemed to affect sympathy for a single 
target victim. This gives tentative support for the notion that victim-focused affect is not 
as sensitive to changes in victim number as it is to how affectively salient and concrete 
the actual target victim is presented (i.e., identified vs. unidentified). 
Further investigations ofthe origins ofsympathy for victims in Study 5 showed 
that the ability to visually focus on a specific target victim may lead to higher sympathy 
ratings compared to situations where one is not able to focus. Thus, increasing the 
number ofvictims by introducing pictures ofdistractors concurrently with the target 
victim reduces sympathy ratings for that single target. Apparently, ifpeople cannot 
(visually) attend to a victim, their sympathetic response is reduced. It is not clear 
whether this effect is specific to visual attention, but evidence from Study 2 suggests that 
attending to more deliberative aspects (like calculations) takes attention away from 
affective aspects, and thereby reduces sympathy. 
Results for self-focused affect are also relatively consistent across the studies 
presented in this dissertation. Self-focused affect (as measured by anticipated regret and 
the extent to which people feel better about themselves when donating) was robust 
against most of the employed information processing manipulations. Unlike victim­
focused affect, anticipated regret and how much better participants felt after a donation 
was not dependent on the ability to deliberate, nor was it influenced by priming 
participants to evaluate the victims by calculation or by feeling. Furthermore, unlike 
victim-focused affect, some evidence emerged that self-focused feelings are responsive to 
the number ofvictims. Adding background statistics that link a single victim to a larger 
group had the effect ofmaking participants feel less good about themselves due to a 
donation in comparison with a condition without these background statistics. Self­
focused affect functions as a motivator for donations to ameliorate one's negative 
feelings resulting from the victims' predicament (Batson, 1990). Thus, if the impetus is 
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to change how one feels about oneselfthen donating to a smaller group, where the impact 
ofthe donation is larger, seems to be more attractive to participants. In essence, this 
sheds new light on the drop in the bucket effect (e.g., Friedrich et aI., 1999; 
Fetherstonhaugh et ai. 1997), since it highlights the self-centered motivation behind 
donating (or, as in the case when the victim-referent group is too large, not donating). 
Investigation ofother affect-related variables (apart from self- and other-focused 
affect) gave insight into how the mental representations of the victims were influenced by 
information processing mode. Reducing cognitive resources had the somewhat 
counterintuitive effect ofa more coherent mental representation ofand clearer feelings 
about the victims. This was true especially for victim groups, which were seen as more 
entitative (e.g., unitary and coherent) when deliberative information processing was 
limited. Apparently, less deliberation can lead to more extreme judgments on group 
coherence because deliberative capacity may be needed to notice and process the 
differences between individual members. The result is a clearer affective image ofthe 
group that "glosses over" differences ofthe individual victims. 
In addition to the effects ofinformation processing on perceptions ofvictim 
groups, the data in Study 3 suggest that participants with higher numeracy had a less clear 
feeling and less coherent picture ofa single target victim. This is further evidence that 
higher numeracy can lead to a more abstract representation ofthe victims, and result in 
lower affective responses towards one victim. However, the extent to which large masses 
ofvictims elicit differential affect from high vs.low numerate people needs to be 
addressed by future research. 
Effects ofInformation Processing Mode on the Relationship Between Affect and 
Donations. The extent to which information processing mode moderated the relationship 
between affect and donations was explored in Studies 1 - 4. Affect was divided into self­
vs. other-focused emotions, and the effects ofone type ofaffect on donations were 
always explored while controlling for the effects of the other type. 
Some evidence emerged from the data that participants decided to donate based 
on how they felt (or would feel) about themselves. To the extent that donation decisions 
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consist of a two-step process (e.g., Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968), participants first had to 
decide whether they want to donate money and in a second step determine the donation 
amount. Throughout the studies on donations (i.e., Studies 1 - 4), participants' self 
focused affect seemed to be important in determining whether they wanted to donate 
money or not. It appears as though the initial decision to donate is related more to 
feelings that target the self than other people. As feelings focused on the self are thought 
to be less effortful and are possibly more quickly accessible than other-focused feelings 
(e.g., Rossnagel, 2000), it is possible that people first consult how negative they would 
feel about themselves if they do not help the victims to decide whether a donation is 
warranted. 
An investigation of the actual donation amounts suggests that the relationship 
between other-focused affect and donations was moderated by processing mode. 
Specifically, in Study 1 participants' other-focused affect significantly predicted donation 
amounts when their deliberative processing resources were limited, but not when 
deliberation was possible (i.e., in the low load condition). The disruptive effect of 
deliberation on the relationship between other-focused affect and donations was 
supported by Study 2. Inducing participants to engage in mathematical calculations 
reduced the ability of sympathy and compassion to predict donations relative to an 
affective priming and control condition. It seems as though increasing deliberation not 
only negatively impacts overall victim-focused affect, it also reduces the extent to which 
victim-focused affect is related to donation decisions. Further evidence for the 
moderating effects ofinformation processing mode on the relationship between victim­
focused affect and donations comes from the studies that manipulated processing by 
varying the way victims were presented. Victim-focused affect predicted donations only 
when a single target victim was identified and presented alone (vs. part of a larger group). 
As the number of other victims presented before the target victim increased in number, 
sympathy for the victim was no longer predictive of donations for the target victim. The 
same effect occurred regardless of the presentation format ofthese other victims, as 
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increasing the number ofvictims by a large and abstract number (i.e., 20,000) had the 
same disruptive effect as showing pictures of several victims. 
In contrast to victim-focused affect, self-focused affect was overall robust in its 
predictability of donations. Neither the manipulation ofdeliberative capacity nor 
affective vs. calculation priming had an impact on the relationship between self-focused 
affect and donations. In all conditions that manipulated information processing directly, 
higher self-focused affect always predicted higher donations. Furthermore, varying the 
presentation mode ofa target victim showed that self-focused affect was predictive of 
donations regardless ofwhether the victim was identified or not. Somewhat mixed 
results were obtained for changing the number ofvictims. Whereas making a single 
victim part of a bigger group (i.e., 20,000) did not reduce the predictive power of self­
focused affect on donations in Study 3, Study 4 showed that anticipated regret was only 
predictive ofdonations when a single target victim was preceded by pictures ofa few 
other victims, but not when presented by itself. This points to the possibility that affect 
focused on the self can be a motivator to help victims in need when participants are 
sensitive to the victim context. If a donation is judged to have an impact on the victims, 
self-focused affect motivates people to help others because they would like to alleviate 
one's own bad feelings. However, if a donation is judged to bejust a drop in the bucket, 
then self-focused feelings are not particularly motivating as they will not reduce the 
negative emotions (like anticipated regret). This social-egoism explanation ofhelping 
(Batson 1990) was largely supported in the present studies. 
Towards a General Model ofDual Information Processing in Helping Behavior 
The presented results offer tentative support for the general model ofdual 
information processing proposed earlier (see Figure 1). A critical feature ofthis model is 
that affective reactions can be focused on the self and on others. These two types of 
affect are not independent ofeach other, but the underlying motivation for helping (i.e., 
altruistic vs. egoistic) is tied to what kind of affect-focus dominates in a given situation. 
For example, if affective reactions are focused on the self, then the likelihood ofhelping 
127 
(and the extent of that help) depends on whether one can actually improve one's negative 
affect by means ofaiding the victim. Thus, social-egoistic motivations ofhelping appear 
to be related to mood management strategies to regulate behavior (e.g., Batson, 1990). 
Affective reactions that are focused on the victim, on the other hand, seem to be 
governed by different mechanisms than self-focused affect. First, the generation ofother­
focused affect seems to be moderated by information processing mode. While affective 
(i.e., System 1) processing is conducive to higher sympathy for the victims, deliberative 
(System 2) processing can have deleterious effects. In Studies 1 and 2, deliberative 
processing (or the ability to deliberate) had negative consequences for sympathetic 
responses. Second, deliberative processing also disrupted the relationship between 
sympathy and donations. System 2 processing appears to not only reduce overall 
sympathy, but it can also reduces the motivational aspects ofsympathy and other feelings 
that are focused on the victim. Further support for other-focused affect being less 
important as a determinant for donations comes from Study 3, which showed that higher 
numeracy can lead to lower sympathy yet higher donations. This suggests that not all 
forms ofabstract processing necessarily reduce donations. In fact, in theory it should 
also be possible to increase sympathetic responses to victims ifone can use this 
deliberation to attend to features of the victim that give rise to higher-order affect on top 
of sympathy generated through System 1. The experiments in this dissertation did not 
collect data on what participants were deliberating about, so it is not possible to pinpoint 
exactly what kinds ofdeliberations reduce sympathy and other-focused affect. 
The mechanisms by which this disruption occurs need further investigation, but it 
is possible to speculate that deliberation focuses people on other aspects ofthe situation, 
possibly unrelated to the affective appeal ofvictims. For example, awareness ofthe 
bigger problem at hand, one's own moral obligations to other causes, and deservingness 
of the victims are examples of how increased deliberation can distract from the 
immediate affective response of sympathy and then lead to a decision to help based on 
other factors. 
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Implications 
An interesting question raised by the results and model presented here is whether 
self-focused vs. other-focused affect is more important in (i.e., predictive of) helping? 
Which motivation for helping (i.e., egoistic vs. altruistic) leads to more consistent and 
effective helping behavior? While more empirical research is needed to answer these 
questions fully, the results presented here suggest that the type ofmotivation depends on 
several factors: Ifpeople are primarily concerned with regulating their own emotional 
state, then situations where they perceive that they can make a difference (and thereby 
alleviate their own negative emotions) should be more conducive to helping. While a 
large group ofvictims does not free us from a moral obligation to provide help to anyone 
of them (Singer, 1972), self-focused affect motivates helping when the number ofvictims 
is small enough to be able to make a difference. 
Another important consideration in the investigation of underlying motivations 
for helping is whether help is provided on a continuous basis or just once. Humanitarian 
aid organizations give donors the option to make a one-time donation or to donate a 
certain amount each month. Ifhelping is motivated by the desire to alleviate one's own 
negative emotional reaction (such as anticipated regret), then it is more likely that a 
donation is only made once. 
On the other hand, if people are motivated by sympathy for the victim, then it 
would be best if they are not distracted from that sympathy. The extent to which people 
differ in their empathic disposition (Davis, 1994) is, naturally, also an important 
ingredient in this equation. However, it seems more important to identify the situations 
in which any type of affect is predictive of donations. While it probably does not make 
much difference to a victim exactly where the motivation for helping himlher comes 
from, humanitarian aid organizations, funding agencies, and philanthropists should be 
concerned about the determinants ofhelping and how they can be manipulated. The 
presented model in this dissertation is an attempt to address these determinants, and 
identify ways in which we can protect and nurture "the fragile flower ofcaring" (Batson, 
1990, p. 345). 
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Limitations 
Interpretation ofthe present data needs to take into account the possibility that 
with the chosen designs it is not entirely clear whether affective reactions to the victims 
precede donation decisions. In Studies 1 - 4, participants were first asked to make a 
decision about donating, and then asked to answer related affect questions (such as 
sympathy and anticipated regret). It is possible that affective responses were influenced 
by each participant's donation decision, such that those participants who donated more 
money felt like they needed to also respond with greater affect. However, this is unlikely 
for the following reason. All affect variables should have been showing a high 
correlation to donations in all conditions if affect was cued by donations, which was not 
the case. Moreover, a mediation analysis of the effect of affect on donations in Study 2 
suggested that only victim-focused affect (and not self-focused affect) was mediating the 
relationship between information processing and donations. 
Another possible limitation is that throughout the different studies self-focused 
affect was measured by either anticipated regret or predictions ofhow much better one 
would feel after donating. Both of these measures are arguably not "pure" affect 
variables. Even though theorists distinctly categorize anticipated regret as an emotion 
(e.g., Miller and Taylor, 2002; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), it has a cognitive component 
that sets it apart from many other emotions (including sympathy). Namely, it is a 
forecasted emotion and projects how one feels into future situations (e.g., through 
counterfactual thinking). However, this distinction is not a particular problem for the 
proposed model in this research, because anticipated emotions have anticipatory 
components to them that make them "felt" and influential at the time when decisions are 
made (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Moreover, anticipated regret and judgments ofhow 
much better one would feel about oneself are, as posited by the model, definitely focused 
on the self, whereas the same is not necessarily true for sympathy. 
Finally, several of the presented studies have compared one vs. several victims in 
an attempt to manipulate the number ofvictims. Research on group perceptions suggests 
that if a group gets large and complex enough it will no longer be viewed as a collection 
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of individuals but rather a more abstract group average (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Asch, 1952, 
1946). It is possible that participants did not see the victims as a group but rather an 
abstract average or prototype in the conditions where several victims were shown 
concurrently (Posner & Keele, 1968). This could explain the null effects ofvictim­
number manipulations on donations in Studies 1 and 2, as it would suggest that 
participants treated the group ofvictims similarly as a single victim. Support for this 
interpretation comes from Study 1, where groups were seen as more entitative than 
individual victims, albeit not significantly so. While the current study designs do not 
allow for a more thorough investigation ofthe possibility of abstracting groups of 
victims, other research has found that individuals can be seen as more entitative (e.g., 
Hamilton & Sherman) and receive higher donations (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a) and 
affective reactions (Vastfjall, in preparation) than groups ofvictims. 
Future Directions 
Apart from examining the effects ofvictim group size, future research needs to 
address whether extremely large groups ofvictims can be made more affectively salient. 
If the number ofvictims becomes large enough, victims become statistics (Slovic, 2007), 
and we are only at the beginning in understanding how affect and deliberation play into 
helping behavior. These future endeavors need to take the motivational source ofhelping 
into account, and expand the present research on self- vs. other-focused affect. 
Research on perspective-taking and self-other-overlap (e.g., Batson et aI., 2007; 
Davis et ai., 2004; VanBoven & Loewenstein, 2003) has begun to examine the 
antecedents ofempathic concern, and research on donations should make use ofsimilar 
methodologies to increase people's affective reaction and encourage donations towards 
victims. Ifperspective taking can increase empathic concern about victims in need, 
research should aim at identifYing the specific conditions when increasing self-other 
overlap motivates people to provide help. Ifperspective taking is a skill, then maybe it 
can be taught and increase empathic and sympathetic responses to charity requests. 
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Another interesting topic for future research concerns people's numeric ability. 
Results from Study 3 suggested that numeracy might be an important individual 
difference involved in the perceptions ofvictim entitativity and, more importantly, 
donations. This leads to two (theoretical and applied) considerations. From a theoretical 
perspective, if high numeracy does indeed lead to less concrete and more abstract 
processing, this difference in processing mode should be visible in other domains as well 
(e.g., financial decision making). From a practical viewpoint, it should be possible to 
tailor charity requests to peoples' numeric ability. People with low numerical skill are 
more likely to base their donation on immediate affective responses to the victims, 
whereas high numeric people might not. Future research also needs to address the 
possibility that a given person will donate more when feeling more of an affective 
response to the victims, but that across people those who rely on affect may give less. 
Future research also needs to address the possibility that an increase in 
deliberation might result in higher affective responses, donations, or both. While the 
studies in this dissertation have shown that deliberation can have a disruptive effect on 
the generation and use ofother-focused affect, it also transpired that visually attending to 
a victim yields higher sympathy than not attending. Thus, it might be possible to find 
types ofdeliberation (e.g., perspective taking) that focus people on the victims and 
increase sympathetic responses. 
Finally, it stands to reason that attention not only influences sympathy but also 
helping and possibly self-focused affect. The role ofvisual attention in the generation of 
feelings has only recently begun to draw researchers' interest, (e.g., Fenske & Raymond, 
2006), and has potentially far-reaching consequences for research on affect and decision 
making. In the specific context ofdonation decisions, attention may increase emotional 
reactions in some situations (e.g., by making emotional reactions more salient), but 
decrease emotions in situations where it is too difficult (or even harmful) to emphasize 
(Batson, 1990; Hodges & Biswas-Diener, 2007). One mechanism for "down-regulating" 
(i.e., reducing) empathic responses is compassion fatigue, defined as traumatic stress that 
results from witnessing the suffering of others (Figley, 2002). It is likely that exposure to 
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too much suffering induces mechanisms that decrease empathic responses and donations. 
More research is needed to identify why and when people engage in empathic regulation 
and how it affects helping. 
Conclusions 
Regardless ofwhether we witness the suffering ofmillions or just one individual, 
from a philosophical perspective the moral obligation to provide help to others in need 
does not rest on how the suffering is portrayed (Singer, 1972). However, from a 
psychological perspective things look differently. We seem to be more motivated to help 
when affectively involved, and when we care about ourselves and others. This 
explanation might sound matter-of-fact or unemotional, but from a practical standpoint 
one could say that any motivation to help is a good one. Still, what is concerning about 
social-altruism is that helping might depend on how much we can focus on our (hopefully 
existing) immediate affective reactions on the victims. Ifwe are either unable or 
disinclined to focus on those emotional reactions, helping may not occur. It would be 
nice ifwe could say that all we need to care about and help others is to "feel", but things 
do not seem to be that easy. For some, caring is the first step in actually providing help, 
but for others helping depends on factors unrelated to sympathy and compassion. The 
research in this dissertation was motivated by an attempt to contribute to our 
understanding ofwhen we use our feelings as effective guides in the decision to help 
others, and it showed that these feelings depend, at least in part, on how we process 
information. 
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APPENDIX A 
MATERIALS AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR STUDY 1 
Materials 
Low Load Condition: 
Below are some random alphabetical letters to memorize. Please take as much time as 
you would like to memorize these letters. At the end ofthis section, you will be asked to 
recall these letters as accurately as possible. After you memorize the letters below, you 
will be asked to make a series ofchoices. There are no right or wrong answers. We are 
interested in your opinion. Throughout these choices, try to rehearse the letters in your 
head. 
Letters to memorize: XD 
High Load Condition: 
Below are some random alphabetical letters to memorize. Please take as much time as 
you would like to memorize these letters. At the end ofthis section, you will be asked to 
recall these letters as accurately as possible. After you memorize the letters below, you 
will be asked to make a series of choices. There are no right or wrong answers. We are 
interested in your opinion. Throughout these choices, try to rehearse the letters in your 
head. 
Letters to memorize: DKZZVHTRKJ 
Donation and Affect Questions for Single Victims (sample): 
This is Emily, a two-year old child with a life threatening disease who is being treated 
through the American Cancer Society. 
1) Would you be willing to donate money to help save Emily? _ Yes _No
 
2) If you answered yes to the previous question, how much money would you donate?
 
Please type the value in the space below:
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3) 
Not at all Very much 
After reading Emily's story I felt worried, upset and 
sad. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt sympathy and compassion towards Emily. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much would donating money make you feel 
better? 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would feel regret not donating money. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much do you think your donation would help 
Emily? 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How clear a feeling do you have about Emily? 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To what extent do you have a clear and coherent 
picture ofEmily? 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5) Please enter the letters you memorized: 
Donation andAffect Questions for Group Victims: 
This is Emily, Jacob, Michael, Isabella, Hannah, Elizabeth, Joshua, and Daniel, a group 
oftwo-year old children with a life threatening disease who are being treated through the 
American Cancer Society. 
1) Would you be willing to donate money to help save these children? Yes No 
2) Ifyou answered yes to the previous question, how much money would you donate? 
Please type the value in the space below: 
3) 
Not at all Very much 
After reading these children's story I felt worried, 
upset and sad. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt sympathy and compassion towards these 
children. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much would donating money make you feel 
better? 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would feel regret not donating money. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much do you think your donation would help 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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these children?
 
How clear a feeling do you have about these
 2 3 4 5 6 7
children?
 
To what extent do you have a clear and coherent
 2 3 4 5 6 7picture ofthese children? 
5) Please enter the letters you memorized: 
Additional Results 
Analyses including all Participants (including those who did not recall their number): 
Table Ai: Means and Standard Deviations ofWTC and Affect Variables 
Standard 
N Mean Deviation 
WTC 193 137.96 767.44 
WTC' 193 2.61 1.88 
Worry 192 3.11 1.64 
Sympathy 192 4.20 1049 
Sympathl 192 19.82 10.64 
Feel better 192 2.73 1.54 
Anticipated Regret 192 2.56 1.92 
Donation help 192 2.32 1.64 
Clear a feeling 192 2.59 1.62 
Coherent a picture 190 2.57 1.63 
Table A2: Non-Corrected Correlations Between WTC and Affect Variables 
WTC Worry Sympathy Feelbetter Regret Donationhelp 
Clear 
Feeling 
WTC 
Worry .18* 
Sympathy .12 .66** 
Feel better .03 040** .34** 
Anticipated 
Regret -.01 046** .33** .50** 
Donation 
help .21 ** .35** .31 ** .52** .21 ** 
Clear 
feeling .20** .51 ** .37** .36** .26** 048** 
Coherent 
picture .20** 043** .38** .36** .30** .39* .70** 
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Table A3: Correlations Between WTC and Affect Variables 
WTC' Worry S hympat y Feelbetter Regret 
Donation 
help 
Clear 
Feeling 
WTC' 
Worry .42** 
Sympathl .31** .63** 
Feel better .40** .40** .29** 
Anticipated 
Regret .43** .46** .30** .50** 
Donation 
help .39** .35** .28** .52** .21** 
Clear 
feeling .37** .51 ** .42** .36** .26** .48** 
Coherent 
picture .28** .43** .39** .36** .30** .39* .70** 
Table A4: Component Loadings for Affect Variables 
Affect Affect Component Variables: 
Sympathy .771 
Worry .841 
Feel better .711 
Anticipated Regret .738 
Eigenvalue 2.4 
Percentage of Variance explained 57.8 
Table A5: Component Loadingsfor Affect Variables on Other- and Self-Focused Affect 
Affect Other-focused Self-focused 
Variables: Affect Affect 
Sympathy .917 .328 
Worry .843 .145 
Feel better .181 .850 
Anticipated Regret .241 .825 
Eigenvalue 1.6 1.5 
Percentage of Variance explained 41.1 38.3 
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Figure Ai: Other-focused Affect by Cognitive Load and Number ofVictims 
Other-focused affect is dependent on number ofvictims, such that groups of 
victims elicited higher affect (M = 7.71, SD = 2.60) than single victims (M = 6.87, SD = 
3.07), F(1 ,188) = 5.0,p < .05, ,,/= .03. Additionally, participants reported slightly more 
other-focused affect under higherload (M= 7.55, SD = 2.81), F(I,188) = 3.0,p < .09,,,/ 
= .02. The interaction was not significant. Similar analyses with self-focused affect and 
impact judgments showed no significant main effects or interaction. 
Table A6: Frequency Counts (and Percentages) ofRespondents who Contributed 
Low Cognitive Load High Cognitive Load Totals 
One victim 250f31 (81%) 47 of 60 (78%) 72 of91 (79%) 
Eight victims 34 of48 (71%) 430f54 (80%) 77 of 102 (75%) 
Totals 59 of79 (74%) 90 of 114 (79%) 149 of 193 (77%) 
138 
Table A 7: Logistic Regression Analyses by Cognitive Load Condition 
Overall Model Individual Predictors Exp(b) Wald p 
Other-Focused Affect 1.029 .05 .813
 
Low Cognitive Load
 Self-Focused Affect 1.587 9.34 .002l (3) = 31.3, P < .001
 
Donation Help 2.338 5.98 .011
 
Other-Focused Affect 1.125 1.36 .526
 
High Cognitive Load
 Self-Focused Affect 1.839 17.83 .001l (3) = 41.3,p < .001
 
Donation Help 1.030 .02 .882
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Figure A2: WTCfor Cognitive Load by Number ofVictims 
Participants donated slightly more to a group (M = 2,70, SD = 1.88) than single 
victims (M= 2.28, SD= 1.41), F(l,189) = 2.7,p = .1, 11/= .01. No other effects were 
significant. 
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Figure A3: PerceivedEntitativity for Cognitive Load by Number ofVictims 
Results indicate that in the high load condition judged the victims to be more 
entitative (M = 5,66, SD = 2.83) than single victims (M = 4.45, SD = 3.07), F(1 ,186) = 
7.2,p < .01, 11/ = .04. A simple effects analysis showed that in the high load condition 
groups ofvictims (M= 5.61, SD = 2.68) were seen as more entitative than groups in the 
low load condition (M = 4.37, SD = 2.92, t(98) = 2.2,p < .05. No other effects were 
significant. 
Table A8: Regression Analyses by Cognitive Load Condition 
Overall Model Individual Predictors fJ p 
Low Cognitive Load Affect focused on victims .24 2.0 .054 
F(2,75)=10.5, 
p<.OI, adjR2=.20 Affect focused on self .28 2.3 .027 
High Cognitive Load Affect focused on victims .23 2.7 .009 
F(2,111 )=26.1, 
p<.OI, adjR2=.31 Affect focused on self .43 4.9 .000 
Additional analyses that excluded the participants who did not recall their letter­
sequence correctly (i.e., N = 152). 
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Table A9: Correlations Between WTC and Affect Variables (untransformed variables) 
Feel Donation Clear 
WTC" Worry Sympathy better Regret help Feeling 
WTC 
Worry .19* 
Sympathy .10 .68** 
Feel better .03 .42** .38** 
Anticipated 
Regret 
.24** 
.48** .38** .50** 
Donation 
help .12 .38** .33** .49** .25** 
Clear 
feeling .17* .55** .35** .36** .25** .47** 
Coherent 
picture .17* .45** .35** .42** .35** .41 * .64** 
** p<.01 **p<.05 Variables in order: Willingness to contribute; Worry, upset, and sad; 
Sympathy and compassion; Feel better if donation is made; Regret if donation would not be 
made; How much a donation would help; How clear a feeling participants' had about the 
victim(s); How coherent a picture of the victim(s) participants had 
Table Al2: Regression Analyses ofVictim-Number Conditions 
Overall Model Individual Predictors p p 
One Victim Sympathy .18 1.5 .147 
F(2,68)=8.1, p<.O 1, Anticipated 
.32 2.6 .011
adjR2=.17 Regret 
Eight Victims Sympathy .27 2.7 .009 
F(2,77)=14.4, p<.00 1, Anticipated 
.39 3.9 .000
adjR2=.25 Regret 
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Table A13: Regression Analyses ofVictim Number by Cognitive Load Conditions 
Overall Model fudividual Predictors fJ p 
Low Load: 
One Victim Sympathy .24 1.2 .232 
F(2,26)=6A, 
p<.OI, adjR2=.28 
Anticipated 
Regret 040 2.1 .050 
Low Load: 
Eight Victims Sympathy .07 .4 .659 
F(2,38)=5.3, 
p<.OI, adjR2=.18 
Anticipated 
Regret .44 2.9 .006 
High Load: 
One Victim Sympathy .14 .9 .382 
F(2,39)=3.1, 
p<.06, adjR2=.09 
Anticipated 
Regret .29 1.8 .083 
High Load: 
Eight Victims Sympathy .45 3.3 .002 
F(2,36)=10.7, 
p<.OOI, adjR2=.34 
Anticipated 
Regret .35 2.6 .014 
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APPENDIXB 
MATERIALS AND ADDITiONAL RESULTS FOR STUDY 2 
Materials 
Introduction: 
Today you will be asked to make a series ofchoices. Please choose whatever you think 
is the best option in each one. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in 
your opinion. 
Calculation Prime Condition: 
Please answer the questions below. Type your answer in the space provided. You are not
 
allowed to use a calculator.
 
2) If an object travels at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet
 
will it travel in 360 minutes?
 
3) If a student needs 30 hours to read 40 articles, on average, how many hours did the
 
student need per article?
 
4) If a number is divided by 4 and then 3 is subtracted, the result is O. By your
 
calculation, what is the number?
 
5) If a plane flies at 35,000 feet and descends at a rate of 2500 feet per minute, how long
 
will it take to reach 20,000 feet?
 
6) Ifteam A scored twice as many points as team B, and team A scored 28 points, by
 
your calculation how many points did team B score?
 
7) There are x number of boys in the class. This is three more than four times the number
 
of girls. How many girls are in the class?
 
Affect Prime Condition: 
Please answer the questions below. Type your answer in the space provided.
 
2) When you hear the name "George Bush", what do you feel? Please use one word to
 
describe your predominant feeling.
 
3) When you hear the word "baby," what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
 
your predominant feeling.
 
4) When you hear the word "music", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
 
your predominant feeling.
 
5) When you hear the word "disease", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
 
your predominant feeling.
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6) When you hear the word "sunshine" what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
 
your predominant feeling.
 
7) When you hear the word "Hurricane Katrina" what do you feel? Please use one word
 
to describe your predominant feeling.
 
Donation andAffect Questions for Single Victims (sample): 
This is Emily, a two-year old child with a life threatening disease who is being treated 
through the American Cancer Society. 
•...;'f\..
 
1) Would you be willing to donate money to help save Emily? (circle one) 
Yes No 
2) If you answered yes to the previous question, how much money would you donate? 
Please write the value in the space below: 
3) 
Not at all Very much 
After reading Emily's story I felt worried, upset and 
sad. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt sympathy and compassion towards Emily. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel for Emily. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much would donating money make you feel 
better? 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Donation and Affect Questions for Group Victims: 
This is Emily, Jacob, Michael, Isabella, Hannah, Elizabeth, Joshua, and Daniel, a group 
oftwo-year old children with a life threatening disease who are being treated through the 
American Cancer Society. 
1) Would you be willing to donate money to help save these children? (circle one) 
Yes No 
2) Ifyou answered yes to the previous question, how much money would you donate? 
Please type the value in the space below: 
3) 
Not at all Very much 
After reading these children's story I felt worried, 
upset and sad. 
I felt sympathy and compassion towards these 
children. 
I feel for these children. 
How much would donating money make you feel 
better? 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Additional Results 
Table Bl: Frequency Distribution o[Calculation Answers 
Number of correct answers Frequency Percent 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2 
o 
9 
10 
37 
27 
2 
2.3 
o 
10.3 
11.5 
42.5 
31 
2.3 
Total 87 100 
Table B2: Correlations o/Correct Calculation Answers with Other Variables 
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Other-focused Self-focused 
Correct answers WTCa affect affect 
Correct answers 1 
WTCa 
-.07 
Other-focused 
affect -.05 .32** 
Self-focused 
.06 .48** .55**
affect 
** p<.OO 1; WTCa = log-transfonned variable 
Table B3: Frequency Distribution ofAffect Answers 
Number of 
Positive ­
Negative 
emotions Frequency Percent 
Greater frequency of -3 2 2.3 
negative emotions -2 7 8.0 
-1 13 14.9 
Neutral 0 44 50.6 
1 11 12.6 
2 6 6.9Greater frequency of 3 2 2.3positive emotions 4 1 1.1 
5 1 1.1 
Total 87 100 
Table B4: Correlations a/Correct Calculation Answers with Other Variables 
Number of 
Positive ­ Other­ Self­
Negative focused focused 
emotions affect affect 
Number ofPositive ­ 1Negative emotions 
WTca -.05 1 
Other-focused affect .01 .39** 1 
Self-focused affect -.07 .47** .40** 1 
** p<.OOl; WTCa = log-transformed variable 
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APPENDIXC
 
MATERIALS AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR STUDY 3
 
Materials 
Identified Victim: 
You have the opportunity to donate any ofyour just-earned money to the humanitarian 
aid organization Save the Children. Any money that you donate will go toward relieving 
the severe food crisis in Southern Africa. 
In particular, any money that you donate will go to Rokia, a 7-year old girl from Mali, 
Africa. 
Rokia, 7 years old 
Rokia is desperately poor, and faces a threat ofsevere hunger or even starvation. Her life 
will be changed for the better as a result ofyour financial gift. With your support, and 
the support ofother caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia's family 
and other members ofthe community to help feed her and provide her with education, as 
well as basic medical care and hygiene. 
Identified victim with Statistics: 
In particular, any money that you donate will go to Rokia, a 7-year old girl from Mali, 
Africa. 
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Rokia, 7 years old 
Rokia is one of about 20,000 needy children in the same region who are desperately poor, 
and face a threat of severe hunger or even starvation. Her life will be changed for the 
better as a result ofyour financial gift. With your support, and the support of other caring 
sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia's family and other members of the 
community to help feed her and provide her with education, as well as basic medical care 
and hygiene. 
Unidentified Victim: 
In particular, any money that you donate will go to a child from Mali, Africa. 
The child is desperately poor, and faces a threat of severe hunger or even starvation. His 
or her life will be changed for the better as a result ofyour financial gift. With your 
support, and the support ofother caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with the 
child's family and other members ofthe community to help feed the child and provide 
him or her with education, as well as basic medical care and hygiene. 
Unidentified Victim with Statistics: 
In particular, any money that you donate will go to a child from Mali, Africa. 
This child is one of about 20,000 needy children in the same region who are desperately 
poor, and face a threat ofsevere hunger or even starvation. His or her life will be 
changed for the better as a result ofyour financial gift. With your support, and the 
support ofother caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with the child's family and 
other members ofthe community to help feed the child and provide him or her with 
education, as well as basic medical care and hygiene. 
Donation and Affect Questions for Identified (Unidentified) Conditions: 
1. Would you be willing to donate money to help save Rokia (this child)? [Check one 
box.] 
DYes 
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2. If so, how much money would you be willing to donate? 
[Circle one amount, or write in an amount ofmore than $6.] 
$1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $----­
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about Rokia (this child). [Circle one number for each item.] 
Not at all Very much 
3. After reading Rokia's (this child) story, I felt 
worried, upset and sad. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I felt sympathy and compassion towards Rokia 
(this child). 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. How clear a feeling do you have about Rokia 
(this child)? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. How much would donating money make you feel 
better? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. How much would you regret not donating 
money? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. How much of an impact would your donation 
have on Rokia's (this child) life? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Imagine Rokia (this child) among the other 
children in need. To what extent do you have a clear 
and coherent picture ofRokia (this child)? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Numeracy Scale: 
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many
 
times do you think the die would come up as an even number?
 
Answer:

'---------­
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances ofwinning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What 
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? 
Answer: people 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance ofwinning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
Answer: % 
4.	 Which ofthe following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1 in 100 1 in 1000 1 in 10 
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5.	 Which ofthe following numbers represents the biggest risk ofgetting a disease? 
1% 10% 5% 
6. If Person A's risk ofgetting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B's risk is 
double that ofA's, what is B's risk? 
Answer: % in years 
7. IfPerson A's chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B's risk 
is double that ofA, what is B's risk? 
Answer: in years 
8. If the chance ofgetting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get 
the disease: 
A: Out oflOO? Answer:~~~~~~~people 
B: Out of 1000? Answer:	 people 
9. If the chance ofgetting a disease is 20 out ofl 00, this would be the same as having a 
__% chance of getting the disease. 
10. The chance ofgetting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how 
many of them are expected to get infected? 
Answer: people 
11. Which ofthe following numbers represents the biggest risk ofgetting a disease? 
1 chance in 12 1 chance in 37 
12. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a 
mammogram. Of 100 women like her, 10 ofthem actually have a malignant tumor and 
90 ofthem do not. Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the mammogram 
indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 1 ofthem 
does not have a tumor. Of the 90 women who do not have a tumor, the mammogram 
indicates correctly that 81 ofthem do not have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 9 of 
them do have a tumor. The table below summarizes all ofthis information. Imagine that 
your friend tests positive (as if she had a tumor), what is the likelihood that she actually 
has a tumor? 
Tested Tested Totals
 
positive negative
 
Actually has a tumor 9 I 10
 
Does not have a tumor 9 81 90
 
Totals 18 82 100
 
Answer: out of
 ~-- ~---
13. Imagine that you are taking a class and your chances ofbeing asked a question in 
class are 1% during the first week ofclass and double each week thereafter (i.e., you 
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would have a 2% chance in Week 2, a 4% chance in Week 3, an 8% chance in Week 
4). What is the probability that you will be asked a question in class during Week 7? 
~swer: % 
14. Suppose that 1 out ofevery 10,000 doctors in a certain region is infected with the 
SARS virus; in the same region, 20 out ofevery 100 people in a particular at-risk 
population also are infected with the virus. A test for the virus gives a positive result 
in 99% ofthose who are infected and in 1% of those who are not infected. A 
randomly selected doctor and a randomly selected person in the at-risk population in 
this region both test positive for the disease. Who is more likely to actually have the 
disease? 
_ They both tested positive for SARS and therefore are equally likely to have the 
disease 
_ They both tested positive for SARS, and the doctor is more likely to have the 
disease 
_ They both tested positive for SARS and the person in the at-risk population is 
more likely to have the disease. 
Table C2: Correlations for Identified Single Victim Condition 
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Table C4: Correlations/or Unidentified Single Victim Condition 
WTC 
WTC Worry Sympathy 
Clear 
Feeling 
Feel 
better Regret Impact 
Coherent 
Picture 
Worry -.04 
Sympathy 
Clear 
Feeling 
Feel better 
-.01 
-.09 
.15 
.60** 
.53** 
.36* 
.62** 
.17 .27 
Regret .30* .35* .28 .27 .54** 
Impact .22 .39* .30* 
Coherent 
.12 .52** .38*Picture 
* = sig. at p<.05 ** = sig. at p<.OI 
.35* 
.78** 
.54** 
.39* 
040* 
.39* .51** 
Table C5: Correlations (or Unidentified Victim with Statistics Condition 
Clear Feel 
WTC Worry Sympathy Feeling better Regret 
WTC 
Impact 
Coherent 
Picture 
Worry .00 
Sympathy 
Clear 
Feeling 
Feel better 
.06 
.27 
.35* 
.71 ** 
.57** 
.31 * 
.70** 
.31 * .39* 
Regret 043** .26 .32* Al ** .58** 
Impact .21 .35* 040** 
Coherent 
.26 .30* .31 * Picture 
* = sig. at p<.05 ** = sig. at p<.O 1 
.50** 
.63** 
.55** 
.53** 
.18 
.20 .59** 
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Table C6: Means and Standard Deviations by Single Victim vs. Victim with Statistics 
Victim without Victim with 
statistics statistics 
Means (SD) Means (SD) 
Numeracy" 23103 (11971) 23738 (13387) 
WTC" .99 (.87) .91 (.81) 
Worry 4.0 (1.6) 4.0 (1.7) 
Sympathy" 27.5 (13.8) 29.4 (15.2) 
Clear Feeling 3.5 (1.7) 3.5 (1.6) 
Feel better 3.5 (1.8) 2.9 (1.7) 
Anticipated Regret 3.9 (2.0) 3.5 (2.2) 
Impact" 1.3 (.41) 1.2 (.38) 
Coherent Picture" 1.7 (.53) 1.6 (.48) 
"Non-linearly transformed variable; N = 82 in each condition 
Table C7: Correlations ofNumeracy for Single Victim vs. Victim with Statistics 
Victim without Victim with 
statistics statistics 
WTCa .18 .20 
Worry -.10 -.17 
Sympathya 
-.16 -.17 
Clear Feeling -.15 -.14 
Feel better .01 .12 
Anticipated Regret .03 .06 
Impacta -.17 -.10 
Coherent Picturea -.18 -.09 
* = sig. at p<.06 ** = sig. at p<.OI; "Non-linearly transformed variable 
Additional Effects ofNumeracy: 
Univariate ANOVAs with identifiability (identified vs. unidentified victim) and 
numeracy (high vs. low) as between-subject factors and affect variables as dependent 
variables revealed the following results: 
Clear Feeling. Results show a significant main effect for identifiability, such that 
participants who saw the identified victim (M = 3.7, SD = 1.6) reported clearer feelings 
than those who did not (M= 3.2, SD = 1.7), F(1,163) = 4.2,p< .05, lJp=.03. Additionally, 
high numerate subjects (M= 3.8, SD = 1.6) reported less clear feelings toward the victim 
than low numerates (M= 3.2, SD = 1.6), F(1,163) = 5.9,p< .05, lJp=.04. The interaction 
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between numeracy and identifiability was marginally significant, F(l, 163) = 2.8, p< .1, 
I1p=.02. As can bee seen in Figure Cl, identified victims evoked clearer feelings for low 
numerates, whereas this difference disappeared when the victim was unidentified. 
5 IMiI Low Numeracy l§:j High Numeracy 
.S '" 4 
Q)
 
<l) 3
 
~ 
1a 
<l) 
[) 2 
0+--­
Unidentified Identified
 
Figure Cl: Clear Feeling by ldentifiability andNumeracy 
Sympathy. Results reveal a significant main effect for numeracy, such that high 
numerates (M= 27.7, SD = 14) reported lower sympathy than low numerates (M= 30.9, 
SD = 14.5), F(l,163) = 4.5,p< .05, I1p=.03. No other effects were significant. 
Worry. Results indicate a marginally significant main effect for numeracy, such 
that high numerates (M = 3.8, SD = 1.7) reported lower sympathy than low numerates (M 
= 4.2, SD = 1.6), F(l,162) = 3.0,p< .1, I1p=.02. Additionally, a marginal interaction 
suggests that only in the identified condition were high numerates (M = 3.6, SD = 1.8) 
less worried about the victim than low numerates (M = 4.5, SD = 1.4), F(l,162) = 2.8,p< 
.1, I1p=.02. Conversely, high and low numerates did not differ in how much they worried 
when the victim was unidentified (M = 3.9 for both high and low numerates). 
Regret and Feel Better. No significant main effects or interactions emerged from 
the ANOVAs with either regret or feeling better as dependent variables. 
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Relationship Between Numeracy, WTC, and Sympathy 
While numeracy is positively correlated to WTC (r = .19, p < .05), it is negatively 
correlated with sympathy (r = -.16,p < .06). These relationships are more pronounced in 
the identified conditions (r = .25,p <.05 and r = -.2l,p <.07 for WTC and sympathy, 
respectively), than for the unidentified conditions (r = .13, p >.2, and r = -.1, p >.4 for 
WTC and sympathy, respectively). 
Effect ofNumeracy on WTC and Sympathy. An analysis of the differential 
relationship between numeracy with WTC and sympathy that retains the continuous 
scaling ofnumeracy supports the notion that as numeracy increased, sympathy decreased 
and WTC increased. This becomes even more evident when inspecting only participants 
in the identified condition (Figures C2, C3, and C4). 
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APPENDIXD 
MATERIALS AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR STUDY 4 
Material 
Condition 1 (Single target, no additional victims): 
In Mali, Africa, severe rainfall deficits have resulted in a sharp drop in maize production 
for 2006. The resulting food shortage has especially impacted the quality oflife for the 
children in Mali, who are facing the possibility of starvation. To alleviate the food 
shortage, the organization "Children in Africa" is pairing individual sponsors with 
specific children in need of help. hnagine that you have the possibility to contribute a 
donation to one ofthese children. 
This is Moussa, a 5-year old boy from Mali. Any money that you donate will go directly 
to the effort to help feed Moussa. 
, ..
~, . 7 .•· •.. ··&

Conditions 2, 3, and 4: (three additional victims, seven additional victims, and seven 
targets) 
In Mali, Africa, severe rainfall deficits have resulted in a sharp drop in maize production 
for 2006. The resulting food shortage has especially impacted the quality oflife for the 
children in Mali, who are facing the possibility of starvation. To alleviate the food 
shortage, the organization "Children in Africa" is pairing individual sponsors with 
specific children in need of help. hnagine that you have the possibility to contribute a 
donation to one ofthese children. 
You will now see some children that are in need of contributions and you may be able to 
contribute to one of them. 
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Additional pictures used in Study 4: 
Donation and Affect Questions: 
(1) Would you be willing to donate money to help Moussa? 
Yes No 
(2) If you answered yes to the previous question, how much money would you 
contribute? 
The amount I'd be willing to contribute is $ _ 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel. 
Not at Very 
all much 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(3) How much emotion did you feel while you were reading the story about Moussa? 
(4) After reading the story about Moussa, I felt worried, upset and sad. 
(5) I felt sympathy and compassion towards Moussa. 
(6) I feel close to Moussa. 
(7) How much would donating money make you feel better? 
(8) To what extent do you feel the story about this child is relevant to you? 
(9) How much do you think your donation would help Moussa? 
Additional Results 
Effect ofFrequency Conditions on Individual Variables: 
To test the effect of the frequency manipulation on individual variables, separate 
ANOVAs were conducted. No significant differences emerged due to frequency 
condition (all Fs <1) for all variables with the only exception for this being how relevant 
the target victim's story was to the participants, F(3,127) = 2.88,p<.05, '7=.06. While no 
pair-wise comparison was significantly different, inspection ofthe means suggest that 
personal relevance decreases as the frequency ofvictims increases (see Figure Dl). To 
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test this, polynomial contrasts analysis were run and found a significant linear trend, 
F(1,127) = 4.4,p<.05, 1}p =.04. This suggests that as the number of sequentially 
presented victims is increasing, participants might feel that the victim's story had less 
personal relevance. Research has proposed that personal relevance is a key ingredient in 
the decision to help others (Loewenstein & Small, 2007), and the present result 
corroborates and extends this line or reasoning by suggesting that relevance is a function 
ofnumber ofvictims. 
3 
o 
Single 
Target 
Target + 3 Target + 7 
Distractors Distractors 
Target + 7 
Targets 
Figure Dl: Personal Relevance ofthe Target Victim's Story 
Correlations Between WTC andAffect by Condition 
Table Dl: Correlations Between WTC and Affective Responses by Condition 
No additional 
victims + Target 
(N=27) 
3 additional 7 additional 
victillli + victims + 
Target Target 
(N=30) (N=3l) 
Seven 
Targets + 
Target 
(N=44) 
Emotion 
intensity .58** .59** .39* .13 
Worry .61 ** .65** .15 .27 
Sympathy 
Feel better 
.53** 
.28 
.59** 
.72** 
.22 
.27 
.29* 
.31 * 
Donation help .43* .64** .15 .37* 
Closeness .35 .28 .58** .16 
Relevance .62** .33 .41 * -.13 
* sig at p<.05; ** sig at p<.Ol 
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As is evident from Table Dl, differential correlational patterns are visible for the 
different conditions. Whereas emotions such as distress and sympathy are highly 
correlated with WTC in the single picture and four different pictures conditions, these 
correlates are much lower when participants saw eight pictures. It is also ofnote that 
personal relevance is highly correlated to WTC in the single pictures condition, but only 
moderately so in the other conditions. This result is even more evident when combining 
worry about and sympathy for the victim, as well as feeling better due to a donation and 
how much a donation would help into two variables (see Table D2). Feelings seem to be 
less correlated with WTC in situations where different victims are displayed in greater 
frequency. 
Table D2: Correlations Between WTC and Combined Responses by Condition 
No additional 3 additional 7 additional Seven 
victims + victims + victims + Targets + 
Target Target Target Target 
(N=27) (N=30) (N=3l) (N=44) 
Worry and 
.63** .69** .21 .28*Sympathy
 
Feel better
 
.39* .74** .26 .42**
andHe1p 
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Regression with Theoretically Informed Combination ofIndividual Difference Variables. 
Table D3: Regression Analyses o/Donations by Priming Conditions 
Overall Model Predictors fJ p 
Single Target Sympathy + Worry .49 2.3 .029 
F(3,23) = 5.9, Feel better + Help -.02 -.1 .915 
p<.Ol, adjR2=.36 Relevance + Closeness .25 1.2 .232 
Three additional Sympathy + Worry .35 2.0 .055 
victims + Target Feel better + Help .56 3.0 .007 
F(3,25) = 13.4, Relevance + Closeness -.12 -.8 .460p<.OOl, adjR2=,57 
Seven additional Sympathy + Worry -.03 -.2 .862 
victims + Target Feel better + Help -.09 -.4 .675 
F(3,27) = 3.8, Relevance + Closeness .61 2.9 .007p<.05, adjR2=.22 
Eight Targets Sympathy + Worry .29 1.5 .128 
F(3,39) = 6.7, Feel better + Help .44 2.5 .015 
p<.Ol, adjR2=.25 Relevance + Closeness -.26 -1.68 .102 
The results from Table D3 show that the combination of sympathy and worry 
predict WTC best in the single victim condition, and this emotion towards the victim 
becomes less important in participants' determination ofWTC as the total number of 
victims increases. Affect focused on the self: measured by how much better participants 
feel due to their donation and how much they think it will help the victim is only 
independently predictive ofWTC when the target victim was preceded by a small 
number of additional victims. When the total number ofvictims shown increases, 
participants' perception ofhow relevant the victim's story is to them and how close they 
feel towards the victim becomes more important in the prediction ofWTC. Higher 
personal relevance and closeness to the victim is predicting higher WTC. The pattern of 
results for participants who saw the target victim several times before they could make a 
donation suggests that self-focused affect is individually predictive when sympathy and 
personal relevance are controlled for. This suggests that being exposed to the target 
victim several times before making a donation entices participants to use self-focused 
feelings as a determinant for donation amount. 
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